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ABSTRACT 
Dominant Designs, New Firm Survival and Competitive Dynamics in Nascent Market 
Categories  
Tianxu Chen 
V.K. Narayanan Supervisor, Ph.D. 
  
Technological change represents a key driver to shape new market categories and 
organizations. Characterized by a process of social technological variation, selection and 
retention, the growth of a nascent market category manifests changing competitive 
dynamics and the success (or failure) of entrepreneurial organizations, particularly in the 
face of dominant designs — technologies that achieve absolute dominance in specific 
market categories. In spite of accumulated research on dominant designs in diverse 
perspectives (e.g., economics, marketing and strategic management), the understanding 
of this dynamic process is yet incomplete. Building upon the punctuated equilibrium 
model of technological change, I address several research questions in regard to the 
interface between technological evolution, dominant designs, competitive dynamics, and 
institutional entrepreneurship. I conduct three separate yet interconnected studies in 
search of conceptual links among these areas of research.  
The first essay organizes the diverse but fragmented management literature on 
dominant designs based on the meta-theoretical scheme developed by Astley and Van de 
Ven (1983).  The essay systematically reviews and assesses the “central perspective(s)” 
of over 89 relevant papers in influential journals in management, marketing and 
management related disciplines. Cumulative research streams on this topic have stayed 
within a single central perspective, the development of research across the four central 
perspectives has been uneven, and works incorporating multiple central perspectives have 
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been limited in number. The essay argues for complex models that take into account the 
two boundary conditions — technological complexity and institutional environment — 
which have been implicit in the extant literature. The essay calls for more theoretically 
grounded works in collective action and strategic choice views, but the major opportunity 
lies in integrative works that will take this research one step closer to a comprehensive 
view of dominant designs.  
In the second essay, I posit a conceptual link between the punctuated equilibrium 
model of technology change and dynamics of entrepreneurship. I develop hypotheses 
addressing the relationships between competitive environment (including competitors), 
firm strategy (resources) and survival of entrepreneurial firms seeking the establishment 
of dominant designs. This effort to investigate the edge between technological change 
and entrepreneurship improves our understanding of the opportunities and threats facing 
new organizations in the technological field, as well as the strategies that innovative new 
ventures may deploy to enhance survival chance in turbulent industries.    
The third essay adds insights to the sustained work on the process models of 
dominant designs by empirically examining the association between technological 
evolution and competitive dynamics to define dominant designs. This essay discusses 
how the frequency and complexity of firms’ competitive actions surrounding dominant 
designs co-evolve along the life cycle of technological discontinuities. I examine the 
influence of three factors: the stage of the technological regime, the density in the market 
category, and the emergence of dominant designs in the market category. I found these 
factors strongly influence on firms’ competitive actions both directly and through 
interactions with related factors.     
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Strategic management research has observed a growing interest in competitive 
dynamics associated with technological change and the emergence of dominant designs 
or de facto standards (Clymer & Asaba, 2008; Gallagher, 2007; Schilling, 2002; Soh, 
2009; Srinivasan, Lilien, & Rangaswamy, 2006; Suarez, 2004). Representing a major 
technical advance that offers sharp improvements over existing technologies (Dosi, 1982; 
McGrath, Macmillan, & Tushman, 1992; Sahal, 1981; Shapiro & Varian, 1999b; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986), a technological discontinuity introduces an “era of 
ferment” in which technological variants compete and compromise to define a dominant 
design – a single technology that accomplishes dominance in a product class (Abernathy 
& Utterback, 1978; Anderson, Jack, & Dodd, 2005; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Benner 
& Tushman, 2003; Soh, 2009). Since a dominant design serves as a technological base, or 
a platform, that allows other technologies to be developed (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; 
Gandal, 1994; Jones, 2003; Schilling, 2000), firms controlling dominant designs are de 
facto technological leaders who decide the “rules of engagement” of relevant socio-
technological spaces (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002). In spite of cumulative 
research on dominant designs in diverse perspectives (e.g., economics, marketing and 
strategic management), the understanding of this dynamic process is yet incomplete. In 
this dissertation, I address several research questions in regard to the interface between 
technological evolution, dominant designs, competitive dynamics, and institutional 
entrepreneurship. I conduct three separate yet interconnected studies in search of 
conceptual links among these areas of research.  
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Essay One: Research on Technology Standards 
The first essay organizes the diverse but fragmented management literature on 
dominant designs based on the meta-theoretical scheme developed by Astley and Van de 
Ven (1983).  The essay systematically reviews and assesses the “central perspective(s)” 
of over 89 relevant papers in influential journals in management, marketing, and 
management related disciplines. An integrative review of existing literature will facilitate 
conversations among research streams. The review will bridge works under different 
labels clarifying connections among them, organize the literature within a relevant 
framework summarizing the linkages and differences among levels of analysis, identify 
significant gaps in knowledge and distill opportunities for integration. Such a review will 
also allow standards scholars of different theoretical stances to reconcile contrasting 
theories and bring together dialectical interpretations of various facets of the phenomenon 
(Astley & Van de Ven, 1983).  
To achieve theoretical integration, I utilize Astley and Van de Ven’s (Astley & 
Van de Ven, 1983) influential framework for organizing management theories to 
distinguish various strands of work in this domain. Astley and Van de Ven’s framework 
is uniquely suited for this purpose because their scheme accommodates a) macro and 
micro levels of analysis, b) environmental selection, firm adaptation and strategic choice, 
and c) individual and collective actions of firms – all of which are not only relevant to the 
phenomenon of standards but have been the factors along which the literature has 
developed leading to the current state of fragmentation. 
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Essay Two: Dominant Designs and New Firm Survival 
In the second essay, I posit a conceptual link between technology change and 
survival of new firms seeking institutional entrepreneurship in turbulent technological 
environments. Research has shown that every firm faces challenges as a new venture at 
one point and its success in the early corporate lineage depends substantially on its ability 
to develop the fit between its strategy and the industry in which it competes (Fan, 2010; 
Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010). In the attempt at understanding these dynamics, 
scholars incorporated various academic perspectives to theorize the linkages between 
new firms’ competitive environment, strategy and performance (Fan, 2010; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1988; Romanelli, 1989). One research stream has particularly focused on the 
success of new firms in the course of technological evolution (Kim & Kogut, 1996; 
Zahra, 1996; Zahra & Bogner, 2000). Scholars suggested that firm performance in the 
technology industry is a function of the firm’s response to technology change, 
particularly, in the process in which the dominance of a single technology or design is 
established in a product class (Christensen, Suarez, & Utterback, 1998; Mitchell, 1991; 
Soh, 2010; Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Tegarden, Hatfield, & Echols, 1999; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986).  
Such a dominant technology, or a de facto standard, represents the industry-wide 
agreed-upon technical logic for product design and interconnectivity (Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Soh, 2010). While the emergence of a de 
facto standard rests in the form of technical design, the impact of such an event is not 
merely a technological issue. Researchers have pointed out that the establishment of a de 
facto standard defines key facets of emerging social-economic institutions, whereby the 
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winning design dictates ‘rules of engagement’ and collective benefits of various 
economic agents (Garud et al., 2002; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993; Hargadon & 
Douglas, 2001). In effect, once a de facto standard begins to emerge, it not only gains 
mass adoption in the technological community  based on its design, but also tends to lock 
out all other technological communities pursuing alternative designs, leading to a 
situation known as winner-take-all (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Arthur, 1989; Schilling, 
2002; Suarez, 2004). However, due to technological variation and competition, the 
emergence of a de facto standard is a highly uncertain process (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Christensen et al., 1998; Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Tegarden et al., 1999). 
Accordingly, the firm’s involvement in standard-based competition represents both an 
important opportunity to establish its core competence and destroy that of competitors, 
and a substantial risk of being technologically locked out if the design the firm sponsors 
turns out not able to accomplish technological dominance (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Schilling, 2002).  
To date, the focal point of empirical studies on firms’ engagement in standard-
based competition has been on firms’ adaptation in the face of de facto standards (e.g. 
Christensen et al., 1998; Suarez & Utterback, 1995). But firms’ strategy in this 
competition is not merely a matter of adaptation. Several researchers suggested that firms 
with technical capabilities to create original designs are often strongly committed to 
establishing de facto standards (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Garud et al., 2002; Khazam 
& Mowery, 1994; Suarez, 2004; Wade, 1996; Waguespack & Fleming, 2009). In the 
innovation literature, these firms are referred to alternatively under such labels as 
‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Garud et al., 2002; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Maguire, 
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Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004) or ‘platform leaders’ (Adner & Kapoor, 2009; Cusumano & 
Gawer, 2002).  
Creating de facto standards is a particularly meaningful strategy for new ventures 
whose success depends on the ability to launch ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 
1934a, 1950) — by initiating technology change and thus new standards,  new firms can 
not only destroy the competence of established competitors but also become a new 
generation of de facto industrial leaders (e.g., Microsoft and Adobe Systems). Yet this 
standard-based entrepreneurship is a risky business (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001). In 
particular, cases such as Lotus Development and Netscape indicate that even for firms 
who have accomplished technological dominance at one point of time, the risk factors 
from the technological field or poorly designed competitive strategy may completely 
dethrone their leadership, forcing these once glorious organizations to exit from the 
market. These observations lead to the research question: How will technological 
evolution and firm strategy influence the likelihood to exit of de novo ventures that 
compete by creating original designs? In the effort to provide an answer to this 
unaddressed issue, I draw from various theories and develop five hypotheses to 
conceptualize the links between the competitive environment, competitive actions and the 
likelihood to exit of design-based entrepreneurial ventures. I find strong empirical 
support for the theoretical framework based on panel data of 188 design-based 
entrepreneurial ventures in the period from 1980 through 2006.   
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Essay Three: Technological Change, Dominant Designs and Competitive 
Dynamics 
The third essay adds insights to the sustained work on the process models of 
dominant designs by empirically examining the association between technological 
evolution and competitive dynamics to define dominant designs. This essay discusses 
how the frequency and complexity of firms’ competitive actions surrounding dominant 
designs co-evolve along the life cycle of technological discontinuities. Indeed, the impact 
of technological change on industry and organizations has attracted substantial attention 
among theorists of innovation and strategy. A fruitful research stream has conceptualized 
technological change as an evolutionary process of technological variation, selection and 
retention (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Technological discontinuities introduce variation 
into otherwise stable technological fields by creating new technological trajectories and 
markets,  followed by a selection process in which social, political and economic forces 
as well as entrepreneurship initiate competitive dynamics to determine a standard or a 
dominant design among various technological variants in the nascent market category 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Garud, Gehman, & Karnoe, 2010; Hargadon & Douglas, 
2001; Navis & Glynn, 2010: 441). While some researchers have idealized the outcome of 
this selection as a winner-take-all solution whereby the entire market will conform to the 
agreed-upon product configuration defined by the dominant design (Schilling, 1998), 
more researchers have recognized that the increased popularity of complex technological 
systems  has added considerable complexity to the competitive dynamics surrounding 
dominant designs (Garud et al., 2002; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993; Teece, 2007) —  in 
fact, even after a dominant design has emerged, competitors often follow closely behind 
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to threaten the market leadership,  as reflected in the continued battles between Microsoft 
versus Apple in operating systems, Intel versus AMD in microprocessors, and Google 
versus Yahoo in search engines.   
Process models of dominant designs have suggested varied technological stages in 
the lifecycle of a discontinuous innovation. Anderson and Tushman (1990) divided the 
process of technological change into eras of ferment versus retention, suggesting 
systematic differences between them. Suarez  (Suarez, 2004) conceptualized five major 
phases of a dominance battle — marked by a milestone (e.g., introduction of a product 
prototype or the emergence of a dominant design), "each phase is characterized by 
different dynamics that in turn make  some of the factors associated with dominance 
more relevant than others." At the micro-level, firms undertake competitive actions to 
address various uncertainty and competitive threats caused by industrial dynamism and 
competitors in each market stage and seek temporary advantages over rivals by "strategic 
surprise, speed, and simultaneous and sequential thrusts" (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Rindova, 
Ferrier, & Wiltbank, 2010: 1475). However, the problem with the conceptions of the 
process models of dominant designs is that they do not clearly reveal the co-evolvement 
of competitive dynamics with technological innovation, which calls for more research on 
how competition unfolds along the life cycle of dominant designs.    
I believe the sustained work on competitive dynamics provides a useful lens to 
observe the competitive process associated with dominant designs. Rooted in the 
Austrian view of the market as a disequilibrium system, the competitive dynamics 
research argues that competitive advantage is temporary and dynamic, embedded in the 
streams of competitive actions that firms undertake to disrupt the market positions of 
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competitors (Jacobson, 1992; Rindova et al., 2010; Schumpeter, 1934b, 1950). Because 
of the rapid changes in technological field, firms competing to define dominant designs 
must remain unconfined from traditional practices and to be receptive to new actions in 
the response to industrial dynamism and competitors' actions to succeed in new 
competitive landscapes in distinct technological stages (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Chen, Lin, & 
Michel, 2010). As a result, the competitive dynamics will demonstrate different patterns 
as technology evolves along the life cycle.  
To observe the overall characteristics of firms’ competitive behavior, competitive 
dynamics research has underscored three attributes of competitive actions to define the 
aggressiveness of rivaling firms: frequency (i.e., number of actions undertaken), 
magnitude ( i.e., resources committed to each action), and complexity ( i.e., the different 
types of actions taken) (Ferrier, 2001; Rindova, Becerra, & Contardo, 2004; Yu, 
Subramaniam, & Cannella, 2009). In this paper, I discuss how the frequency and 
complexity of firms’ competitive actions to ferment dominant designs co-evolve along 
the life cycle of technological discontinuities. I examine the influence of three factors: the 
maturity of the technological market, the density in the market category, and the 
emergence of dominant designs in the market category.  
I tested the hypotheses using a sample of 145 market categories (with total 358 
technological designs) sponsored by 253 organizations. I found that technological leaders 
sponsoring alternative designs compete more fiercely in the post-dominant design phase, 
in terms of both frequency and complexity of competitive action. The longitudinal 
observation suggests that the maturity of a technology-based market category — captured 
by the age of the market category — has strong implication on the pattern of competitive 
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dynamics in a market category. Specifically, this research suggests that the frequency of 
action between technologies pursuing dominant designs follows an S-curve (first increase 
and then decrease) along the linage of a nascent market category; however, competitive 
complexity linearly increases over time as the market turns mature. I also found a strong 
association between patterns of competitive dynamics and density — i.e., the total 
number of competing technological leaders. I found density in general increases the 
frequency of action, but this association becomes weaker after the emergence of a 
dominant design. In contrast, I found a curvilinear ( inverted-U shaped) relationship 
between density and action complexity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH ON TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS 
ACCOMPLISHMENT AND CHALLENGES 
Technology standards are a characteristic of many industries, and the fate of firms 
may depend largely upon the outcome of the standard-based competition. The well 
documented competitive battles between Betamax and VHS (Cusumano, Mylonadis, & 
Rosenbloom, 1992) and Microsoft and Apple (Eisenmann, Parker, & Alstyne, 2006; 
Windrum, 2004) – to name a few —are illustrative of the phenomenon in their respective 
industries. In the management literature, scholars from different disciplines (e.g., 
industrial organization (IO) economics, strategic management, management of 
information science, and marketing) have examined technology standards, as well as the 
dynamics of standard-based competition, pursuing research streams employing concepts 
such as “standards” (e.g. Besen & Farrell, 1994; Cusumano et al., 1992; Farrell & 
Saloner, 1985), “dominant designs” (e.g. Srinivasan et al., 2006; Suarez, 2004; Tushman 
& Anderson, 1986) ,“platforms” (e.g. Economides & Katsamakas, 2006; Gandal, 1994; 
Kim & Kogut, 1996; Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Teece, 2007), “dominance battles” (e.g., 
Suarez, 2004), “technology races” (e.g., Lerner, 1997) or “systems competitions” (e.g., 
Hagedoorn, Carayannis, & Alexander, 2001; Katz & Shapiro, 1994).  
The phenomenon captured by the concept of technology standards is indeed 
complex, as the evolution of standards involves both macro (environmental) and micro 
(firm) level forces, and standards both drive and are driven by the actions of firms and/or 
industry associations (Hemphill, 2009; Suarez, 2004). The complexity is reflected in the 
significant volume of work that has developed around standards in recent decades, where 
scholars pursued this broad phenomenon from their own necessarily narrow disciplinary 
perspectives. Thus the richness of the literature came at the cost of fragmentation caused 
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by the inconsistent use of terms, and limited communication among scholars operating at 
different levels of analysis or treating standards as exogenous or endogenous variables. 
Further, there have been limited attempts at reviews and integration (Gallagher, 2007; 
Murmann & Frenken, 2006; Suarez, 2004). In one review, Murmann and Frenken 
(Murmann & Frenken, 2006)  confined themselves to 24 studies of dominant designs, 
prompted by their interest in technology policy. In another, Suarez (Suarez, 2004) 
provided an integrative framework for managerial actions, an objective that precluded a 
focus on macro level issues such as industry evolution. The absence of integrative 
reviews has perhaps contributed to a paucity of conversations across research streams. 
The resulting fragmentation of literature may also have obscured the strategic importance 
of standards and in particular, the standard-based competition in management disciplines, 
judged partly by its marked absence in a major review of competitive dynamics 
(Ketechen Jr., Snow, & Hoover, 2004).  
An integrative review of existing literature will facilitate conversations among 
research streams. The review will bridge works under different labels clarifying 
connections among them, organize the literature within a relevant framework 
summarizing the linkages and differences among levels of analysis, identify significant 
gaps in knowledge and distill opportunities for integration. Such a review will also allow 
standards scholars of different theoretical stances to reconcile contrasting theories and 
bring together dialectical interpretations of various facets of the phenomenon (Astley & 
Van de Ven, 1983).  
Thus the primary objective of this paper is to provide an integrative review of the 
management literature on technology standards. We utilize Astley and Van de Ven’s 
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(Astley & Van de Ven, 1983) influential framework for organizing management theories 
to distinguish various strands of work in our domain. Astley and Van de Ven’s 
framework is uniquely suited for our purpose because their scheme accommodates a) 
macro and micro levels of analysis, b) environmental selection, firm adaptation and 
strategic choice, and c) individual and collective actions of firms – all of which are not 
only relevant to the phenomenon of standards but have been the factors along which the 
literature has developed leading to the current state of fragmentation. 
To accomplish our objective, we proceed as follows. In the next section, we 
outline the background of the literature on technology standards, highlighting the concept 
of standards, and standard-based competition. Next, we summarize the methodology for 
the selection of papers in our review and the rationale for the choice of our organizing 
framework. We then review the literature in this area which sets the stage for 
recommendations for future work. Finally, we summarize the major managerial 
implications that surface from our findings. 
Background: Research on Technology Standards 
What is a technology standard? 
A standard can be defined broadly as the consensus of different agents to do 
certain key things with agreed-upon rules (Farrell & Saloner, 1992; Nickerson & 
Muehlen, 2006), and technology standard can be viewed as “a set of specifications to 
which all elements of products, processes, formats, or procedures under its jurisdiction 
must conform” (Tassey, 2000 :588).To understand the functional aspects of technology 
standards, it is helpful to consider the differences between supply and demand sides. On 
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the supply side, a technology standard represents the synthesis of proven concepts on the 
design logics to organize the hierarchy and functional parameters for a particular type of 
product (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Clark, 1985; Murmann & Frenken, 2006; Tassey, 
2000; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Weiss & Birnbaum, 1989). On the demand side, a 
technology standard reflects the desire of consumers for agreement on a uniform 
technological format that permits integration and interchangeability across multiple 
products (Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, & Bruderer, 1995; Cusumano et al., 
1992). Essentially, a technology standard represents the collective choice resulting from a 
balance between utility of consumers,  technical possibilities and cost structure of 
manufacturers, and constraints of political, social, and economical institutions (Garud et 
al., 2002; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Tassey, 2000) . 
In management literature, Utterback and Abernathy (1975) used the term 
“dominant designs” to refer to the technologies that achieve market dominance. Inspired 
by their work, a number of management researchers investigated technology standards 
under the label of “dominant designs” (e.g. Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Srinivasan et 
al., 2006; Suarez & Utterback, 1995), leading Gallagher (Gallagher, 2007) to 
conceptually distinguish dominant designs and technological standards1
Research on standard-based competition 
. For our 
purposes, we assimilate the literature on dominant designs within the more inclusive 
literature on standrads.  
                                                          
1 Gallagher considered standards as narrowly driven by the importance of network effects while dominant designs have 
more to do with architectures. Gallagher also argued that standards are often important components of dominant 
designs.  
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Products involving technology standards have varying degrees of technological 
complexity, ranging from non-assembled simple products(e.g. light emitting polymers)to  
complex technological systems (e.g. computer) (Suarez, 2004). By observing relatively 
simpler products, researchers have identified a set of technology- and market-based facets 
of standard-based competition. Moreover, in view of the growing complexity of today’ 
technological systems, especially in complex computer (West, 2003), telecommunication 
(Funk & Methe, 2001), and Internet-based industries (Waguespack & Fleming, 2009), the 
scholarly focus on collective actions to set standards have increased dramatically in the 
past two decades2
Technology- and market-based facets of standard-based competition 
.  
One facet of standards-based competition is based in technology: How 
technological evolution — captured by concepts such as technological lifecycle, 
technological discontinuity, and emergence of dominant technological design — shapes 
the competitive dynamics and structure of the industry. This line of thought originated 
with the studies of scholars such as Abernathy and Utterback (e.g., Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), whose research led to the 
conceptualization of the emergence of technology standards (or in their words dominant 
designs) as cyclic processes of punctuated equilibria (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Utterback & Suárez, 1993). Indeed, the punctuated equilibrium models of technological 
change are linked to the studies on the sociology of science and technology about the 
history of scientific progress  (Kuhn, 1962; Suarez, 2004).  
                                                          
2 We thank the anonymous reviewer who pointed out this to us. 
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In contrast, the market-based facet of a technology standard reveals how market 
mechanisms — in particular, “network effects” — drive the emergence of standards. 
Management researchers have incorporated the concept of network effects from the work 
of economists (Farrell & Saloner, 1985, 1986; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Saloner & Shepard, 
1995). Network effects, also known as “network externalities”, are said to arise if a 
technology becomes more valuable as the number of users, or, the availability of 
complementary products, increases (Economides & Katsamakas, 2006; Farrell & Saloner, 
1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1992; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1994; Suarez, 2004). Since 
network effects are built into the demand function, the competition surrounding standards 
follows dynamics that are considerably different from the competition without standards, 
requiring firms to pursue unconventional strategies, such as open architecture (Garud & 
Kumaraswamy, 1993) and/or free software (Armstrong, 2006), and sometimes can result 
in a winner-take-all situation (Katz & Shapiro, 1994) whereby the winning technology 
may drive all other technologies out of the market (Besen & Farrell, 1994; Schilling, 
2002). The research on network effects has also provided economic reasoning to explain 
why radical innovation sometimes are considerably delayed in the presence of standards, 
as illustrated by the continued dominance of QWERTY layout in the keyboard market 
(Arthur, 1989; Katz & Shapiro, 1992).  
Collective action in standard-based competition 
A complex technological system often consists of a core technological base, or a 
platform, and numerous related pieces of technology developed separately by different 
manufacturers (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Murmann & Frenken, 2006). Since each 
technological system is supported by a co-specializing network of complementary actors 
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collectively possessing the skills and resources required in the development of 
innovation, collective action is often required to set standards (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 
2006; Wade, 1996). The firm controlling the core technology — i.e., the platform —is 
said to face two levels of challenges: (1) at the community level, the competitive threat 
imposed by competing platforms in the dominance battle; and (2) within the community, 
the coordination problem with various producers of ancillary products that expand the 
platform’s market (Annabelle & Cusumano, 2002; Cusumano & Gawer, 2002).  
To account for the role of complementary products in complex technological 
systems, some economists have advanced the concept of two-sided markets to address the 
strategy of firms controlling platforms (Economides & Katsamakas, 2006; Eisenmann et 
al., 2006; Gallaugher & Wang, 2002; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & Tirole, 
2006). In a two-sided market, the platform serves as the inter-mediating platform to 
connect two distinct, complementary user groups that are called (1) “sellers”, who 
produce complementary products for the standard (or its competitor), and (2) “buyers”, 
who desire the synergy of the standard (or its competitor) and various complementary 
products (Economides & Katsamakas, 2006; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Gallaugher & 
Wang, 2002; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & Tirole, 2006). For example, a PC 
operating system connects the end users and software developers, and a video game 
console connects gamers and game developers. Competition in two-sided markets is 
complex because there are several reinforcing mechanisms at work. The buyers’ utility of 
using an intermediating platform (e.g., a game console) increases with more sellers 
selling complementary products. At the same time, sellers are more motivated to produce 
complementary products for a particular platform if it attracts a larger number of buyers 
17 
 
(Rochet & Tirole, 2003). As a particular inter-mediating technology becomes 
increasingly adopted, the market tends to select the platform as the “standard” of the 
market, forcing all other platforms to exit (Armstrong, 2006; Eisenmann et al., 2006; 
Shapiro & Varian, 1999a). Thus, the firm controlling the platform may build coalition of 
systems assemblers, software vendor, and hardware manufacturers to enhance the 
adoption of its technology in the market (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006). 
To capture firms’ interdependences surrounding a complex technological system, 
some researchers have developed the concept of “technological ecosystem” (Teece, 
2007)(Teece, 2007)(Teece, 2007)[14][14][14][14][14][14] composed of one or a few 
core firms (often the “platform leaders”) and numerous periphery firms (Annabelle & 
Cusumano, 2002; Teece, 2007). The key decisions facing an ecosystem leader include (1) 
whether the standards needs to be open or proprietary, (2) whether the leader should 
financially invest in complementors to facilitate innovation, and (3) whether incentives 
should be provided to encourage the complementor’s investments. In view of the 
complexity of this strategic decision, Teece (Teece, 2007: 1332) argued that the success 
of firms facilitating standards will require “uncommon foresight and the ability to shape 
outcomes”. 
Method of Review 
To facilitate a coherent review, we followed the approach of Dahlander and Gann 
(2010) who used systematic searches and formal summaries of the literature to integrate 
major studies on a specific topic. We started with an exhaustive search for scholarly 
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work3 on technology standards. To find as many relevant publications as we could, we 
intentionally created a broad range of keywords for our search. We derived our list of 
keywords by extensively reading related literature and consulting experts in this area. The 
final list of keywords used in our search included: “dominant design”, “standard” , 
“platform”, “system”, “modularity”, “network externalities”, “two-sided markets” and 
“technological ecosystems”4. We searched the major journals5 in the management field 
and then checked with the ISI database to make sure that we did not miss any highly cited 
work in this area 6. This process yielded 567 papers after we dropped duplicates7
2005
. We 
then scanned each paper to assess its relevance to our topic. We used two criteria for 
exclusion. First, we excluded papers in which standards were not discussed. For instance, 
we dropped Bhaskaran and Gilbert’s ( ) study from our review because standards are 
not mentioned in the text. Second, we limited our sample to papers that discuss 
technology standards and those discussing other forms of standards, such as a 
management practice, were excluded. For example, we did not include Fischhoff’s (1984) 
paper on safety standards in our review because the paper does not focus on technology 
standards. Applying the selection criteria, we reduced the sample to 89 papers. All these 
articles have formalized technology standards as a key issue under investigation. We 
broke down our sample into two categories: theoretical (21 total) versus empirical (66 
                                                          
3 To make the research work more comparable, we focused on published journal articles and did not include books.  
4 Some keywords (e.g. “Standard”) were ambiguous and yielded too many irrelevant articles. So, in the searching 
process, we used “technology” with the “AND” option to exclude irrelevant articles. We compared the searching 
results by including and excluding “technology” as a required keyword for several years, and results were the same.   
5 The journals involved in our initial search included: Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management 
Journal , Administrative Science Quarterly , IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management , Journal of Business 
Venturing , Journal of Engineering and Technology Management , Journal of Management , Journal of Management 
Studies, Journal of Marketing , Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Product Innovation Management, 
Management Science, MIS Quarterly, Organization Science, Research Policy, Strategic Management Journal, and The 
Business History Review. 
6 This added a few papers from journals not involved in the initial search (Fee Figure 1). 
7 The search yielded duplicates because the author(s) may mention more than one keyword in the same paper.  
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total). For an initial overview of the literature, we graphically present the distributions of 
published articles by outlets in Figure 1 and over time in Figure 2.  
We then proceeded to develop a detailed summary for each article in our sample, 
respectively for theoretical and empirical papers (See Appendix1 and 2). A review of the 
theoretical models and main findings in this body of literature indicated that research on 
technological standards is fragmented and covers a variety of topics through diverse 
theoretical lenses. To probe the coherence of this scholarly community, we employed the 
analysis used by Dahlander and Gann (2010) to portray the collaboration networks 
among authors. Figure 3 illustrates which scholars have coauthored with whom on 
publishing technology standards. Following Dahlander and Gann (2010) , we used 
“nodes” to refer to individual authors and “ties” to represent co-authorships. We 
normalized the nodes by the number of papers the authors have published on this topic8
---------------------------------------------------- 
.  
Please insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Altogether 154 authors were involved in the scholarly community on technology 
standards. However, as the figure shows, the co-authorship network is fragmented. Even 
the most prolific authors, such as Tushman, Suarez, and Utterback, have been very 
limited in terms of collaborative research. The lack of extensive collaboration perhaps 
has led to the inconsistent use of terminologies in the literature, as well as difficulties in 
integrating findings across studies (Gallagher, 2007; Suarez, 2004), warranting an 
organizing framework for reviewing the literature. 
                                                          
8 For each node, the larger the size, and darker the color, the more papers the author the node represents has published.  
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A Framework of Review 
According to Ginsberg and Venkatraman (1985), an analytical framework is 
necessary for systematically evaluating the contribution of a given body of literature and 
discerning patterns. The literature on technology standards has invoked different 
ontological assumptions and focused on different levels of analysis. To accommodate the 
diverse perspectives, and to develop a systematic, coherent analysis of issues pertaining 
to technology standards, we utilized the organizing framework of Astley and Van de Ven 
(1983). As already mentioned in the introduction, this influential framework is ideally 
suitable to accommodate the divergent perspectives of scholars in the research on 
technology standards.  
In view of the growing pluralism and complexity of organizational literature, 
Astley and Van de Ven developed a two-dimensional framework to conceptualize the 
fundamental approaches and debates of organizational theorists. This framework is based 
on two analytical dimensions: (1) the level of analysis (macro versus micro) and (2) the 
relative emphasis of research on deterministic versus voluntaristic assumption about the 
human nature of managers. The first analytical dimension, level of analysis, captures the 
differences between theories about a single firm (micro) versus those analyzing total 
populations of firms (macro). The second analytical dimension, deterministic versus 
voluntaristic orientation, addresses the distinctions between scholars who view firm 
behavior as determined by exogenous forces versus those who believe that firms act out 
of free will.  
Crossing these two dimensions, Astley and Van de Ven offered four “central 
perspectives” in organizational theory: (1) natural selection, (2) system structural, (3) 
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strategic choice, and (4) collective-action. The natural selection view assumes a 
deterministic role of managers and uses the macro-level phenomena as the unit of 
analysis to examine the “economic and technical dimensions of an industry that provide 
the context within which competition occurs” (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983: 250). 
Extending the deterministic assumption to micro-level analysis, the system structural 
view portrays the firm as a technically constrained system that must constantly adapt to 
develop a fit with the context. In contrast to the deterministic logic, the strategic choice 
view maintains that firms are “socially constructed, subjectively meaningful embodiments 
of individual action” (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983: 251) and therefore focus on the firm’s 
proactive action to initiate both micro- and macro-level change. Following a similar 
voluntaristic assumption, the collective action view argues that firms may act collectively 
to achieve shared strategic purposes, and therefore focuses on how the collective action 
of a population of firms can generate change in the industry (Astley & Van de Ven, 
1983).  
Astley and Van de Ven’s framework has had profound influence on management 
disciplines9
                                                          
9 The fact that this article has been cited 770 times in scholarly publications (up to August 2010) is one indicator of the 
comprehensiveness and fundamentality of this paper and its influence on management disciplines. 
, primarily in the fields of organizational theory, strategic management and 
innovation management. The contribution of this work is twofold. First, the framework 
offers an overview of the basic architecture of research on various organizational 
phenomena, and by extension allows scholars of different assumptions and focal 
attentions to speak with each other to advance integrative understandings of reality. 
Second, by comparing and contrasting distinct views of underlying theories, the 
framework reveals the dialectical tensions among the theories, offering insights on six 
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“central debates “that animate theory and are therefore biased towards specific parts of 
the reality of organizational life10
Astley & Van de Ven, 1983
. As Astley and Van de Ven suggested, both 
deterministic and voluntaristic views are “necessary for developing a dynamic 
appreciation of organizations” and  to properly study organizations, one must go “across 
levels of analysis to understand the dialectical relationships between forces of conflict, 
coercion, and disruption at one level of organization [micro], and forces of consensus, 
unity, and integration at another level [macro]” ( ).    
We chose this meta-theoretical scheme to organize our review for two reasons. 
First, the evolution of standards involves both macro (environmental) and micro (firm) 
level forces, and requires comparing and integrating studies at different levels of analysis. 
Second, standards both drive and are driven by the actions of firms (or firm groups / 
associations), and a review of this work should consider both the structural forms and the 
firm’s proactive action (Hemphill, 2009; Suarez, 2004).A schematic framework to map 
these diverse approaches in the scholarly community will not only expose the diversity 
across studies but also (perhaps more importantly) reveal the linkages and overlaps 
between various lines of thought and thus facilitate conversations among different 
research streams.   
Following Astley and Van de Ven (1983), we arrayed various papers on 
technology standards along two dimensions, with the first one based on levels of analysis 
(macro versus micro), and the other along the scholar’s relative emphasis on the 
assumptions about the human nature  (deterministic versus voluntaristic).In our review, 
we considered the level of analysis of a paper as “macro” if the paper focuses on a 
                                                          
10 For more details about the central debates, see Astley and Van de Ven [1].  
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technological regime (Anderson & Tushman, 1990), or a standards battle (i.e., 
competition to define standards) (Besen & Farrell, 1994), and “micro”, if a paper focuses 
on a firm. We then assessed the authors’ assumptions regarding the deterministic versus 
voluntaristic orientation of the managers. We considered a paper as “voluntaristic” if the 
paper investigates how the firm, or a group of firms, initiates action to render a certain 
outcome. For instance, we considered Clymer and Asaba’s study (2008) as voluntaristic 
because the paper focuses on firms’ strategies to establish dominant designs. We also 
considered a paper as “voluntaristic” if the paper models industrial factors as the 
contingencies to moderate the impact of the firm's action on outcome (e.g., Suarez, 
2004). In contrast, we considered a paper as deterministic if the firm’s action is viewed as 
the outcome of changes in the industry (e.g., Kim & Kogut, 1996), or not addressed (e.g., 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986).We also allowed a paper to have more than one perspective. 
These criteria enabled us to array all papers in our sample along the four central 
perspectives identified by Astley and Van de Ven (1983). Figure 4 offers a broad 
overview of the analytical foci, underlying logics, theoretical lenses, and managerial 
implications of each perspective. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Figure 4, Table 1 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
In addition, themes emerged in each perspective as we proceeded to review the 
papers in more detail. Table 1 offers summaries of the major mechanisms and key 
arguments of the themes, arrayed along the four central perspectives. Moreover, using 
these themes as a coding scheme, we coded all the articles in our sample to reflect the 
central perspective(s) of each study and the major theme(s) it explores. We first had the 
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two authors code the articles separately and compared the overall agreement between 
their coding (greater than 80 per cent). We then incorporated in-depth discussions to 
resolve the discrepancies, leading to unanimously agreed-upon coding results (see 
Appendix 1 and 2). We repeated the coding procedure after the completion of the 
manuscript, and since we obtained consistent results, we were confident of the reliability 
of our coding.  
We then developed a graphic presentation of the distributions of papers by theme 
in Figure 5. Furthermore, since the themes explored in a same paper may incorporate 
more than one central perspective, we used two Venn diagrams, one for theoretical 
papers and the other for empirical papers, to visualize the distribution and overlap of the 
standards literature along the four central perspectives (See Figures 6 and 7). 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figures  5, 6 and 7 around here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Overview of Literature 
Our review revealed a number of themes in the literature on technology standards. 
In this section, we first discuss the themes within the four central perspectives indentified 
by Astley and Van de Ven (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983) and then focus on the limited 
number of studies that have incorporated multiple perspectives.  
Natural Selection View (macro level, deterministic orientation) 
Theorists studying technology standards based in this perspective believe that 
strategic flexibility of firms in the face of standards is limited by environmental 
characteristics. Therefore, technological change and the emergence of standards follow a 
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deterministic path and the role of management is not a focus in this view. A review of the 
literature yielded three related themes in this view: 1) process models of technology 
change, 2) factors that lead to the emergence of a standard, and 3) industry structures.  
Process models of technology change  
Technology change is often associated with fierce competition and the shaping 
and reshaping of the industries and firms (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Jolson, 1980; Rogers, 1983; Schilling, 2000; Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975). In an attempt to conceptualize the pattern of this change, Dosi (1982) 
argued that the process of technology change resembles the process of “paradigm shift” 
in the scientific field articulated by Kuhn (1962): continuous changes in an established 
paradigm (represented by a dominant technological trajectory or technological regime) 
are interrupted by major scientific breakthroughs and the rise of new paradigms stems 
from the interplay between scientific advances, social institutions, as well as economic 
forces.  
Similarly, Tushman and Anderson (1986) proposed a model of punctuated 
equilibrium. In this model, technology evolution is a cyclical process characterized by 
long periods of incremental improvements punctuated by technological discontinuities. 
Each technological discontinuity is followed by an “era of ferment,” during which fierce 
competition takes place among technological variants until a dominant design, or a 
standard, is selected and alternative technologies are locked out (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Schilling, 1998, 2002; Wade, 1996). Anderson and Tushman (1990) further argued 
that the competition in the era of ferment is characterized by two distinct selection 
processes: the replacement of entrenched technological regimes by emerging 
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technological regimes and the rivalry between alternative designs embedded in new 
technologies.    
Furthermore, if technology change involves the innovation of complex 
technological systems, the process of standard-based competition can be even more 
complex (Funk, 2004). In this case, each technological design constitutes a technological 
community (a technology regime) that contains core firms controlling the basic design 
and periphery firms that have a stake in the core technology. Wade (Wade, 1995, 1996) 
suggested that firms’ entry into and exit from these technological communities are a 
function of the population density and the emergence of technology standards. Kogut, 
Walker, and Kim (1995) suggested that the more the potential partners and customers 
using a standard, the higher the number of new entrants into a technological regime.  
Factors that lead to the emergence of standards  
The driving forces of a technology standard are a mixture of numerous factors. In 
addition to technological superiority, factors such as network effects, switching costs, 
government policy, and intellectual property regimes, as well as other environmental 
factors, play a major role (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Arthur, 1996; Funk, 2004; 
Srinivasan et al., 2006). 
First, in the presence of network effects, the ferment and emergence of technology 
standards will depend substantially on the installed base — a significant advantage in the 
installed base allows a product to dominate competitors increasingly until it locks out all 
alternatives, creating a phenomenon called “bandwagon” which eventually leads to 
“winner-take-all” (Lee, Lee, & Lee, 2006). The development of a large installed base is 
embedded in a set of  strategic factors such as licensing policies (Economides & 
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Katsamakas, 2006), compatibility with other systems (Tassey, 2000), the availability of 
complementary products (Gandal, Kende, & Rob, 2000) , and/or the decision regarding 
whether to pursue an open source strategy (Casadesus-Masanell & Ghemawat, 2006).  In 
spite of this theorizing, empirical studies have provided contradictory findings about the 
role of installed base in standardization. Cottrell (1994) suggested that installed base 
plays a critical role in the development of technology standards and the uniform standard 
in the U.S. computer software embodied difficulty moving to new standards. In contrast, 
Stremersch and co-authors (2007) reported that network effects from the installed base 
(availability of complementary products) are actually weaker than expected in the 
literature, and that hardware sales are likely to lead software availability rather than the 
reverse. In addition to installed base, researchers also revealed that other network-related 
factors, such as  network topology and density, are related to the rise of network effects 
(Weitzel, Beimborn, & Knig, 2006).  
Second, switching costs offer another explanation for why technology standards 
emerge, particularly why an accepted standard may lock in the market even though a 
newer, superior technology is available. The adoption of the new technology may imply 
substantial investment in terms of hardware, software, or special technical skills, and the 
loss of existing networks, creating switching costs to inhibit the adoption of a new 
technology (Bonaccorsi, Giannangeli, & Rossi, 2006; Chen & Forman, 2006; Farrell & 
Saloner, 1985; Forman, 2005; Zhu, Kraemer, Gurbaxani, & Xu, 2006). Due to the 
mixture of network and non-network based switching costs, the market for a technology 
standard is characterized by excess inertia11 Katz & Shapiro, 1992( ) , path dependence12
                                                          
11 A network market is said to have excess inertia if the market is biased towards existing products. 
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(Mazzoleni, 1997; Takahashi & Namiki, 2003) and lock-in13 Arthur, 1989( ; Liebowitz & 
Margolis, 1995; Loch & Huberman, 1999). 
Third, government policy and intellectual property regimes influence the 
emergence of technology standards.  Takahashi and Namiki (Takahashi & Namiki, 2003) 
suggested that government policy should, on the one hand, permit collaboration required 
for technology innovation, while one the other hand, prosecute clear violations of 
antitrust law to intervene into the process for de facto standards to emerge. If strong 
intellectual property rights hinder innovation, the authorities need to bring antitrust 
action. Bekkers and co-authors  (Bekkers, Duysters, & Verspagen, 2002) revealed that 
dominant players’ position in the network is based on ownership of essential intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) and that there is a positive relationship between market power and 
essential IPRs and network centrality. A related topic is open system strategy. Lecocq 
and Demil (Lecocq & Demil, 2006) found that open systems may lower the entry barriers 
for complementary producers by conferring partial or total access to proprietary 
knowledge, which reduces switching costs. 
Finally, environmental factors other than to regulatory forces, such as 
appropriability and environmental munificence, are also found to be relevant to the 
ferment of technology standards (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986). Anderson and Tushman found that a single dominant technology is more likely to 
emerge following a technological discontinuity in low appropriability regimes. Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Path dependence represents an alternative analytic perspective in economics, arguing that a minor advantage or 
inconsequential lead for some technology or product in the earlier stage have profound influence (set the path) on the 
allocation of resource in the market in the later stage.  
13 Lock-in is the result of inherent self-reinforcing dynamics, referring to the state of irreversibility and total 
inflexibility. 
29 
 
Srinivasan and co-authors. (2006) found that standards (dominant designs) are more 
likely to appear in industries with weaker appropriability, lower radicalness of innovation 
and higher R&D intensity. The same authors also found that the intensity of competition 
shortens the time needed to select a dominant design.  
Industry structures 
Natural selection researchers observed that standards are associated with the 
winner-take-all dynamics. Once a standard emerges, it will be entrenched in distribution 
channels and the minds of customers, reduce the price of new technology through 
economies of scale, and attract the vast major of software and peripherals for 
compatibility with the standard (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Due to network effects, a 
winning standard will govern a large user base and the more it gains prevalence, the more 
likely it will emerge as a sole technological design in a given technological field (Arthur, 
1996). However, Lee, Lee, and Lee (2006) cautioned about the use of the “winner-take-
all” notion, arguing that the outcome might depend on the structural characteristics of a 
customer network. Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne (Eisenmann et al., 2006) argued that 
three conditions for winner-take-all to occur: (1) It is costly for users to adopt more than 
one technology; (2) Network effects are positive and strong; (3) Users do not have strong 
preferences for special features. 
As we previously mentioned, the study of network effects also revealed a two-
sided market structure for technology standards. In the presence of abundant cross-side 
network effects between the two sides of a network market, a platform sponsor may 
employ a “getting-both-sides-on-board” strategy. For example, a platform sponsor may 
provide easy access to users of one side of the market, and thus strategically construct a 
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“loss center”, to ensure a significant amount of cross-network effects. This explains some 
unconventional pricing and technology strategies of firms who are willing to give out free 
products or subsidize related products without expecting future exploitation of these 
market segments (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). 
Some natural-selection papers have investigated the impact of standardization on 
the shape of the industry’s demand curve. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) found that in 
the spreadsheet industry, higher prices are associated with spreadsheets providing a 
higher degree of compatibility. Chakravarti and Xie (2006) found that consumers are less 
likely to purchase a new product when there is competition for a standard. 
Finally, several studies have suggested that technological change and the 
emergence of technology standards may influence firms’ entry into and exit from the 
industry. Tushman and Anderson (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) found that technological 
change influences the entry-to-exit ratio in the industry, whereby competence-enhancing 
technological discontinuities will be associated with decreased entry-to-exit ratios and 
this pattern will be reversed for competence-destroying discontinuities. Lecocq and 
Demil (2006) found that new entrants adopt open systems more readily than incumbents, 
resulting in  a decrease in the average size of firms in the installed base. 
Summary  
 In addition to process models, studies in the natural selection view proposed 
several theoretical links among the concepts discussed above, as shown in Figure 8.  As 
shown in the figure, the emergence of technological standards is associated with a set of 
industrial outcomes captured by concepts such as winner-take-all, demand curve and 
firms’ entry and exits. Drivers of technology standards are documented in three blocks of 
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factors —  (1) technological regime, (2) institution / environment and (3) market 
mechanisms. Although not fully explicated in the literature, the influence of these factors 
appears to be contingent on the complexity of technological system — compared with 
simple products, complex technological systems may demonstrate different patterns of 
technological evolution, have different requirements for institutional / environmental 
factors, and follow distinct market mechanisms.          
System Structural View ( micro level, deterministic orientation) 
Research from this perspective has focused on how firms play the “survival-of-
the-fittest” game in the face of technology standards — i.e., firms’ adaptive strategy. 
Studies in this view have shed light on three facets of firms’ adaptation: (1) time-related, 
(2) technology-based and (3) market-based.      
Time-related adaptation  
Utterback and Abernathy (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975) suggested that 
technological change follows systematic patterns and involves several stages along the 
timeline. The firm’s key task in this process is to develop the fit with different 
requirements in each technological stage, whereby its overall efforts in innovation should 
move from product towards process innovation. Utterback and Suarez (Utterback & 
Suárez, 1993) argued that firms are not born to win or lose the natural selection 
associated with technological change; rather, incumbent firms may react by adjusting 
their administrative and production structures in accord to dynamics of industrial 
innovation to become the surviving ones. For new comers, selecting the right time to 
enter a technological industry is critical. This notion inspired several empirical studies 
with contradictory findings. Suarez and Utterback (1995) found that the probability of 
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survival tends to be higher for firms entering the industry before the emergence of a 
technology standard than for firm entering after it. Whereas Christensen and co-authors 
(Christensen et al., 1998) reported similar findings,  Tegarden and co-authors (Tegarden 
et al., 1999) found that firm survival in the face of standards not only depends on time of 
entry but also significantly on technology-based adaptation.  
Technology-based adaptation  
Firms’ technology-based adaptation involves several strategic decisions. The first 
concerns the decision to incorporate the technological features of a standard in product 
design. Christensen and co-authors (Christensen et al., 1998) found that in the disk drive 
industry, firms incorporating what became the dominant design have had much higher 
probability of survival than firms that ignored such features. However, other researchers 
suggested that firms are not necessarily doomed even if they chose the wrong design 
initially — firms shifting to the dominant design in a later stage still have the chance to 
survive (Tegarden et al., 1999). Second, if a standard is embedded in a complex 
technological system, the adaptive firm’s profitability will depend on the extent to which 
its product is compatible with (1) other products of the same type and (2) various 
complementary products in a hardware/ software network (Sheremata, 2004). Xie and 
Sirbu (1995) suggested that compatibility with a dominant player is beneficial for new 
firms. Such a notion received support in the empirical work. In a study on the video game 
industry, Venkatraman and Lee (2004) found that a software developer is more likely to 
work with a platform with a dominant market position. Finally, Bonaccorsi and co-
authors (2006) suggested that firms tend to use hybrid business models to adapt to an 
environment dominated by open standards, and the degree of openness toward open 
33 
 
standards is affected by organizational factors such as those of organizational size and 
age.  
Market-based adaptation  
Incorporating the concept of network effects, Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy 
(2004) found that network effects may both positively and negatively influence the 
survival of firms. They found that if a firm adopts a new technology early, the influence 
of network effects is contingent on several other factors such as the radicalness of the 
new technology, technological intensity of products, and the incumbency of the firm. In 
addition to network effects, switching costs represent additional market mechanism to 
influence firms’ adaptation. Sheremata (2004) argued that the profits of firms introducing 
radical innovation to the market depend on how much switching costs of the new 
technology — such challengers must provide value that exceeds the cost of switching; 
otherwise, consumers will not switch.  
Summary  
The system structural view on technology standards is essentially embedded in 
contingency theories of organization, which link environment, firm characteristics and 
firm performance. These studies have addressed two sets of questions: (1) “how does the 
firm react to technological change and the emergence of a technology standard?” and (2) 
“what are the performance implications of the firm’s adaptive strategy?”  Figure 9 offers 
a summary of the findings from distinct studies: In the competition related to technology 
standards, factors in the technological regime are the main drivers influencing firms’ 
adaptive strategies, which in turn influence micro-level (organizational) outcomes.  Two 
sets of contingencies have been revealed to be at work: first, firm resources may serve as 
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a moderator of the way firms adapt to technological change and standards; second, the 
institution / environment and market mechanisms may serve as a moderator of the 
linkages to the effectiveness of firms’ adaptation.  
Strategic Choice View (micro level, voluntaristic orientation) 
In the standards literature, theorists of the strategic choice view argued that 
competitive advantage in standardization is not merely a function of environmental 
determinism, but also a function of firm strategy and resources (Cusumano et al., 1992; 
Funk, 2003; Gallagher, 2007; Khazam & Mowery, 1994). Researchers in this arena have 
highlighted five major aspects of firms’ strategic choices in the face of technology 
standards: 1) institutional entrepreneurship, 2) technology and product strategies, and 3) 
the role of resources.  
Institutional entrepreneurship 
Several researchers suggested that technology change goes beyond a technical 
issue to involve substantial change in the otherwise stable institutional landscape (Garud 
et al., 2002; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Maguire et al., 2004). 
Thus, firms pursuing standards can be thought of as “institutional entrepreneurs” whose 
innovation is intended to dislodge established institutions in the technological field. 
Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) summarized four sets of challenges facing an 
institutional entrepreneur. The first is the framing contest — technological change 
introduces rivaling new technological, therefore, an institutional entrepreneur will 
compete to establish the legitimacy of its own technological trajectory in the public 
domain. The second challenge is to enact a collaborative network of firms whose 
products and/or services are critical for the success of the core technology standard 
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controlled by the institutional entrepreneur. Third, the institutional entrepreneur must 
facilitate institutional arrangements such as regulating systems and resources allocation. 
Finally, the institutional entrepreneur must enact the political and collective processes 
through which standards emerge.  
Several case studies have described the role of institutional entrepreneurship in 
the emergence of technology standards. Cusumano and co-authors (1992) provided 
detailed information regarding how the coalition initiated by JVC facilitated the VHS-
based strategic alliances which eventually made the market select VHS over Betamax 
format as the standard for videocassette recorders. Hargadon and Douglas (2001) found 
that to launch technological change, it is crucial for institutional entrepreneurs to 
incorporate concrete designs in the early stage of the new technology to invoke public’s 
familiarity with existing technologies, but without losing the ability to replace them. 
Garud and co-authors (Garud et al., 2002; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993) revealed built-
in tensions in established technological fields due to enabling and constraining effects 
forged by in-depth cooperation among competitors.  
Technology and product strategies 
Strategic-choice studies have addressed four sets of technology and product 
strategies used by firms in setting technology standards: 1) proprietary versus open 
platforms, 2) bundling and compatibility strategies, and 3) learning and innovation.  
Proprietary versus open platforms. Providing rivals easy access to the firm’s core 
technology represents an unconventional strategy to set standards (Garud & 
Kumaraswamy, 1993). Yet the degree of openness varies substantially across firms 
ranging from purely proprietary (e.g., closed system) to completely open (e.g., open 
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source), which is mainly reflected in the licensing policy (Suarez, 2004).  If a firm 
decides to pursue open standard, the most extreme case of licensing, the firm will make 
its technology completely available for free (e.g., Sun Microsystems). Khazam and 
Mowery (1994) found that in the case of Sun Microsystems, this strategy contributed to 
the establishment of Sun’s SPARC architecture as the dominant design in the workstation 
market. The downside of the open architecture strategy is that it may significantly reduce 
network-related entry thresholds and stimulate cooperative input to advance the 
technological offerings of a standard. In addition, open strategy may result in a poor 
appropriability regime, leading to constraints on the standard-setting firms’ sustained 
competitive advantage (West, 2003). In contrast, if the firm is committed to protecting 
intellectual rights, a strategy somewhat opposite to open standard, it is less likely to 
actively engage in standardization processes (Blind & Thumm, 2004).  
Compatibility and bundling strategies. A firm’s compatibility strategy is 
embedded in the technological design that allows its product to be used with other 
products (Suarez, 2004). Large complex technological systems require system-wide 
compatibility and integration. Thus, for innovative firms that wish to shift the locus of 
standards from an existing core system to a new one, the support of compatible 
subsystems becomes functionally critical (Soh & Roberts, 2003). Moreover, in the 
market, compatibility induces users to converge around a single technological system 
rather than support multiple systems, which forces one technology to become dominant 
overtime (Schilling, 2002).  
Bundling is to sell two or more separate products in a package (Stremersch & 
Tellis, 2002). In setting standards, firms can leverage the installed base of an established 
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product by bundling a new, compatible product to it. This strategy can be decisive in the 
standards battle. In the competition with Netscape to set a standard for Internet browsers, 
Microsoft’s bundling strategy gave it a competitive edge — the additional installation 
requirements of Netscape Navigator implied a cost, whereas Microsoft IE was 
automatically bundled with the operating system (Windrum, 2004).  
Learning and innovation. In setting standards, other things being equal, the firm 
offering a better technology than rivals has higher likelihood to become dominant 
(Suarez, 2004). For firms controlling complex systems, integrating know-how from 
outside and within the firm is especially important — the creation of learning, 
knowledge-sharing, and knowledge integration are critical to business performance 
(Teece, 2007). Empirically, Schilling (2002) found that continued learning seems to 
decrease firms’ likelihood of lock-out. Warner and co-authors found that (Warner, 
Fairbank, & Steensma, 2006) firms can reduce uncertainty and steer standardizing 
processes by acquiring relevant knowledge through  merger and acquisition.  
Role of resources  
In addition to technological superiority, other forms of firm resources, such as 
complementary products and installed base, are critical in setting technology standards 
(Suarez, 2004). First, empirical studies have suggested that the availability of 
complementary products plays a key role to the success of technology standards. 
Cusumano and co-authors (1992) suggested that the availability of VHS-based movies 
represented a decisive factor to establish VHS’ leading position in the VCR market. 
Schilling (Schilling, 2002) found that when the availability of complementary goods is 
lower, firms competing in network markets are likely to suffer a competitive 
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disadvantage. Second, researchers have provided evidence that the installed base of a 
firm’s technology is a critical factor to drive the firm’s success in setting technology 
standards (Schilling, 2002).  Moreover, some researchers suggested that firms might also 
benefit from network-related resources in standard-based competition. Funk (2003) 
suggested that NTT DoCoMo and its suppliers used information advantages that heavily 
influenced dominant design. Finally, some researchers highlighted the importance of 
appropriate resources allocation in standard-based competition. Clymer and Asaba (2008) 
suggested that a manufacturer of a complex product should pay attention to the 
deployment of technology resources to generate higher revenue growth.  
Summary  
The basic logic of the strategic choice studies is that firms’ strategic actions 
initiate technological change and the emergence of standards in the industry. As shown in 
Figure 10, these studies have portrayed the emergence of technological standards as 
driven by three blocks of firm-level factors — (1) institutional entrepreneurship, (2) 
technology / product strategies,  and (3) firm resources. The influence of micro-level 
factors on the emergence of technological standards is found to be contingent on several 
factors related to institution/environment and market mechanisms.  
Collective-Action View (macro level, voluntaristic orientation) 
With a collective-action model, technology change can be viewed as a dialectical 
process in which coalition of partisan actors espousing conflicting views confront each 
and engage in political behaviors to create and change standards (Hargrave & Van De 
Ven, 2006). The emergence of a standard reflects the collective actions of firms that have 
a stake in the technological regime that create not only technology standards, but also 
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new institutional structures to impact macro-and micro-levels of innovation performances 
(Economides & Katsamakas, 2006; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Hargrave & Van De 
Ven, 2006; West, 2003).  The empirical literature on collective action in setting standards 
has given us insights into: (1) drivers of collective action, (2) forms of collaboration and 
competition, and (3) mechanisms in the creation of standards.  
Drivers of collective action  
Extant research has suggested three major drivers of collective action in setting 
technology standards: (1) complexity of technological systems, (2) governmental action, 
and (3) the motives of the firm.  
Complexity of technological systems. Facilitating standards in complex 
technological systems requires the collective efforts of various agents including in-and 
out- house innovation units, manufacturers of core and periphery components, the 
government, industrial associations, all firms that have a stake in the emerging 
technological regime, and various technology users (Lee & Lim, 2001). Van den Ende  
and Kemp’s (1999) review of the computer industry indicated that computer technology 
is developed as a result of collective action in which agents within the same technological 
regime are connected to incorporate changes in user practices, the development of new 
skills, software, and the changing definition of a computer. In a study on VIP 
standardization efforts, Markus, Steinfield, Wigand, and Minton (2006) proposed that 
standard makers must ensure the collective participation of representative members of 
user groups, and evaluate the likelihood that other firms will commit to the development 
of the same standard.  
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Governmental action. Case studies also revealed the role of governments in 
facilitating collective action. Cottrell (1994) outlined Japanese and the U.S. governments’ 
different public policy efforts to distinct short- and long-term problems in the Japanese 
versus the U.S. software industries. Japanese firms lagged in the near term and faced with 
the problems posed by multiple standards, however, these challenges aided long-term 
adaptability and performance of the Japanese industry. In contrast, the U.S. industry 
benefitted from a single dominant standard, but has experienced difficulty moving to new 
standards. Funk and Methe (2001) suggested that governments may exert influences on 
the forecasted and actual installed base for a technological system, the amount of 
competition in the market, and the number of and degree of openness in the standards, 
which in turn regulates the cooperation and competition in the standards battle.  
The motives of the firm. Empirical studies also examined firms’ motivation for 
collective action. One line of work has focused on the role of “institutional 
entrepreneurs” to formulate collective action with firms whose technology complements 
and co-evolve with the core technology (Garud et al., 2002; Hargrave & Van De Ven, 
2006). Researchers found that these firms’ decision to participate in collection action may 
depend on the firms’ technological capability (Blind & Thumm, 2004) and the amount of 
uncertain in the technological field (Kogut et al., 1995). In a study on participating firms 
in open source communities, Waguespack and Fleming (2009) found that by actively 
participating in setting open source standards, firms may influence the standardization 
processes and in turn increase their performance. Soh (Soh, 2010) suggested that firms 
attract the complementary manufacturers by building alliance networks to favor an 
intended technology standard. In this process, firms with high ego network density, 
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together with a strategic purpose for knowledge acquisition and sharing within the 
technological community, achieve better innovation performance. 
Forms of cooperation and competition.  
Since complex technological systems consist of nested platforms, subsystems and 
components (Murmann & Frenken, 2006), the competition for standards occurs at the 
community rather than at the firm level. This adds substantial complexity to inter-firm 
relationships in the standards battle. As the number of firms in a technological 
community increases to a critical mass, a mixture of cooperative and competitive 
relationships among these firms begins to accumulate. The collective action of this 
emerging network, composed of “institutional entrepreneurs” (Garud et al., 2002) or 
“platform leaders” (Annabelle & Cusumano, 2002),and firms performing diverse roles in 
the community, eventually will transform the technological community into a 
commercially viable industry (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006). 
In the case of complex technological systems, the cooperation and competition for 
standards among technological communities often has a hierarchical structure (Van de 
Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999: 169). On top of the hierarchy is the 
competition between technological leaders — i.e., firms controlling technological 
platforms and standards. In the early stage of technological change, fierce competition 
may occur at this level and firms within a technological community must cooperate to 
lock out firms from competing communities to create new institutions in the industry 
(Garud et al., 2010; Garud et al., 2002; Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006). In the later stage 
of technological change, even firms from competing technological communities may 
collaborate (Hagedoorn et al., 2001). In the personal computer industry, for example, the 
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current standard is IBM and Microsoft personal computing architecture, which dominates 
the other version of personal computing, represented by the Macintosh computers by 
Apple. However, there have been an increasing number of alliances between IBM and 
Apple. Joint development of innovation appears to be a major objective of these 
alliances. Yet the timing of cooperation between technological leaders is critical — 
indeed, the technological partnering between two competing technological regimes, 
Macintosh of Apple and DOS-based design of IBM and Microsoft, has only occurred 
after the latter had become the standard (Hagedoorn et al., 2001).  
Competition may occur between open-source versus proprietary platforms. A 
proprietary platform involves an architecture of related standards, sponsored by one or 
more technological leaders (West, 2003). West (West, 2003) suggested that firms’ profits 
from innovation depends on the appropriability regime associated with IPRs. In the 
absence of such IPR protection, firms must use some combination of speed, timing and 
luck if they hope to appropriate returns. Nevertheless, open source represents a different 
approach. Instead of using IPRs to set boundaries between vendors and their competitors 
and customers, open source software facilitates collaboration of all agents, maximizing 
adoption throughout the value networks.  
Mechanisms to create standards 
It is common for firms to “strategically maneuver” the market mechanism to 
shape and facilitate adoption of de facto technology standards (Axelrod et al., 1995). The 
standardization of Java, a complex technological system that enables computers to run 
applications distributed over a network, had much to do with the coalition of Sun 
Microsystems with numerous systems assemblers, software firms, and computer 
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manufacturers, as well as the International Organization for Standards and the European 
Computer Manufacturers’ Association. Collective action allowed Java to break away 
from Unix and to challenge the dominance of Microsoft’s Windows (Garud et al., 2002; 
Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Takahashi & Namiki, 2003). Two other examples, the 
VHS alliance coordinated by JVC to sponsor a video recorder standard and the technical 
workstation alliances to sponsor Unix operating system standards, provide additional 
insights on the same phenomenon(Axelrod et al., 1995).  
Committees represent the de jure mechanisms to create technology standards 
through collective action. Funk and Methe (2001) distinguished between two types of 
committees: governmental and industrial-based. Governmental committees can carry 
tremendous weight to support a standard, superceding the market processes; whereas 
industrial committees must be supported by firms in addition to governments. By 
comparing the standardization processes in the telecommunication market in the U.S. 
(more market-based) versus Japan and Europe (more committee-based), Funk and Methe 
(2001) found that without the actions of committees, the market may be slower for a 
standard to emerge when technological change occurs, particularly if substantial 
investment in infrastructure is required. 
Researchers also revealed other social mechanisms in collective action that drive 
the emergence of technology standards. Building on Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch (Bijker, 
Hughes, & Pinch, 1987), Hargrave and Van De Ven (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006)  
suggested that the emergence of a technology standard may be a result of negotiation 
among relevant social groups. Except for a few simple technologies, the acceptance and 
innovation of dominant technology is seldom a function of technological determinism —
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instead, standards emerge out of a sociopolitical process of compromise and 
accommodation played out in the community. To cope with these tensions, sponsors of 
new standards must co-opt the standardization process by means of impression 
management, sense-making, legitimation, and appealing to authority to change the “rules 
of the game”, as well as loosening the coupling between institutions and their 
stakeholders (Garud et al., 2002; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993; West, 2003).  
Summary  
In Figure 11, we summarize the findings in the collective action view. Collective 
action — captured by concepts such as alliances, industrial consortium or standard setting 
bodies, and hybrid models — is driven by three blocks of factors —  (1) technological 
regime, (2) institution / environment, and (3) motives of the firm. Collective action leads 
to both macro- and micro-level outcomes. At the macro-level, collective action can shape 
technology standards, but at the same time, intensify competition between cooperators. 
At the micro-level, collective action influences both the individual firms' decision to join 
the industry as well as their performance. The formulation of collective action and the 
way it influences the macro- and micro-level outcomes are contingent on the institutional 
and market factors.  
Studies based in multiple views 
Our review also identified some studies based in more than on view. These 
studies generally fall into three clusters: 1) incorporating both natural selection and 
system structural views, 2) addressing factors related to both natural selection and 
strategic choice; and 3) assessing the relative importance of collective action and strategic 
choice of individual firms. In the first, the contingency concept of fit is invoked to 
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explain the performance. The degree to which internal characteristics of the firm (e.g. 
resources and processes) are matched to the environment (including technological 
domain) is predicted to be the causal agent behind performance (e.g., Utterback & 
Suárez, 1993). In the second case, both market and technology factors as well as strategic 
actions (e.g., timing of entry) are jointly hypothesized to predict performance (e.g., 
Suarez, 2004). Finally, as an extension of the line of thought among standards researchers 
in terms of whether standard-setting requires “individual action” or “collective action,” 
some scholars (e.g., Waguespack & Fleming, 2009) have pointed out that open source 
communities are an important contingency that bridges the strategy of individual firms 
and collective actions of firm as an interdependent group. 
Discussion 
Our review of the standards literature has underscored the fragmentation of this 
literature, partly because of the differences in perspective of the researchers and the 
absence of conversations among them.  The differences in perspective are reflected in the 
flow of logic, specific concepts invoked and sometimes even the research methods 
utilized in different streams. We have summarized the findings under broad unifying 
constructs (e.g., technological regime, institution / environment, market mechanisms, see  
Figures 8-11) with an eye to offering pathways to integration. The absence of 
conversations across perspectives is reflected in the choice of variables by researchers in 
distinct views: in spite of the relevance, many variables are unitarily conceptualized in 
one view and are absent in other views — e.g., population density (natural section view), 
survival (system structural view), network position (strategic choice view), and co-
opetition (collective action view).    
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It is possible that these differences reflect differences in the problems being 
addressed by the researchers.14
But before we discuss fruitful avenues for needed integration, we provide a brief 
evaluation of the literature along five themes: 1) Unevenness in the development of 
literature; 2) Differences in the flow of logic; and 3) Research methods.  
 For example, some researchers have used a natural 
selection view because they focus on dominant designs that do not involve strong 
network effects; others have used a micro view because they are addressing standards in a 
simple products such as CD’s and video systems; still others have taken a collective 
action view because they have addressed standards in complex technological systems. 
This possibility augurs well for efforts at integration: by encouraging conversations 
among scholars from different perspectives we may arrive at increasingly integrated 
understanding of the standards phenomenon.   
Unevenness in the development of the literature 
As shown in Figures 6 and 7, both theoretically and empirically, the natural 
selection view is most developed followed by the strategic choice view. Albeit with 
different logics, researchers in these perspectives have pursued a pattern of systematic 
accumulation of research. Empirical works have dominated the collective action view, 
where there has been a conspicuous absence of theoretical work. The system structure 
view has attracted relatively limited attention and hence the promise of informing 
organizational adaptation in the face of technological change and the emergence of 
standards remains only partly fulfilled.  
                                                          
14 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this point to our attention. 
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In addition to the uneven development sketched above, there has been a singular 
paucity of works that utilize more than one perspective. Indeed, the standards phenomena 
is a complex one (Hemphill, 2009; Suarez, 2004); therefore, research utilizing multiple 
perspectives is particularly valuable to enhance our understanding. While the limited 
number of works invoking multiple perspectives relied on contingency models, this 
current fragmentation of the literature may be framed as a major opportunity to move us 
closer to an integrative understanding of this complex phenomenon.  
Differences in the flow of logic 
The emergence of standards occupies a focal point in all perspectives. However, 
as the figures reveal, the four perspectives differ in terms of the flow of logics that 
underpin the explanation of standards emergence. We highlight four major differences:  
1. In the natural selection view, the emergence of standards is driven by technological, 
institutional / environmental, and market factors whereas the strategic choice view 
considers standards as the result of firm’s proactive actions, captured by 
entrepreneurship and competitive strategies / resources. The collective action view is 
characterized by an additive model combining both macro- (e.g., technological 
regime and institution) and micro-level factors (e.g., firm entrepreneurship and 
strategy). In the system structure view, the emergence of standards is considered as an 
external contingency.  
2. The natural selection view is also concerned with other macro-level outcomes such as 
industrial structure (e.g., winner-take-all) and firms’ entry and exit. Some collective 
action studies have addressed the micro-level outcomes such as participating firms’ 
performance. In the system structure view, the emergence of standards is not 
considered as an outcome. Most of the system structure studies have focused on the 
effectiveness of firms’ adaptive strategy in the face of standards.    
3. The role of institutional / environment factors is also different across the four views. 
In the natural selection view, institutional / environmental factors (e.g., IPRs) are 
direct drivers of standards. However, in the system structure and strategic choice 
views, these factors are modeled as contingencies influencing the impact of firm 
action on macro- and micro-level outcomes. The collective action view considers 
these factors as both the drivers of standards as well as contingencies.     
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4. Firms’ resources are relevant in the system structure and strategic choice views. In the 
strategic choice view, a set of firm-specific resources is drivers to determine the 
outcome of the dominance battle. In contrast, firm-specific resources are 
conceptualized as moderators in the system structure view to influence the S-C-P 
relationships.  
The differences among perspectives are also reflected in the research methods. 
Research method 
Table 2 provides a summary of research methods across perspectives. Research in 
the natural selection view has displayed a wide diversity of research methods: case 
studies and quantitative research using archival data, followed by some survey-based 
works and limited research utilizing other methods (e.g., interviews and simulation). The 
system structure view has manifested a conspicuous lack of variety in research methods 
— except for a small number of survey-based studies, most works in this view have 
pursued quantitative research designs using archival data. The strategic choice view 
resembles the natural selection view by clustering in case studies and quantitative 
research using archival data but differs from the latter as it has characteristically more 
interviews and fewer survey-based works. Finally, in the collective action view, case 
studies seem to be the most frequently used approach.  
Inconsistent findings 
Although cross-fertilization of ideas among the four perspectives is rare, both 
within each perspective and across perspectives, the research findings are not always 
convergent. We highlight three significant sets of inconsistent findings:  
1. The role of complementary products. Although the availability of complementary 
products has been theorized as a key factor influencing the success of a technology 
standard (Suarez, 2004), the findings from empirical studies have been inconsistent. 
Schilling (2002) found that poor availability of complementary goods will increase 
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the likelihood of technological lockout. However, Stremersch and co-authors (2007) 
found such influence is lower than expected — by examining consumer electronics 
products (e.g., CD) in different historical time periods, the authors found in most 
markets, hardware sales drive software availability rather than the other way around.  
2. Time of adopting a standard. Empirical studies have reported inconsistent findings 
regarding the relationship between the time of adopting a standard and firm survival. 
Suarez and Utterback (1995) found that firms entering the market before the 
emergence of a standard (dominant design) will have high survival chance than those 
entering the market after. Christensen and co-authors (1998) suggested that higher 
survival chance for firms is associated with a relatively short time-window. However, 
Tegarden and co-authors (1999) found that even for firms entering the market after a 
standard has emerged, firms may have high survival chance as long as they adopt the 
winner standard. 
3. Likelihood of winner-take-all. The research on network effects has found that 
competition between incompatible technologies leads to the “winner-take-all” 
outcome (Arthur, 1996). However, Lee and co-authors (Lee et al., 2006) suggested in 
some interaction networks, customers influenced by their acquaintances may adopt a 
lagging technology even when a lead technology has built a large installed base, 
which prevents winner-take-all to occur. Anderson and Tushman (1990) also 
suggested that single standard that takes all market is more likely to happen in market 
with low appropriability regimes.    
These contradictory findings cry out for resolution and may also be framed as 
opportunities of further research. 
Future Directions 
Flowing from our discussion above, the standards literature should encourage 
integrative studies or studies that incorporate multiple perspectives. However, given the 
complexity of this phenomenon, opportunities also exist for scholarship confined to a 
single perspective. In what follows, we outline both opportunities.  
Research opportunities through theoretical and empirical integration 
Given the complexity, integrative models on technology standards are especially 
useful. We organize our discussion along three lines: 1) Significant boundary conditions 
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as moderators; 2) Integration among the four perspectives; and 3) Persistent debates. We 
provides a summary of research opportunities in Table 3. 
Significant Boundary Conditions as Moderators  
Our analysis of the literature suggests two major boundary conditions that limit 
the generalizability of the findings, boundary conditions that are left implicit and hence 
not adequately recognized in the literature: 1) Complexity of the technological system15
Technological complexity. Although, as we summarized earlier, some theorists 
have articulated the concept of levels of technological complexity (
 
and 2) the influence of the institutional environment. 
Bettis & Hitt, 1995), 
their insights are rarely carried over into the theoretical reasoning and empirical works 
under the four perspectives. Cumulatively in this literature, the search has been for 
conclusions tacitly assumed to hold across levels of complexity.  For example the process 
models of punctuated equilibrium discussed in the natural selection view were built up 
from the experience of simple products (Anderson & Tushman, 1990); these models may 
not describe the process of change in complex technological systems, where collective 
action may be necessary to arrive at standards. Similarly, the type of drivers of standards, 
strategies, systems and structures may vary across levels of technological complexity.   
Influence of institutional environment. Although the dominant locale for data in 
the empirical literature has been the United States, some studies have looked at standards 
phenomenon in Europe (e.g., France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,  Scandinavia (Funk, 
2003; Funk & Methe, 2001) )  and Asia (e.g. Japan (Cottrell, 1994) ).   Although we are 
                                                          
15 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility.  
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heartened by the presence of evidence from different nations, the differences in 
institutional environments among nations have not been a preoccupation in the studies, 
making it difficult to compare findings from different nations. Further, many industries 
are witnessing the emergence of global standards that transcend specific institutional 
environments. Global evolution of standards has yet to receive significant attention in the 
literature.  
Both these boundary conditions may be viewed as moderators that limit the 
generalizability of findings. Indeed, one necessary pathway to integration is development 
of “mid range theories” (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1994) of standards phenomenon for 
different levels of technological complexity and for different of institutional 
environments.  
Integration among the four perspectives 
A second line of integration is to develop additive, moderated and mediated 
models employing the various factors identified in Figures 8 to 11, thereby taking 
advantage of the developments in related perspectives to provide greater explanatory 
power to dependent variables of interest. Astley and Van de Ven’s (1983) pair-wise 
approach to resolve the central debates among the central perspectives generates six 
pathways to build these large scale contingency models. In our discussion of studies 
invoking multiple perspectives, we have witnessed three attempts to this pathway to 
integration (e.g., Suarez, 2004; Utterback & Suárez, 1993; Waguespack & Fleming, 
2009). We may suggest three more major directions to advance the standards literature:  
1. Research may integrate the strategic choice and system-structural views to examine 
how complementors will react to the “ecosystem” controlled by technological leaders. 
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Technological leaders normally coordinate co-specialization within the technological 
regimes by facilitating standards (Teece, 2007). The success of these technological 
leaders, such as Intel and Microsoft, often depends not only on their own strategic 
actions but also on the actions of various complementors. Since leaders tend to 
strategically control the operations of the complementors, the way the complementors 
respond to the “system” would depend on the actions of the leader. At the same time, 
the leading position of a given technological leader can be unstable depending on 
various factors such as technological change, entry of competition designs, and the 
leader’s technology strategy. From a competitive dynamics point of view, for 
example, we may explore how the competitive moves of the leader in the combat 
against its rivals would drive the competitive moves of the complementors.  
 
2. The collective-action and natural selection views may be combined to examine the 
patterns of cooperation among firms from a longitudinal perspective. Navis and 
Glynn’s (2010) study revealed that as a technological field becomes mature, the 
interaction between firms changes from collective efforts to legitimate the new 
technology to competition by way of differentiation. Indeed, many technology 
standards grow out of emerging fields whereby this type of change is likely. 
However, the extant standards literature has been limited in this regard. Future 
research may examine how firms' collective actions change along the path of 
technological evolution. Longitudinal research designs will be particularly useful to 
address this research gap. 
 
3. Finally, it is also useful to advance the system-structural logics in light of collective-
action models. The extant literature in the system-structural view has typically treated 
firms as individual agents who respond to the dynamics of the system (sometimes 
using environment as the contingency). Yet firms in standard-based competition 
rarely compete on individual bases. Instead, collective action is an essential nature of 
this competition (Suarez, 2004). Firms' reaction to the system, therefore, may depend 
largely on their interactions with other firms.  
Persistent debates  
Astley and Van de Ven (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983) articulated key differences 
in assumptions among the four perspectives, and our analysis of the standards literature 
has revealed the differing concepts, and logic structures among them in the four 
perspectives. Although it is possible that these differences reflect differences in the 
problems being addressed by the researchers, Astley and van de Ven (Astley & Van de 
Ven, 1983)  suggest that some differences are ontological, and may persist. In the 
standards literature, we suspect the differences along the deterministic - voluntaristic 
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dimension may be the most difficult to reconcile. For example, it is convenient to 
attribute a priori voluntaristic behavior to standard setting firms and deterministic 
behavior to those firms that are adapting to standards. However, from a voluntaristic 
perspective both may see as the willful decision of the firms: some firms proactively 
decide they will adapt to standards instead of creating them. A deterministic orientation 
may lead others to different conclusions. These differences are largely irreconcilable 
within empirical and theoretical domains.  Integration around these assumptions is less 
likely to be achieved by empirical or theoretical means; rather creation of forums for 
debate and dialogue may be the appropriate response to these tensions (Narayanan & 
Zane, 2010).  
------------------------------------------------------ 
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Research opportunities within each perspective  
 Although our primary emphasis is on the need for integrative studies, we should also 
acknowledge that opportunities exist for research within single perspectives. We summarize some 
of the key opportunities along the four perspectives: 
1. Natural selection view. Research based on the natural selection view may benefit 
from a further investigation into the post-standard era. In some industries (e.g., IT 
sectors), the cost to adopt a new technology can be very low (e.g., free software). 
Thus, consumers may use several technologies at the same time (multi-homing) and 
constantly switch back and forth between different technologies. Due to the increase 
in technological uncertainty, the standard-based competition in these industries may 
continue to be intense even after a standard has emerged (Eisenmann et al., 2006).The 
current punctuated equilibrium models have yet to incorporate these dynamics. A 
useful approach is to incorporate the network economics literature on two-sided 
markets (e.g., Armstrong, 2006). This literature provides important insights on the 
structural characteristics of network markets and the economic rationale for the rise of 
network effects. 
 
2. System-structural view. Technological leaders controlling standards often sponsor 
new ventures whose products serve as complements to their key technologies. The 
survival of such new ventures depends largely on the “system” (normally the 
54 
 
technological regime) in which they operate. The extant literature has primarily tied 
these firms’ survival to their technology strategy in the face of technology standards 
(e.g., Suarez & Utterback, 1995). However, the new ventures’ interaction with the 
“system” goes beyond the technological domain to include issues such as legitimation 
(Navis & Glynn), equity investment (Annabelle & Cusumano, 2002), knowledge 
acquisition (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009), and misappropriation (Katila, Rosenberger, 
& Eisenhardt, 2008). Incorporation of the new venture literature would enhance our 
understanding of firms' reactions to the environmental changes in standardization 
processes. 
 
1. Strategic choice view. Future research based on the strategic choice view may further 
investigate how firms’ strategies shape industrial standards. One useful approach is to 
incorporate the action-response perspective (Chen, 1996)from the competitive dynamics 
research. Since firms’ competitive moves constitute the basic elements of inter-firm rivalry 
(Chen, 1996), revealing how firms’ competitive moves in the standards battle influence 
industrial standards and/or improve firm performance may help extend the understanding of 
technology standards. Recently, competitive dynamics researchers have begun to address the 
‘co-opetition’ phenomenon (Ketchen Jr., Hult, & Slater, 2007), which is another key issue in 
the standards battle (Suarez, 2004). Strategic choice research also needs to use a longitudinal 
perspective to examine the standard-setting firms. We especially need to know more about 
the period following the emergence of a standard. The competition in post-standard phase is 
often intense among firms conforming to the same dominant technology (Gallagher & Park, 
2002; Suarez, 2004). For instance, Lotus has established a standard, but why did the firm fail 
to establish sustained competitive advantage based on its successful Lotus-1-2-3? Similarly, 
IBM PC has emerged as the standard, however, why IBM failed to sustain its competitive 
advantage over the IBM PC clones? Therefore, it is useful to design longitudinal studies to 
investigate these phenomena. In addition, research based on the natural selection perspective 
should shed light on the proactive roles of some entrepreneurial ventures in the formulation 
and retention of technology standards (e.g., Microsoft, Oracle). Methodologically, the 
strategic choice research on technology standards should design large sample empirical 
studies to test the theoretical models.  
 
2. Collective-action view. The collective-action perspective has to date focused primarily on 
empirical description and could benefit from explicit theoretical frameworks (or grounded 
theory works). We offer two approaches that may be worthy of consideration: a social action 
model of institutional innovation by Hargrave and Van De Ven (2006) and Olson’s (Olson, 
1971) logic of collective action. The social action model focuses on institutional change, but 
is built with a keen understanding of technological change. The model invokes four key 
concepts—framing contests, construction of networks, enactment of institutional 
arrangements, and collective action processes, all of which are germane to technology 
standards. By contrast, Olson’s logic of collective action is anchored in the economics of 
collective action and may offer a window into the standard-based competition that 
incorporates the role of the government and interest groups, both of which may be significant 
players in the competition for technology standards. Hargrave and Van De Ven (2006) and 
Olson (1971) both offer macro voluntaristic perspectives but work with different 
assumptions. Taken together, they may offer different theoretical windows into standard-
based competition at the collective level.  
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Table 4 displays the key research opportunities within each perspective.  
Managerial Implications 
 This paper has several implications for managerial practice. Notably, it suggests 
that firms operating in science and technology intensive industries need to strategize for 
the emergence of technology standards, even before stable industries are formed. 
Competition for standards is more volatile than in stable industries, and sometimes 
culminates in a winner-take-all outcome, forcing the exit of firms that lose the standards 
battle. This competition is often characterized by network effects (Saloner & Shepard, 
1995; Srinivasan et al., 2006; Suarez, 2004), entry of start-ups with new technologies 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Zahra & Bogner, 2000), and the influence of 
complementors (Suarez, 2004; Teece, 2007) and others in institutional fields (Garud et 
al., 2002; Maguire et al., 2004). 
 During the competition for technology-based standards, the level of uncertainty 
experienced by firms is likely to be higher than during the era of incremental change and 
some suggested that speed of change is also significantly higher (Christensen et al., 
1998).This era thus demands significant vigilance and agility on the part of participating 
firms. Firms need to continually scan and monitor their environments to learn the 
developments in the product market sector as well as the relevant technical and 
institutional sectors. They also need to be agile in their responses to their competitors. 
Organizational learning (Schilling, 2002) is a prerequisite to survival in these 
environments, both in product design, technology, and in a firms’ strategy.  
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Engagement in the competition for standards requires firms to properly device 
their strategic position in their competitive landscape. Indeed, the competitive 
engagement surrounding technology standards often occurs at the system level, or 
community level, rather than between individual firms. The potential technological 
dominance of a technological community and the increasingly important role of network 
effects in this competition, due to interconnectivity and complementary products, require 
strategic managers to carefully design their interactions with various complementors and 
other supporting agents in the ecosystem. The work of Annabelle and Cusumano (2002) 
has clearly shown how two giants in the computer industry, Intel and Microsoft, have 
gained industrial leadership through a “platform strategy” to facilitate extensive 
coordination and innovation in the technological community.  
In contrast to technology leaders, a key issue facing follower firms in the 
standardization processes is the timing of their entry into the technological field 
(Christensen et al., 1998; Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Tegarden et al., 1999). These firms 
are confronted with the challenge of predicting the future standards in the technological 
field — a task which is extremely difficult due to the technological and competitive 
uncertainty in the process of technology change. Entry before the emergence of a 
standard represents early mover advantages; however, it is also associated with the threat 
of being locked out (Schilling, 2002). Some useful tactics to address this volatility 
include the real option logic, multi-homing strategy, stage investment models and 
managerial flexibility (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Kauffman & Li, 2005; McGrath, 1997; 
Tegarden et al., 1999). 
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Collective action represents another decisive driver of standardization and 
innovation in technology intensive industries. Open source, co-specialization, licensing 
and cross-licensing, and compatibility are important issues managers must consider in 
strategy formulation. As Suarez (2004) has suggested, few technologies today can work 
in isolation and some form of collaboration with other technologies is usually required to 
advance a sustained competitive advantage. Nevertheless, firms’ participation in 
collective action substantially reduces resource heterogeneity in the industry and 
therefore may culminate in intensified competition between technological clones, 
particularly after a standard has emerged and the industry has been stabilized. The 
techniques to manage this paradox constitute an ongoing topic among managers and in 
academia. 
 This period of competition for technology standards is also important for firms 
not involved in this competition as they signal potential disruptive technologies. The 
degree to which a technology is disruptive depends on the frame of reference, and 
whether a “new technology” can be detected early enough. Adequate responses can be 
crafted either through adoption of the new technology or through strategic action. 
Attention to this era of competition may yield valuable lead-time for firms in order to 
prevent subsequent surprises.  
Summary and Conclusion 
 Over the past several decades, a growing body of literature has examined 
technology standards. These studies have adopted different perspectives, and this has 
partly caused fragmentation and lack of integration within the literature. Broadly, some 
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have examined the evolution of the environmental context or macro level phenomenon 
whereas others have used firm as the unit of analysis. Similarly some have adopted a 
deterministic orientation and others have been interested in a voluntaristic orientation. 
Our analysis suggests the unevenness of development of literature, with collective-action 
and strategic choice perspectives, both particularly relevant to managerial action, being 
underrepresented in this literature. Indeed, studies that address collective level actions 
have suffered from a lack of theoretical grounding. The development of natural selection 
and system-structural perspectives is partly due to the availability of economic and 
organization theories from the 1980s; economic concepts such as two sided markets or 
ecological and institutional theories are yet to inspire studies in these perspectives.  
Our major observation is that some researchers have invoked multiple 
perspectives, but these have been limited in number. Thus although much has already 
been accomplished, many promising opportunities lie ahead. For future research in this 
domain to be cumulative and impactful in guiding scholarship and managerial action, 
there is a need to incorporate multiple perspectives. In the future, integrative studies 
should move to the center stage of attention. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DOMINANT DESIGNS AND NEW FIRM SURVIVAL 
Introduction 
Every firm faces challenges as a new venture at one point and its success in the 
early corporate lineage depends substantially on its ability to develop the fit between its 
strategy and the industry in which it competes (Fan, 2010; Geroski et al., 2010). In the 
attempt at understanding these dynamics, scholars incorporated various academic 
perspectives to theorize the linkages between new firms’ competitive environment, 
strategy and performance (Fan, 2010; Hannan & Freeman, 1988; Romanelli, 1989). One 
research stream has particularly focused on the success of new firms in the course of 
technological evolution (Kim & Kogut, 1996; Zahra, 1996; Zahra & Bogner, 2000). 
Scholars suggested that firm performance in the technology industry is a function of the 
firm’s response to technology change, particularly, in the process in which the dominance 
of a single technology or design is established in a product class (Christensen et al., 1998; 
Mitchell, 1991; Soh, 2010; Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Tegarden et al., 1999; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986).  
Such a dominant technology, or a de facto standard, represents the industry-wide 
agreed-upon technical logic for product design and interconnectivity (Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Soh, 2010). While the emergence of a de 
facto standard rests in the form of technical design, the impact of such an event is not 
merely a technological issue. Researchers have pointed out that the establishment of a de 
facto standard defines key facets of emerging social-economic institutions, whereby the 
winning design dictates ‘rules of engagement’ and collective benefits of various 
economic agents (Garud et al., 2002; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993; Hargadon & 
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Douglas, 2001). In effect, once a de facto standard begins to emerge, it not only gains 
mass adoption in the technological community  based on its design, but also tends to lock 
out all other technological communities pursuing alternative designs, leading to a 
situation known as winner-take-all (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Arthur, 1989; Schilling, 
2002; Suarez, 2004). However, due to technological variation and competition, the 
emergence of a de facto standard is a highly uncertain process (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Christensen et al., 1998; Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Tegarden et al., 1999). 
Accordingly, the firm’s involvement in standard-based competition represents both an 
important opportunity to establish its core competence and destroy that of competitors, 
and a substantial risk of being technologically locked out if the design the firm sponsors 
turns out not able to accomplish technological dominance (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Schilling, 2002).  
To date, the focal point of empirical studies on firms’ engagement in standard-
based competition has been on firms’ adaptation in the face of de facto standards (e.g. 
Christensen et al., 1998; Suarez & Utterback, 1995). But firms’ strategy in this 
competition is not merely a matter of adaptation. Several researchers suggested that firms 
with technical capabilities to create original designs are often strongly committed to 
establishing de facto standards (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Garud et al., 2002; Khazam 
& Mowery, 1994; Suarez, 2004; Wade, 1996; Waguespack & Fleming, 2009). In the 
innovation literature, these firms are referred to alternatively under such labels as 
‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Garud et al., 2002; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Maguire et 
al., 2004) or ‘platform leaders’ (Adner & Kapoor, 2009; Cusumano & Gawer, 2002).  
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Creating de facto standards is a particularly meaningful strategy for new ventures 
whose success depends on the ability to launch ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 
1934a, 1950) — by initiating technology change and thus new standards,  new firms can 
not only destroy the competence of established competitors but also become a new 
generation of de facto industrial leaders (e.g., Microsoft and Adobe Systems). Yet this 
standard-based entrepreneurship is a risky business (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001). In 
particular, cases such as Lotus Development and Netscape indicate that even for firms 
who have accomplished technological dominance at one point of time, the risk factors 
from the technological field or poorly designed competitive strategy may completely 
dethrone their leadership, forcing these once glorious organizations to exit from the 
market. These observations lead to our research question: How will technological 
evolution and firm strategy influence the likelihood to exit of de novo ventures that 
compete by creating original designs? In the effort to provide an answer to this 
unaddressed issue, we draw from various theories and develop five hypotheses to 
conceptualize the links between the competitive environment, competitive actions and the 
likelihood to exit of design-based entrepreneurial ventures. We find strong empirical 
support for our theoretical framework based on panel data of 188 design-based 
entrepreneurial ventures in the period from 1980 through 2006.   
Theory development 
  Innovation theorists conceptualize technological evolution in a product class as a 
cyclical model of punctuated equilibria (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Benner & Tushman, 2003; 1999; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). This 
theory argues that technology change begins with a technological breakthrough, or a 
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discontinuity, that introduces sharp improvements over existing technologies. Following 
a technological discontinuity is the ‘era of ferment’ in which several designs in the same 
product class compete fiercely to define the de facto standard (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Benner & Tushman, 2003; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). Since each design 
represents a potential technological trajectory in which various technological agents are 
involved, the design-based competition can be viewed as a competition between 
technological communities (Wade, 1995, 1996) or technological ecosystems (Adner & 
Kapoor, 2009; Teece, 2007), in which developers of original designs serve as central 
players. The design-based competition often, but not always, leads to the emergence of a 
de facto standard in the product class — a watershed event which changes the locus of 
competition in the technological domain from the competition between alternative 
designs to the maximization of profitability based on a winning design (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990). The stability of this ‘era of retention’ is uncertain, however, depending 
substantially on the extent to which the de facto standard can reduce technological 
variation in the industry — in fact, such variation can occur whenever a new design is 
introduced, whether it is discontinuous or incremental (Wade, 1995, 1996). 
For new ventures that are technologically capable, competing by original designs 
to initiate technology change represents an important strategy to destroy the competence 
of established technology leaders (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Jones, 2003; Wade, 
1996). However, the success (or exit) of such ‘design-based entrepreneurs’ is subject to 
two major risks from the industry. The first is technological variation, namely, the 
competition between alternative designs (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Srinivasan et al., 
2006). There are two reasons for technological variation to occur. First, when a new 
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technological concept is introduced in a product class, there is often more than one design 
to implement the new technological concept — these alternative designs will compete to 
decide which one should be the standard expression of products in the product class 
(Wade, 1995, 1996). Second, firms sponsoring previous designs will defend their market 
positions by revising the old designs or introducing competence-enhancing designs 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Shapiro & Varian, 1999a).  
The design-based competition is often fierce; in the literature, researchers refer to 
this competition using such terms as ‘standards war’ (Shapiro & Varian, 1999a), 
‘dominance battle’ (Suarez, 2004), ‘technology race’ (Lerner, 1997) or ‘systems 
competition’ (Hagedoorn et al., 2001; Katz & Shapiro, 1994). The outcome of design-
based competition is uncertain. Sometimes the competition leads to winner-take-all, 
whereby one design captures the whole market; or, the market may alternate as one 
design achieves temporary dominance and is then replaced by another design; or, several 
designs may coexist in long periods of time with no one being selected to dominate the 
market absolutely (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Arthur, 1989; Auriol & Benaim, 2000; 
Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Shapiro & Varian, 1999a; Suarez, 2004; Windrum & 
Birchenhall, 2005; Witt, 1997). 
The second risk facing design-based entrepreneurs is the industry’s selection of de 
facto standards. Once a design becomes the standard, it will decrease technical 
uncertainty in the product class and kick off the increasing returns mechanism to generate 
economies of scale and co-specialization with various periphery producers (Teece, 2007; 
Wade, 1995, 1996). Schilling (1998) summarizes two effects of the increasing returns 
mechanism: (1) a widely used design will be rapidly improved through learning-by-
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doing; and (2) network externalities are said to arise as the value of a design depends on 
the size of its installed base (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1986, 1992; 
Schilling, 2002; Sheremata, 2004; Suarez, 2004). Furthermore, from an institutional 
perspective, Hargadon and Douglas (2001) and Garud et al. (2002) argue that the 
emergence of a de facto standard  is not only a significant event in the technical domain, 
but also a social-economic signal which  legitimates the winning design and de-
legitimates all other designs. Yet it should be noted that, for a particular design-based 
entrepreneur, the emergence of a de facto standard represents a twofold possibility. On 
the one hand, the entrepreneur’s design may emerge as the de facto standard; on the other 
hand, a competing design may emerge as the de facto standard — these different 
outcomes can have very different performance implications for the focal design-based 
entrepreneur (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; McGrath et al., 1992; Murmann & Frenken, 
2006; Srinivasan et al., 2006).  
In addition to risk factors from the industry, Utterback and Suárez (1993) further 
consider the firm’s mistakes in undertaking competitive practices along with 
technological evolution as  a major source for organizational failure. Suarez (2004) 
specifically points out that, to be successful, a design-based firm must develop the ability 
to manage a repertoire of competitive actions, such as those of entry timing, pricing, 
licensing, partnerships, marketing and others. While the innovation literature traditionally 
examines how certain types of actions may influence the firm’s performance in design-
based competition (Christensen et al., 1998; Suarez, 2004; Suarez & Utterback, 1995), 
this perspective might be supplemented by an overview of the general characteristics of 
the firm’ competitive repertoire   — the approach usually used in competitive dynamics 
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research  (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999; Miller & Chen, 1994, 1996). In 
this paper, we develop a perspective to bridge these two relatively disconnected bodies of 
literature. On the one hand, we follow the competitive dynamics researchers to propose a 
direct link between a design-based entrepreneur’s likelihood to exit and its concentration 
in competitive actions, defined as the degree to which a design-based entrepreneur tends 
to focus on certain types of competitive actions (Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller & Chen, 
1996). On the other hand, we argue that the strength of this relationship may be 
influenced by the factors in the process of technological evolution. A summary of these 
considerations leads to our integrative framework as illustrated in Figure 12.   
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Technological Variation 
To assess the effects of technological variation, we examine how the total number 
of competing designs in a product class will influence the success (or exit) of a focal 
design-based entrepreneur. Rooted in institutional theory, Hannan and Freeman’s (1988; 
1986) density-dependence theory conceptualizes two competing mechanisms that link the 
number of competitors in the industry to the success of a focal firm. The first is 
legitimation. Accordingly to Hannan and Freeman, when a market is first developed, 
increases in the number of firms offering similar products /services will encourage more 
entrants into the industry, reduce barriers to capital acquisition, and signal entrepreneurs 
of the business opportunities (Wade, 1996). Essentially, these mechanisms will result in 
increased legitimacy as customers and capital market increasingly accept the new 
products or services as ‘taken-for-granted’, which in turn enhances firms’ success. The 
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other mechanism that develops in parallel is competition. Overtime, increases in the 
number of firms will intensify competition for resources and customers, leading to 
increased difficulty for firms to generate profitability. At some point, the effect of 
competition will outpace the effect of legitimacy. Thus, Hannan and Freeman propose an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the total number of competitors in an industry 
and firms’ survival chance.         
Drawing on Hannan and Freeman’s theory, Wade (1995, 1996) suggests that 
legitimation and competition represent two competing drivers in design-based 
competition too. On the one hand, original designs create new product classes and new 
meanings in the technological field (Garud et al., 2010; Verganti, 2009); in this process, 
the need for legitimacy highlights the value of having more designs in the same product 
class (Navis & Glynn). Wade (1996) specifically argues that legitimation works in two 
aspects. First, customers often have high switching costs when they decide to invest in a 
particular design. To avoid ‘being strangled’, they are very cautious in evaluating the 
potential of each design and are more likely to invest in designs that are ‘taken-for-
granted’ (Arthur, 1989; Farrell & Klemperer, 2006; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995).  
Second, the technical specifications of new designs are often poorly understood and 
functionalities are unstable (Anderson & Tushman, 1990); more similar designs in the 
market will help enhance the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of the new technology and justify 
the values it produces (Wade, 1996). Hargadon and Douglas (2001) find that when firms 
introduce new designs to displace old designs, it is very important for the new designs to 
exploit the institutions established by old designs; immediate replacement of old designs 
may actually lead to poor diffusion of new designs. Following a similar logic, Garud and 
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colleagues (2002) further suggest that a design-based entrepreneur is in fact an 
institutional entrepreneur whose success depends substantially on the ability to extend the 
institutional space by involving more players, even competitors, through technological 
openness. In some cases, the seek for legitimacy may encourage firms sponsoring 
competing designs to develop compatibility across designs — these collective actions 
encourage co-existence of multiple designs in the same product class (Annabelle & 
Cusumano, 2002; Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Dahlander & Gann, 2010; West, 2003).  
On the other hand, different designs compete fiercely for technological leadership 
and market share (Arthur, 1989; Arthur, 1996; Auriol & Benaim, 2000; Farrell & 
Klemperer, 2006; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995; Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1998; Witt, 
1997). The competitive dynamics between designs has two major characteristics. First, 
design-based competition normally involves only a very limited number of designs; 
however, each design represents a technological trajectory and is supported by a large 
number of periphery complementors (Teece, 2007). Second, due to network effects and 
learning-by-doing, the dominance of a single design is self-reinforcing (Schilling, 1998, 
2002); in effect, the success of one design often results in sharply decreased market 
shares for all other designs (Gallagher, 2007; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Saloner & Shepard, 
1995; Srinivasan et al., 2006; Stremersch et al., 2007). The rise of JVC’s VHS, for 
example, reduced the market share of its major competitor, Sony’s Betamax, to minimum 
(Cusumano et al., 1992). From a competitive point of view, a single design here 
represents no less competitive threat than, say, ten designs — the competitive threat 
imposed by additional designs is relatively marginal. Thus, the entry of the very first few 
designs will impose significant threat against a focal design-based entrepreneur but offer 
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limited legitimation effect. As the total number of competing designs continues to 
increase, the legitimation effect becomes stronger while the increase in competitive threat 
demonstrates diminishing return. Eventually, legitimation will exert stronger influence 
than competition. These arguments lead to our first hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 1: The total number of competing designs will have a curvilinear 
(Inverted U-Shaped) relationship with a focal design-based entrepreneur’s 
likelihood to exit. Specifically, the first few number of competing designs will 
increase a focal design-based entrepreneur’s likelihood to exit; however, after the 
total number of competing designs reaches a certain point, additional number of 
competing designs will decrease a  focal design-based entrepreneur’s likelihood 
to exit. 
The Emergence of de facto Standards 
We follow Anderson and Tushman (1990) to define a de facto standard as a single 
technological design that establishes dominance in a product class (Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978; Anderson et al., 2005; Benner & Tushman, 2003; Soh, 2009). A product 
class may not select any design as the de facto standard in long periods. Once a design 
becomes the de facto standard, however, it exerts profound influence on organizations 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Funk, 2004; Soh, 2009; Srinivasan et al., 2006; Weiss & 
Birnbaum, 1989). First, future innovation will be regulated to a technological order based 
on the winning design  (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Sahal, 1981; Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975). As technical uncertainty declines substantially in the product class, 
economies of scale and incremental improvements to enhance the winning design 
become the focus of the technological community (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Teece, 
2007; Wade, 1995, 1996). The rise of a standard also signals the de facto leadership of 
the winning design, forcing producers of various complementary products to obey the 
‘rules of engagement’ dictated by the winner (Christensen et al., 1998; Garud et al., 2002; 
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Murmann & Frenken, 2006; Soh, 2009; Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Tegarden et al., 
1999). Marketwise,  large volumes of sales and high availability of periphery products 
send signals to customers indicating the value of the design, triggering bandwagon in 
adoption (Wade, 1996). Additionally, once a design establishes absolute market 
dominance, all other designs will have to compete in a small market space, which 
increases hazards for their sponsors. Absolute dominance in market share also largely 
brings down the production costs for the winner, putting all other designs in a price 
disadvantage (Farrell & Saloner, 1985, 1986; Saloner & Shepard, 1995).  
For a focal design-based entrepreneur, the emergence of a de facto standard 
represents a twofold possibility. First, a competing design may become the de facto 
standard. This event announces the failure of the focal entrepreneur in design-based 
competition. While the design-based entrepreneur may continue to market its own design, 
customers and producers of periphery products are more interested in supporting the 
winning design, making it very difficult for the design-based entrepreneur to diffuse its 
technology. The continuous loss of market share may eventually force the entrepreneur to 
exit. Thus, we hypothesize:     
Hypothesis 2: The emergence of a competing design as the de facto standard will 
increase a focal design-based entrepreneur’s likelihood to exit.  
The second possibility is that a design-based entrepreneur may establish a de facto 
standard in the product class. Success in the dominance battle highlights the entrepreneur 
as the de facto technological leader (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Teece, 2007), allowing 
the new venture to exploit such advantages as extensive coordination in the industry, 
complementary products, learning curve, bandwagon effects and institutionalization 
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(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Garud et al., 2002; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Schilling, 1998, 
2002; Suarez, 2004, 2005). In spite of these benefits, the ability to predict the 
organizational success of the de novo technological leader is still an uncertain process. 
First, the emergence of new technologies represents a constant threat against the design-
based entrepreneur — in fact, each slightly improved design could constitute substantial 
risk to dethrone the leading position of the new venture (Wade, 1995, 1996). In addition, 
design-based entrepreneurs often use unusual strategies to win the dominance battle, such 
as those of technological openness, cross-licensing, and collaborative innovation (Garud 
et al., 2002; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993). These strategies, while useful in competing 
against other designs, may at the same time foster technological imitation and sometimes 
create technological clones in the same product class, giving rise to head-to-head 
competition in a later stage. For instance, to establish a de facto standard in the personal 
computer market, IBM allowed other computer manufacturers to access its core 
technology; the competitors thus created later competed fiercely with IBM and eventually 
drove the company out of the market. Furthermore, researchers suggest that after a 
design-based entrepreneur establishes a de facto standard, the changes in competitive 
emphasis requires the firm to substantially adjust its competitive practices; the firms’ 
inability to accomplish this transition will be a major source for organizational failure 
(Utterback & Suárez, 1993).  
In spite of these challenges, design-based entrepreneurs controlling de facto 
standards do have certain advantages in rivaling against other designs. The self-
reinforcing installed base, for instance, allows the entrepreneur to offset the competitive 
advantage of more innovated designs (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1992). Technological 
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dominance also reduces the motivation of other design-based firms to undertake 
aggressive actions. From a competitive point of view, firms’ decision to undertake 
competitive attacks largely depends on the expected payoffs (Besen & Farrell, 1994; 
Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992; Shapiro & Varian, 
1999a, b; Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 2000). If a competitive action is likely to 
generate threatening retaliation, the firm tends to withdraw the action (Chen, 1996). 
Mirroring this logic, Shapiro and  Varian (1999a) suggest that designs that fail to become 
de facto standards should seek truce rather than competition with the de facto standard— 
for example, these designs may develop compatibility with the de facto standard. For 
firms controlling standards, the collective action of this kind not only reduces the threat 
of technological variation but also will further enhance the legitimacy of the its own 
technology. Thus, we argue that the relationship between technological variation and the 
exit of a design-based entrepreneur will demonstrate a different pattern if the technology 
of the design-based entrepreneur becomes the de facto standard. Specifically, after a 
design-based entrepreneur establishes a standard, (1) the rate of increase in its likelihood 
to exit due to competitive threat will be lower; and (2) the rate of decrease in its 
likelihood to exit due to legitimation will be faster. A summary of these arguments leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The emergence of a focal entrepreneur’s design as the de facto 
standard will moderate the relationship between the total number of competing 
designs in the same product category and the focal design-based entrepreneur’s 
likelihood to exit.   
Concentration in Competitive Actions 
Concentration in competitive actions captures a design-based entrepreneur’s 
strategic orientation to develop specialization in a narrow range of activities, or, to 
72 
 
compete more generally by engaging in a broader range of activities (Ferrier et al., 1999). 
Schumpeter (1934b, 1950) describes the firm’s competitiveness as the ability to 
undertake a wider range of competitive actions. Accordingly, firms’ concentration in 
certain types of competitive actions is considered as an indicator of the firm’s action 
simplicity (Miller & Chen, 1996), lack of resources (Ferrier et al., 1999) and/or 
competitive unaggressiveness (Yu et al., 2009). Miller and Chen (1996) cite Ross 
Ashby’s (1956) ‘law of requisite variety’ to argue that the firm must have a 
comprehensive, diversified competitive repertoire to capture different customer needs; in 
contrast, concentrating only on certain kinds of actions carries the risk of missing 
important market contingencies (Miller, 1992). From a resource-based view, Ferrier 
(1999) suggests that the abundance of firm resources often allows the firm to launch a 
variety of competitive actions; in contrast, the firm’s concentration in certain competitive 
actions may manifest  resources scarcity and therefore is negatively related to its 
performance. In a later paper, Ferrier (2001) further introduces a game theory perspective 
to examine the effects of firms’ concentration in competitive actions. He argues that the 
firm competing with diversified activities will increase the difficulty for rivals to respond; 
however, if the firm’s competitive weapon is limited, the likelihood of response from 
rivals will increase, which in turn generates negative impact on firm performance.  
In the literature on design-based competition, researchers have also discussed the 
potential danger of concentration in competitive practices. Arthur (1989; 1996) suggests 
that due to the increasing returns mechanism, a small lead in the installed base may 
enable a design to eventually capture the entire market. Accordingly, design-based 
entrepreneurs must pay attention to various ‘insignificant events’ to address the non-
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predictability of this competitive war —concentrating only on certain activities may fail 
to address some important market contingencies and thus increase the risk of 
technological lock-out. Warner and colleagues (2006) suggest that a real option logic 
may help manage the uncertainty in design-based competition. Warner and colleagues 
particularly focus on design-based firms’ technology strategy before the emergence of 
standards. According to them, it is beneficial that design-based firms invest in multiple 
technological areas to keep growth options open; in contrast, only developing specialized 
competence in a particular technical area may increase the risk of technological lock-out 
(Kauffman & Li, 2005; McGrath, 1997; Warner et al., 2006). We argue that the real 
option logic not only addresses a design-based entrepreneur’s technology strategy but 
also applies to other competitive activities as well. Indeed, constant technology change 
and market uncertainty requires the design-based entrepreneurs to use various 
competitive weapons to deal with the changing competitive dynamics. As a result, 
concentration in competitive actions overall may have a negative influence on design-
base entrepreneurs’ long-term success. Thus, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 4: Overall, the degree of concentration in a design-based 
entrepreneur’s competitive repertoire will be positively related to the design-
based entrepreneur’s likelihood to exit.  
Technological and market uncertainty highlights the importance of having a wider 
range of competitive actions; the stability in the technological market, however, may 
favor firms competing with specialized competitive repertoires (Miller & Chen, 1996). A 
watershed event in design-based competition substantially reducing market uncertainty is 
that the design of the entrepreneur becomes the de facto standard in the product class 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Once a design-based entrepreneur establishes a de facto 
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standard, practices in the technological domain will be regulated by the ‘rules of 
engagement’. Now, standardized operations and specialization become the focal point of 
competitive actions (Garud et al., 2002; Teece, 2007).  Teece (2007) stresses the 
importance of ‘co-specialization’, arguing that firms controlling standards must 
concentrate on technological collaboration to gain competitive advantage in the 
standardization process. Utterback and Suárez (1993) suggest that successful design-
based entrepreneurs will be those who manage to transform from ‘generalists’ to 
‘specialists’ — firms that concentrate on a narrow range of competitive practices. A 
similar idea is also presented by Romanelli(1989). Thus, we hypothesize:      
Hypothesis 5: The emergence of a design-based entrepreneur’s design as the de 
facto standard will weaken the positive relationship between the degree of 
concentration in the design-based entrepreneur’s competitive repertoire and its 
likelihood to exit. 
Methods 
Sample  
An appropriate sample to test our hypotheses required identifying new 
organizations that have involved in design-based competition. For this purpose, we must 
develop a pool of technological designs that competed to define de facto standards. 
Previous empirical studies on similar topics suffered a major limitation in identifying a 
substantial number of such technological designs: the largest sample used for hypothesis 
testing was developed by Srinivasan and colleagues (2006) who identified 63 office 
products and consumer durables. We designed our research to overcome this limitation. 
By talking to industrial experts and reading extensively various trade journals, we 
recognized that the emergence of a de facto standard is a major industrial event and will 
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likely capture substantial attention in media. Logically, we expected that an extensive 
search in various media sources should allow us to identify a significant number of such 
design-base competitors. Having this idea in mind, we utilized a search process which 
involved three major steps. In Step One, we developed a thesaurus to capture the core 
concept of a ‘de facto standard’ — a technological design that dominates the market. 
After we extensively read research publications and trade journals and talked to various 
industrial experts, we found that the phenomenon could be referred to alternatively in the 
media using such terms as ‘dominant design’, ‘technology /technological standard’, 
‘industry/industrial standard’, ‘standards war’, ‘dominance battle’ and/or ‘standards 
competition’. For an inclusive search, we included all these keywords to construct our 
first thesaurus (Thesaurus One).  
In Step Two, we launched a search at Lexis-Nexis database using Thesaurus One, 
yielding more than 10,000 newspaper articles containing at least one keyword. A review 
of these articles uncovered a number of technological designs involved in creating de 
facto standards. In further investigation, however, we found that a large portion of these 
technologies were duplicates and some were irrelevant or ambiguous, which substantially 
reduced our pool to 167 technologies. We carefully examined each technology to 
understand which product class it belonged to using following sources: Software 
Taxonomy and Hardware Taxonomy developed by a leading market research company, 
technical descriptions offered in public sources such as newspapers, company websites 
and annual reports, and expert opinions. The investigation indicated that the 167 
technological designs belonged to 145 product categories.  
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Step Three involved an additional search for ‘competitors’ of aforementioned 
technological designs using a thesaurus (Thesaurus Two) of keywords such as 
‘competitors’, ‘competing’, ‘compete’, ‘rival’, ‘defeat’ and many others16
The final pool included 358 technological designs in 145 product categories. A 
further investigation indicated that these technological designs were sponsored by 253 
organizations in which 188 were firms incorporated after 1980. We then carefully 
examined the products/technologies of these firms and found that standardization was the 
core strategy for all firms since their incorporation. Thus, this group of firms constituted 
an appropriate sample to test our hypotheses.    
. This search 
was necessary because it substantially adjusted the skewness towards more successful 
technological designs in our search. For example, in the search for technological designs 
competing to establish de facto standards in spreadsheet market, using Thesaurus One 
only uncovered two successful technological designs: ‘Lotus 1-2-3’ and ‘Microsoft 
Excel’; however, using Thesaurus Two, we further identified such technological designs 
as ‘Quattro Pro’ and ‘VP Planner’, which were unsuccessful rivals against ‘Lotus 1-2-3’. 
This exhaustive search enabled us to capture most of the technological designs in a given 
product category.  
Measures 
Likelihood to Exit. The analysis of organizations’ exit, or failure, has been a 
typical approach to test firm performance from a longitudinal perspective. We defined the 
firm’s exit as the event that the firm discontinued to operate as an independent 
organization. To operationalize the firm’s likelihood to exit, we used event history 
                                                          
16 The complete list has 32 keywords and will be provided upon request. 
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analysis to model firms’ hazard for exit. We collected information about firm exits from 
various sources: VentureXpert, LexisNexis, Mergent and 10-k Forms. The data indicated 
that firms could exit from the marketplace in various forms which included bankruptcy, 
disbanding, merger and  acquisition (M&A) (Cattani, Ferriani, Negro, & Perretti, 2008). 
In particular, M&As of private firms were a complex issue — for instance, Waguespack 
and Fleming (2009) argue that some M&As of private firms should be considered as 
liquidity events which indicated superior firm performance. In addition, there was also 
the ‘living dead’ phenomenon associated with new ventures (Ruhnka, Feldman, & Dean, 
1992). To address this complexity, we investigated each M&A in detail to understand 
whether the M&A truly indicated organizational discontinuity. However, we could not 
find enough information to identify the post M&A performance for many private firms. 
Thus we separated M&As of public companies (89 firms) from those of private 
companies (99 firms) and then used separate models to compare the difference — similar 
results were reported. To deal with the ‘living dead’ problem, we carefully examined 
firms’ competitive actions: The firm was considered as a ‘living dead’ if it no longer 
launched competitive actions even though the organization still existed.   
Based on this information, we modeled the instantaneous hazard for exit of a 
design-based entrepreneur in a given year t, as:  
 
where  represented the time when the observation window was closed,  indicated the 
likelihood of that an exit would occur during the time interval from to  .  
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Total Number of Competing Designs. The three-step search allowed us to 
develop listings of competing designs in each product category. We then collected 
information about the entry and exit of each technological design. An entry was recorded 
when the firm first introduced a design; the information was collected from newspapers 
in LexisNexis database, and then verified with other sources such as annual report, 
company website, information provided by other research articles or books. Exit was 
recorded when the firm discontinued the product line. We also recorded exit of a 
technology if it completely disappeared from all public sources. In addition, following 
Tushman and Anderson (1986), exit was also recorded when the firm discontinued 
operating as an independent firm. With the entry-and-exit information, we constructed 
yearly listings of competing designs for all product categories to operationalize total 
Number of Competing Designs (Number of Competitors). 
Emergence and Time of de facto Standards. We followed the method of 
Srinivasan and colleagues (2006) to measure emergence and time of de facto standards. 
Srinivasan and colleagues’ (2006) methodology involved two steps. First, two graduate 
students content-analyzed various archival sources to identify whether and when a 
technological design has become a de facto standard (dominant design). Second, the 
authors validated this measure by collecting market share data17
2006
 and consulting multiple 
industrial experts. Srinivasan and colleagues ( ) reported high correlation (ρ =.86) 
between the de facto standard’s emergence times measured respectively by content 
analysis and market share data.  
                                                          
17 The criteria to decide whether and when a technology has become a de facto standard was that its market 
share was beyond 50 %, the same criteria used by Anderson and Tushman (1990).  
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We utilized the same procedure in this study. We first collected various archival 
information (e.g. research articles, books, trade journals, newspapers) reporting a 
particular technological design’s involvement in standardization 18
2006
. Two coders (one 
author and a Ph.D. student) separately read the articles to code whether and when a 
technological design has emerged as a de facto standard. The two coders unanimously 
coded the emergence and time of 105 technological designs as de facto standards. We 
then followed Srinivasan and colleagues ( ) to validate our measure. We collected 
market share data for each technological design; due to data unavailability, we only found 
market share data for 60 of the 105 technologies coded as de facto standards. We then 
correlated the de facto standards’ emergence times identified from two methods. A 
correlation of  .97 was reported, indicating high consistency between two measures. To 
further enhance our confidence, we invited several industrial experts to review the 
technological designs we identified as de facto standards and asked them to comment on 
(1) whether the technological designs should be considered as de facto standards and (2) 
when the technological designs, if ever, emerged as the de facto standards. Thus, we were 
reassured of the reliability of our measure. 
We then operationalized our variables using aforementioned information. As we 
mentioned above, for a design-based entrepreneurial venture in year t, the emergence of a 
technological design as the de facto standard represented a twofold possibility: (1) the 
emergence of a focal venture’s design as the de facto standard, or (2) the emergence of a 
competing firm’s design as the de facto standard. In addition, a design-based entrepreneur 
                                                          
18 We collected relevant research articles by a comprehensive literature review. We found relevant trade 
journals and newspapers by searching the technology’s name together with keywords such as ‘standard’ , 
‘dominance’,  ‘ winning’ and so on.    
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may establish more than one de facto standard, or compete with a number of standards in 
multiple product classes in a given year t. Thus we used the variable Own Standard to 
denote the number of de facto standards a design-based entrepreneur possessed in year t. 
We used Competitor Standard to denote the total number of de facto standards 
established by the design-based entrepreneur’s competitor(s) in the product classes in 
year t. If two designs emerged as de facto standards chronologically, the first one was 
recorded as dethroned after the second one established de facto standard.       
Concentration in Competitive Actions. To operationalize concentration in 
competitive actions, we first indentified competitive actions. A competitive action is 
defined as an individual move that the firm undertakes to enhance its market position 
(Chen, 1996; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & 
Chen, 1991; Yu et al., 2009). To identify the competitive actions of design-based 
entrepreneurs, we collected textual data in published news articles and wires from the 
LexisNexis database. We limited our search to Business Wires. To establish that Business 
Wires was the appropriate source for our purpose, we randomly selected ten design-based 
entrepreneurs and searched in LexisNexis database for all news articles that had the 
names of the companies in their headlines. Then, we listed out the first ten outlets that 
had most hits in the search, whereby we found that Business Wires stood on the top of the 
list. Next, we randomly selected 50 news articles for each company from other outlets to 
see whether they were reported in Business Wires as well. A careful review of these 
articles revealed that more than 90 per cent of the news articles reported in other outlets 
were also reported by Business Wires. Thus, we were confident that Business Wires was 
an appropriate source to collect data for competitive actions.  
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 Following Ferrier (1999), we focused on news headlines to identify the 
competitive actions. We included all news headlines from Business Wires that contained 
the name of a company in our sample. When the name or abbreviation of the company 
led to confusion, we used LexisNexis ’s ‘intelligent indexing’ function  to screen out 
irrelevant headlines, a technique used by Uotila and colleagues (2009). An extensive 
reading of these news headlines and the literature on competitive dynamics suggested that 
these competitive actions belonged to 13 categories: ‘Introduce a new product / 
innovation’, ‘Update an existing product’,  ‘Form product / innovation alliances’, ‘Form 
marketing based alliances’, ‘Merger and Acquisition’, ‘Open new divisions or restructure 
the organization’, ‘Involve in open source development’ ‘Sign licensing agreement’, 
‘Improve distribution  or customer services’, ‘HR action’, ‘Price action or Promotion’, 
‘Undertake legal action’, ‘Participate in trade events’. We validated these categories by 
consulting several management professors and industrial experts and they agreed that 
these were the common most types of competitive actions in the information technology 
industries. 
We then used a software package, PASW Text Analytics for Survey, to categorize 
the competitive actions. PASW Text Analytics for Survey is a software package developed 
by SPSS Inc. to code textual data into meaningful categories. There were several 
advantages of using this software. First,  PASW Text Analytics for Survey utilized several 
automated linguistic techniques to enhance the reliability of the computer-aided coding. 
To assess its accuracy and reliability, we ask two coders to manually coded 600 headlines 
and then used the software to code the same news headlines; a detailed review of the 
coding results indicated that there was very high consistency between human and 
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computer-aided coding (greater than 80 percent agreement).  The second advantage of 
using computer-aided coding was that it allowed us to handle large dataset with relatively 
high efficiency. As the number of observations increased, the impact of a single coding 
mistake could be substantially reduced (Uotila et al., 2009).Accordingly, we used PASW 
Text Analytics for Survey to code our competitive actions data. The final dataset 
contained 32,941 competitive actions.  
With the competitive actions data, we operationalized concentration in 
competitive actions using a composite measure. Following previous research (Ferrier et 
al., 1999; Yu et al., 2009), we first calculated the overall concentration of a design-based 
entrepreneur’s competitive actions by estimating the extent to which a design-based 
entrepreneur carried out a broad range as opposed to a narrow range of competitive 
actions in year t.  Using Ni,,j,,k
 
 to denote the total number of actions a design-based 
entrepreneur undertook in a particular type of action  j, we calculated the overall 
concentration index in year t as follows: 
Miller and Chen (1996) suggest that the firm’s focus on certain types of actions 
may also be reflected by its emphasis on the single most common type of action in year t. 
Thus we calculated the dominance index using the following formula: 
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We performed a factor analysis on the two indices and a high Cronbach’s Alpha 
(.98) indicated the internal consistency between two indices. Thus, we took average of 
two scores as the final measure for concentration in competitive actions. We used one-
year lag in our analysis to adjust for the effect that a company may undertake less actions 
in the year in which exit occurred. 
Control Variables. We controlled several industry and firm level variables to rule 
out plausible alternative explanations. Previous research has indicated that market 
demand and market competition may influence the survival of new organizations 
(Brittain & Freeman, 1980; Romanelli, 1989). Thus, we controlled for market demand 
using the total sales in year t of all firms sharing the first two digits in SIC code with the 
focal design-based entrepreneur. With a similar method, we controlled for the effects of 
market competition using total number of firms in year t. At the firm level, we controlled 
for the size of design-based entrepreneurial ventures using the number of employees in 
year t and the effects of firm age. We used a time-varying dichotomous variable to 
control for the new ventures’ IPO status in year t and noontime-varying dichotomous 
variable to indicate whether the venture received VC funding. Research on competitive 
dynamics has suggested that the overall competitive aggressiveness may influence firm 
performance (Ferrier et al., 1999; Yu et al., 2009). Consistent with this research, we 
collected yearly data to control for the firm’s overall competitive aggressiveness using its 
total number of competitive actions in year t-1. Finally, we controlled for the year effects 
by including a dichotomous variable, Years80-89, to indicate if the design-based 
entrepreneurial venture was incorporated in the period between 1980-1989.    
Analysis 
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Our dataset consisted of longitudinal observations reflecting how industrial and 
firm strategy changes may influence design-based entrepreneurs’ likelihood to exit. To 
model this dynamics process, we need not only consider whether a design-based 
entrepreneur has exit from the market, but also when it exit, as well as the industrial 
conditions and its competitive strategy at the time or before the occurrence of its exit. We 
also need to address the challenge of censoring: while we did not observe the firm’s exit 
in our data, it may exit right after the completion of our observation at the year 2006. 
These requirements made the discrete method of event history analysis the salient 
analytical technique. The event history analysis techniques provide alternative ways to 
deal with time-dependent covariates of this kind; one extensively used method includes 
Cox regression model (Allison, 1995, 2001; Waguespack & Fleming, 2009). 
Nevertheless, Allison (1995) points out that Cox regression involves quite complex data 
manipulation and computational procedures,  and one can easily make a mistake with 
realizing. Alternatively, Sarkar and colleagues (2006) used the random-effects 
complementary  models to handle a similar analysis based on unbalanced firm-year panel 
data, a data structure similar to ours. However, the log_log model suffers a limitation by 
assuming that the hazard follows a complementary log_log distribution. In view of the 
strengths and weaknesses of these methods, we decided to conduct parallel analyses 
using both models to test our hypotheses. Accordingly, the model specifications were: 
 
for Cox model, where  represented the value of the kth  variable for firm i at time t ,   
denoted the baseline hazard, and  
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For log_log model, where  represented the probability that exit will occur for firm i at 
time t.  
  Results 
Table 5 presents the results of our analysis predicting the relationships between 
industry conditions and design-based entrepreneurs’ hazard for exit. In both Cox and  
models, a positive coefficient in the outputs indicated a positive relationship between the 
independent variable and hazard for exit. Model C1 and Model LL1 included only control 
variables. We found evidence suggesting that design-based entrepreneurs’ hazard for exit 
was negatively related to market demand, but positively related with the total number of 
competitors. The firm size variable was significant and negative, indicating that larger 
design-based entrepreneurs have had lower hazard for exit.  We also found that design-
based entrepreneurs incorporated in 1980s suffered lower hazard for exit, compared with 
those that came into being after 1990, perhaps due to first mover advantages in the 
emerging IT industries. We also found several surprising results. First, we found design-
based entrepreneurs’ IPO status had a significant and positive relationship with its hazard 
for exit. In addition, our analyses reported contradictory results in terms of the 
relationship between firm age and hazard for exit in Cox versus Log_log models. Finally, 
we did not find significant relationship between design-based entrepreneurs’ total 
competitive actions in time t-1 and hazard for exit at time t.  
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Hypothesis 1 predicts that the total number of competing designs in the same 
product class will have a quadratic relationship with a design-based entrepreneur’s hazard 
for exit in the way that the first few number of competing designs will increase a focal 
design-based entrepreneur’s hazard for exit; after the total number of competitors reaches 
a certain point, additional number of competing designs will decrease a focal design-
based entrepreneur’s hazard for exit. If this hypothesis holds, the coefficients in the 
regression models for the total number of competitors should be positive and the 
coefficients for its square term should be negative. Model C2 and Model LL2 tested this 
hypothesis (see Table 5). The coefficients for the total number of competing designs were 
positive and significant (Cox: β = .51, p < .001; Log_log: β = .51, p < .001), and the 
coefficients for its square term were negative and significant (Cox: β = - .05, p < .05; 
Log_log: β = - .06, p < .01), providing strong support for Hypothesis 1.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 5 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the emergence of a competing design as the de facto 
standard will increase a focal design-based entrepreneur’s hazard for exit. We used 
Model C3 and Model LL3 to test this hypothesis. The coefficients for Competitor 
Standard were positive and significant (Cox: β = .54, p < .001;  Log_log: β =  .71, p < 
.001 ), strongly supporting our hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3 argues that the emergence of a focal entrepreneur’s design as the de 
facto standard will moderate the relationship between the total number of competing 
designs in the same product category and the focal design-based entrepreneur’s hazard 
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for exit. To test this hypothesis, we constructed Cox regression Models C4, C5 and C6, 
and Log_log Models LL4, LL5, and LL6.  In Models C4 and LL4, we included variables, 
Own Standard, Number of Competitors and its square term. Then we moved on to 
construct Model C5 and LL5, in which we included interaction term, Own Standard × 
Number of Competitors,  to test whether Own Standard moderates the linear effects of  
total number of competitors on design-based entrepreneur’s likelihood to exit. The 
coefficients for the interaction terms were negative but only significant for one-tailed 
tests (Cox: β = -.18, p < .05 one-tailed; Log_log: β = .51, p <.10 one-tailed), providing 
weak support for the hypothesis. We then constructed Model C6 which included two 
interaction terms , Own Standard × Number of Competitors  and , Own Standard × 
Number of Competitors Square, to further test whether Own Standard moderates the 
nonlinear effects of total number of competitors on design-based entrepreneur’s 
likelihood to exit. We found no support for this expectation.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 6 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Table 6 presents the results of our analysis predicting the relationships between 
the degree of a design-based entrepreneur’s concentration in competitive actions and its 
hazard for exit. Again, we utilized Cox and  models in our analysis. Models C7 and LL7 
only involved control variables. In addition to the control variables in Models C1 and 
LL1, we controlled for the effects of total number of competing designs due to the reason 
that this variable might affect the effectiveness of design-based entrepreneurs’ 
competitive actions. Models C8 and LL8 tested Hypothesis 4 which predicts that a higher 
degree of concentration in competitive actions of a design-based entrepreneur will be 
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positively related to its hazard for exit. After we added the two variables, Concentration 
and Own Standard, into the model, we found that the coefficient for Concentration was 
positive and significant in both models, suggesting that as Concentration increased, the 
design-based entrepreneurs had higher hazard for exit.  Thus, we Hypothesis 4 was 
supported.  
We then added the interaction term Concentration × Own Standard in Models C9 
and LL9, respectively, to test the moderation effect as predicted by Hypothesis 5.  
Accordingly to Hypothesis 5, after the emergence of a design-based entrepreneur’s 
design as the de facto standard, the negative relationship between a design-based 
entrepreneur’s concentration in competitive actions and its hazard for exit will become 
weaker. The results in Model C9 and LL9 both showed that the interaction term, 
Concentration × Own Standard , was significant (-1.50, p< .05; -1.57, p< .05). By a 
partial differentiation of Model C9 with respect to Concentration, we got  
  
 The Equation indicated that when a design-based entrepreneur has not yet 
established a de facto standard (Own Standard < 1), Concentration will be positively 
related to the  hazard to exit; however, after the design-based entrepreneur established a 
de facto standard,  this effect will be largely offset — in this situation, Concentration will 
be negatively related to the  hazard for exit. Similar results were reported in Model LL11. 
Therefore, our Hypothesis 5 was supported.     
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Discussion 
Overall, the results provided support for our theoretical framework. The first set 
of results indicated that the two risk factors from the industry, the total number of 
competing designs in the product class and the emergence of a de facto standard, had 
strong effects on design-based entrepreneurs’ hazard for exit. Consistent with our first 
hypothesis, we found a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between the total 
number of competing designs and the design-based entrepreneurs’ likelihood to exit. We 
also found that when a competing design became the de facto standard, the focal design-
based entrepreneur experienced higher hazard for exit. Additionally, we found support 
for the expectation that the emergence of a focal entrepreneur’s design as the de facto 
standard will moderate the relationship between the total number of competing designs 
and the design-based entrepreneur’s hazard for exit. 
Our second set of results indicated that overall, design-based entrepreneurs’ 
concentration in competitive actions was associated with higher hazard for exit. This 
finding was consistent with the competitive dynamics literature whereby concentration in 
competitive actions is considered as an indicator of competitive simplicity (Ferrier et al., 
1999; Miller & Chen, 1996; Yu et al., 2009). However, we found that the effectiveness of 
this strategy depended substantially on the design-based entrepreneurs’ status quo in the 
design-based competition — as the entrepreneur’s design became the de facto standard, 
the positive relationship between concentration in competitive repertoire and hazard for 
exit turned negative. Our findings echoed Utterback and Suárez (1993) who argue that 
successful design-based firms would be those who transform from ‘generalists’ to 
‘specialists’. 
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Our research is linked to several research streams in the literature. Addressing a 
related topic, Wade (1995, 1996) has found that as the number of competing designs 
increased in the microprocessor market,  the entry of alternative designs first increased 
and then decreased; similarly, the entry of second source (e.g., organizations that had a 
stake in the design) into a technological community first increased and then decreased. 
Drawing from Hannan and Freeman’s (1988) density dependence theory, Wade (1995, 
1996) explains that when the density of competing designs is low, legitimation effect 
tends to dominate, encouraging more design sponsors and second source providers to 
enter the market. As the density continues to grow, however, competition effect will 
eventually dominate, which makes the product class less attractive and thus reduces entry 
rate of design sponsors and second source providers.  
Our research differs from Wade’s (1995, 1996) studies. Broadly speaking, Wade 
(1995, 1996) has primarily focused on how competing designs may affect the competitive 
condition; in contrast, we examine how design-based competition will influence 
organizational outcome for design-based entrepreneurs. While we also consider the 
competing effects of legitimation and competition, our research suggests that the effects 
of these mechanisms may differ from the traditional density-dependence theory, at least, 
when the exit (or survival) of design-based entrepreneurs is the focal point of research. 
Specifically, our research suggests that the first few competing designs impose a very 
strong influence on the performance of a specific design-based entrepreneur, perhaps due 
to the winner-take-all dynamics. As the number of competing designs continues to 
increase, however, the additional threat imposed by the presence of more designs might 
be marginal. On the other hand, the legitimation effect grows steadfastly as additional 
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competing designs enter the market, which eventually outpaces the effect of competition. 
Nevertheless, we are cautious in interpreting our results because the total numbers of 
competing designs in the product classes studied in our research were relatively small 
(the largest number was 12). It is possible that as the number of competing designs 
continues to increase, the competition effect will again outpace the legitimation effect, as 
indicated in the density dependence theory.  
Our research offers further support for conclusions drawn from prior research on 
the link between dominant designs and survival of firms. Prior researchers have in 
general agreed that firms must deploy technology strategies supporting dominant designs; 
aligning with designs that fail to win dominance may increase organizational hazard  
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Christensen et al., 1998; Suarez & Utterback, 1995; 
Tegarden et al., 1999). Our research supports this argument by showing that the 
emergence of competing designs as de facto standards increased design-based 
entrepreneurs’ hazard for exit. Nevertheless, our research raises questions about the 
relationship between design-based entrepreneurs’ technological dominance and sustained 
competitive advantage. One may argue that the establishment of the firm’s design as the 
dominant technology in the product class should significantly enhance the firm’s long-
term profitability; however, our study indicates that winning the dominance battle at one 
point of time may not necessarily decrease design-based entrepreneurs’ likelihood to exit. 
While we have presented several potential reasons to explain this phenomenon, future 
research should use fine-grained measures to fully address this process, in particular, why 
successful dominant technology leaders such as Lotus Development and Netscape 
Communications would soon lose their leadership.     
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Our research highlights the role of design-based entrepreneurs’ competitive 
repertoires. Research on competitive dynamics has posited a positive link between firms’ 
complexity in the competitive repertoire and performance (Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller & 
Chen, 1996; Yu et al., 2009). Consistent with prior research, our research confirms that 
design-based entrepreneurs competing with higher degree of concentration in the 
competitive repertoires (lower degree of competitive complexity) in general have had 
higher hazard for exit. However, our research suggests that the effectiveness of such a 
strategy may depend on the status quo of the entrepreneurial firm. Miller and Chen 
(1996) have provided evidence that market stability moderates the relationship between 
firms’ concentration in competitive actions and performance. Consistent with their study, 
our results have shown that once the design-based entrepreneur’s technology emerges as 
the de facto standard (a signal of market stability), the negative relationship between a 
design-based entrepreneur’s hazard for exit and its concentration in competitive actions 
turns positive. Our findings echo  Teece’s (2007) logic of co-specialization in managing 
technological ecosystems —  a winning design-based entrepreneur is the de facto 
technology leader who must develop highly specialized skills and routines to manage 
technological dominance and transit from a specialist to a generalist Utterback and 
Suárez (1993). 
We are aware of the limitations of our research. In conceptualizing technological 
variation, we have only examined the effects of the total number of competing designs; 
the characteristics of each design were not formally documented. It is possible that the 
characteristics of competing designs per se have had caused the exit of design-based 
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, our approach represents an important perspective by linking 
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the density of competing designs to the performance of design-based entrepreneurs. 
Researchers have suggested that design-based competition often occurs between similar 
technologies (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). We carefully examined the competing 
designs in our sample to make sure that the competing designs in our study were 
relatively similar. To follow up with this line of thought, future research should include 
design-specific measures to capture the subtle differences across designs. We are also 
aware of the potential bias in our sampling strategy. While we have made painstaking 
efforts to identify all firms that have been involved in design-based competition, we 
might still have missed some of the firms, which might eventually bias our results. To 
reduce such a potential bias, we consulted several industrial and academic experts to 
make sure that we have captured at least most of the important cases of design-based 
competition. Furthermore, we used computer-aided coding to capture competitive 
actions. In spite of the advantages of this method, the reliability of the coding procedure 
requires researchers’ scrutiny in extending the method to other research settings.  
Conclusion  
Our study makes an important contribution by conceptualizing the mechanism in 
terms of how technological variation may exert influence on the performance of design-
based entrepreneurial ventures. We extend the current density-dependence perspective on 
technological variation to argue that when the performance of a design-based 
entrepreneur is the focal point of concern, the effects of legitimation and competition may 
function in a different pattern. We argue that due to increasing returns mechanism, the 
competitive threat imposed by a single, or very few, competitors can be severe, which in 
turn changes the overall joint effects of legitimation and competition, leading to 
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outcomes different from predictions of the traditional density-dependence theory. Our 
research also extends understanding on the relationship between technological dominance 
and firms’ sustained competitive advantage. Our results suggest that while the dominance 
of a competing design in the market may increase the likelihood of the focal design-based 
entrepreneur to exit, the technological dominance of its own design, however, does not 
necessarily enhance its survival. Furthermore, our research contributes to the competitive 
dynamics research by re-examining the relationship between competitive repertoire and 
firm performance in design-based competitive engagement. Consistent with prior 
research, our results suggest that design-based entrepreneurs concentrating on certain 
competitive actions in general experience high hazard for exit; however, this relationship 
demonstrates a different pattern after the new venture’s design becomes the de facto 
standard. Finally and methodologically, we used computer-aided content analysis 
techniques to operationalize data for competitive actions. Given its efficiency and 
accuracy, the method appears to have great promise for empirical research in competitive 
dynamics.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, DOMINANT DESIGNS AND 
COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 
Introduction 
The impact of technological change on industry and organizations has attracted 
substantial attention among theorists of innovation and strategy. A fruitful research 
stream has conceptualized technological change as an evolutionary process of 
technological variation, selection and retention (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). 
Technological discontinuities introduce variation into otherwise stable technological 
fields by creating new technological trajectories and markets,  followed by a selection 
process in which social, political and economic forces as well as entrepreneurship initiate 
competitive dynamics to determine a standard or a dominant design among various 
technological variants in the nascent market category (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Garud et al., 2010; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Navis & Glynn, 2010: 441). While some 
researchers have idealized the outcome of this selection as a winner-take-all solution 
whereby the entire market will conform to the agreed-upon product configuration defined 
by the dominant design (Schilling, 1998), more researchers have recognized that the 
increased popularity of complex technological systems  has added considerable 
complexity to the competitive dynamics surrounding dominant designs (Garud et al., 
2002; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993; Teece, 2007) —  in fact, even after a dominant 
design has emerged, competitors often follow closely behind to threaten the market 
leadership,  as reflected in the continued battles between Microsoft versus Apple in 
operating systems, Intel versus AMD in microprocessors, and Google versus Yahoo in 
search engines.   
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Process models of dominant designs have suggested varied technological stages in 
the lifecycle of a discontinuous innovation. Anderson and Tushman (1990) divided the 
process of technological change into eras of ferment versus retention, suggesting 
systematic differences between them. Suarez  (Suarez, 2004) conceptualized five major 
phases of a dominance battle — marked by a milestone (e.g., introduction of a product 
prototype or the emergence of a dominant design), "each phase is characterized by 
different dynamics that in turn make  some of the factors associated with dominance 
more relevant than others." At the micro-level, firms undertake competitive actions to 
address various uncertainty and competitive threats caused by industrial dynamism and 
competitors in each market stage and seek temporary advantages over rivals by "strategic 
surprise, speed, and simultaneous and sequential thrusts" (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Rindova et 
al., 2010: 1475). However, the problem with the conceptions of the process models of 
dominant designs is that they do not clearly reveal the co-evolvement of competitive 
dynamics with technological innovation, which calls for more research on how 
competition unfolds along the life cycle of dominant designs.    
We believe the sustained work on competitive dynamics provides a useful lens to 
observe the competitive process associated with dominant designs. Rooted in the 
Austrian view of the market as a disequilibrium system, the competitive dynamics 
research argues that competitive advantage is temporary and dynamic, embedded in the 
streams of competitive actions that firms undertake to disrupt the market positions of 
competitors (Jacobson, 1992; Rindova et al., 2010; Schumpeter, 1934b, 1950). Because 
of the rapid changes in technological field, firms competing to define dominant designs 
must remain unconfined from traditional practices and to be receptive to new actions in 
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the response to industrial dynamism and competitors' actions to succeed in new 
competitive landscapes in distinct technological stages (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Chen et al., 
2010). As a result, the competitive dynamics will demonstrate different patterns as 
technology evolves along the life cycle.  
To observe the overall characteristics of firms’ competitive behavior, competitive 
dynamics research has underscored three attributes of competitive actions to define the 
aggressiveness of rivaling firms: frequency (i.e., number of actions undertaken), 
magnitude ( i.e., resources committed to each action), and complexity ( i.e., the different 
types of actions taken) (Ferrier, 2001; Rindova et al., 2004; Yu et al., 2009). In this paper, 
we discuss how the frequency and complexity of firms’ competitive actions to ferment 
dominant designs co-evolve along the life cycle of technological discontinuities. We 
examine the influence of three factors: the maturity of the technological market, the 
density in the market category, and the emergence of dominant designs in the market 
category.  
We tested our hypotheses using a sample of 145 market categories (with total 358 
technological designs) sponsored by 253 organizations. We found that technological 
leaders sponsoring alternative designs compete more fiercely in the post-dominant design 
phase, in terms of both frequency and complexity of competitive action. Our longitudinal 
observation suggests that the maturity of a technology-based market category — captured 
by the age of the market category — has strong implication on the pattern of competitive 
dynamics in a market category. Specifically, our research suggests that the frequency of 
action between technologies pursuing dominant designs follows an S-curve (first increase 
and then decrease) along the linage of a nascent market category; however, competitive 
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complexity linearly increases over time as the market turns mature. We also found a 
strong association between patterns of competitive dynamics and density — i.e., the total 
number of competing technological leaders. We found density in general increases the 
frequency of action, but this association becomes weaker after the emergence of a 
dominant design. In contrast, we found a curvilinear ( inverted-U shaped) relationship 
between density and action complexity.  
Theory Development 
Technological change and dominant designs  
The evolution of technology is characteristically embedded in long periods of 
accumulation of research and development investments, knowledge acquisition, design of 
commercialized prototypes, and trial-by-error processes to introduce newly developed 
products to the market (Suarez, 2004; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Often unpredictably, 
a major technological advance may become a discontinuous force to disrupt the ordered 
process of technological change through sharp increases in price-performance ratio 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986), new substitutes to change older ways of doing things 
(Hargadon & Douglas, 2001), or unprecedented functions to create new market 
categories (Navis & Glynn, 2010).  As a technological discontinuity generates new 
demands by either opening a new market category or a powerful substitution of a 
previous one, the competition in the emerging technological order is substantial as 
alternative technological designs compete for dominance (Wade, 1995). This competitive 
process is characterized by a socio-cultural process of technological variation, selection 
and retention, marked by the emergence of a dominant design in the market category 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Srinivasan et al., 2006; Suarez, 2004). 
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Rendered by new technologies that introduce changes into otherwise stable 
technological spaces, technological variation is chaotic, characterized by a trial-by-error 
process in which firms struggle to absorb the innovative technology through alternative 
approaches (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). When blue laser was first used in the DVD 
industry, for example, Sony and Toshiba pursued respective technical approaches, Blu-
ray DVD (Sony) and HD DVD (Toshiba), to utilize the technical improvements initiated 
by the new technology. New market categories originating from such new technologies 
are “unstable, incomplete and disjoined conceptual systems held by market actors” (Rosa 
et al., 1999: 64), requiring firms sponsoring new technologies to work collectively to 
make the new category both understandable and appealing to various actors including 
consumers, analysts, investors, and complementary producers (Navis & Glynn, 2010). In 
this technological ferment, sponsoring firms of a new technology are in the trial process 
to find the best combination of various parameters that reconcile the conflicts between 
cost, performance and technical feasibility, and products based on the new technological 
order not only receive strong resistance from the existing technological order  whose 
performance is well understood, but also several versions of the new technology appear 
because each pioneering firm has an incentive to differentiate its variant from the 
collective identity (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Navis & Glynn, 2010). As crude initial 
designs rapidly improve over time, firms sponsoring alternative technical approaches face 
ever-changing competitive dynamics in distinct market stages (Tushman & Murmann, 
1998).  
Technological variation is accompanied by a selection process to determine a 
dominant design whereby several technical alternatives compete until a preferred 
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technological trajectory becomes evidently the market leader (Suarez, 2004). New market 
categories where dominant designs tend to emerge evolve in a rapid, complex, and 
unpredictable manner characterized by frequent emergence of technological 
discontinuities and standards, as reflected in the rapid changes in computers, software, 
mobile phones, databases and Internet-based products and service. The success of a 
technological product in the dominance battle is becoming increasingly interdependent 
with other technologies and firms that decide the basic pace of change in a market 
category are those that define the rules by which new technologies can deliver value to 
customers, entices buyers by added value, converts customer purchases to profit, and 
constantly introduce new functional features to generate more demands (Teece, 2007). 
For periphery firms, the competitive dynamics among the core players offer a flitting 
window of opportunity to make key technological decisions (e.g., adoption of which 
technology and timing of entry)  prior to the emergence of a dominant design, whereby 
incorporating a positively chosen technology is critical (Christensen et al., 1998). While 
the process of technological ferment are similar when going from simple product to 
complex systems, the product with higher levels of technological complexity will 
normally change faster as more actors are involved to initiate changes at various levels in 
the design architecture.  
The competitive dynamics in technological ferment to define dominant designs 
today is also characterized by the presence of “network externalities” (Farrell & Saloner, 
1986; Garud et al., 2002; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). Network externalities exist when the 
utility of using a product  increases as more others use compatible products (Sheremata, 
2004). In market categories represented by technological systems (network markets), the 
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degree to which technological systems are compatible with and supported by various 
complementary products determines network boundaries of the core technology and these 
boundaries are becoming increasing obscure due to technological convergence — 
previously disparate technologies tend to integrate to render initially distinct 
technological / industrial boundaries blurred (Lee, 2007), which in turn increases the 
scale of competition in the later stage of technological field.  
Managers steering the direction of technological ferment are also required to 
develop a mindset that allows cooperation with competitors. Strategic actions to achieve 
and maintain technological dominance are often beyond the scope of a single firm and 
even competitors sponsoring alternative technological trajectories may need to work 
together to develop more and better new technology in order to remain competitive.  
Strategic alliances are particularly prominent in cases where core technological 
knowledge and know-how are collectively possessed by core players in the industry 
(Afuah, 2000; Lechner, Dowling, & Welpe, 2006; Suarez, 2004). Yet the timing of such 
collaboration is critical. For example, the personal computer industry is characterized by 
the competition between two basic designs with the current dominant design being IBM 
and Microsoft personal computing architecture and the other being Macintosh computer 
from Apple Computer Company. In spite of the competition, there has been increasing 
collaboration between IBM and Apple to jointly develop new technologies. However, 
technology partnering between IBM and Apple only occurred several years later after 
IBM and Microsoft had obtained dominance (Baum & Korn, 1999; Hagedoorn et al., 
2001) .  
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Technological variants positively selected as dominant designs evolve through 
relatively minor technique improvements and increased interdependences with other 
technologies and a community of practitioners (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Wade, 
1996), shifting the locus of innovation in the industry from technological ferment, 
characterized by trials and errors, to elaborating the agreed-upon “rules of engagement” 
guided by the chosen technological standards (Garud et al., 2002; Sahal, 1981). This shift 
is particularly required for dominant designs involving the innovation of complex 
technological systems  that consist of a core technological base, or a platform, and 
numerous related pieces of technology developed separately by different manufacturers 
(Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Funk, 2003; Murmann & Frenken, 2006). Since each 
technological system is supported by a co-specializing network of complementary actors 
collectively possessing the skills and resources required in the development of 
innovation, collective action is often required for a selected technological variants to 
remain dominant (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Wade, 1996).  
Empirical studies has documented the emergence of dominant designs in various 
market categories, including personal computers (Tegarden et al., 1999), Internet 
browsers (Windrum, 2004), microprocessors (Wade, 1995), word processing software 
(Srinivasan et al., 2006), and local area networks (Soh, 2010). However, the competition 
for dominance can persist in long periods of time in some market categories without any 
clearly defined dominant designs, such as what has happened in the markets for 
camcorders, supercomputers, video game consoles (Srinivasan et al., 2006). In some 
other market categories (e.g., operating systems,   microprocessors, search engines), the 
emergence of a dominant design fails to crowd out alternative designs and competition 
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among several technological trajectories competitors may persist as competitors 
constantly threaten the market leadership.  
Dominant designs and competitive dynamics 
The competitive nature of the dominance battle calls a systematic understanding 
of how competitive dynamics unfolds in the process of technological change and the 
emergence of dominant designs. Research on competitive dynamics typically focuses on 
firms’ competitive actions, defined as individual moves that firms undertake to enhance 
market positions (Chen, 1996; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992; Smith et al., 
1991), and conceptualizes inter-firm rivalry as an interactive process of competitive 
attacks by challengers and competitive responses by defenders (Chen & MacMillan, 
1992; Chen et al., 1992; Gatignon & Reibstein, 1997; Smith et al., 1991). Rindova et al. 
(2004) considered the competition for dominant design as a process characterized by 
excessive competition with warlike characteristics. Similarly, other researchers have 
referred to the dominance battle as the “standards war” between firms sponsoring rivaling 
technologies that compete to define de facto leadership in a market category (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Shapiro & Varian, 1999a; Soh, 2009; Stango, 2004). Strategists have 
well understood that selecting a de facto technological leader involves fierce competition; 
the dynamics of this contest is reflected in the literature by use of varied units of analysis, 
with conflicting conclusions (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Farrell & Saloner, 1986; 
Robertson & Gatignon, 1986; Shankar & Bayus, 2003; Sheremata, 2004; Srinivasan et 
al., 2006; Stremersch & Tellis, 2002; Tassey, 2000).  
While there are several studies that conceptualize competing firms as competitive 
pairs whose payoffs are highly interdependent (Auriol & Benaim, 2000; Besen & Farrell, 
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1994; Gallagher & Park, 2002; Rindova et al., 2004; Shankar & Bayus, 2003; Shapiro & 
Varian, 1999a), the understanding of the dynamic processes in which firms conduct head-
to-head competition to win the standards war is still incomplete. In particular, there has 
been no attempt at examining how the competitive dynamics between technological 
designs co-evolve with the market and technological regime. This inattention to the 
fundamental layer of competitive paradigm constitutes a significant gap in the literature: 
after all, it is at this level that actual the standard war occurs and competitive outcome is 
determined (Chen, 1996; Chen & MacMillan, 1992).  
Competitive dynamics research has underscored two attributes of competitive 
actions to define the aggressiveness of rivaling firms: frequency and complexity (Ferrier, 
2001; Rindova et al., 2004; Yu et al., 2009). Action frequency refers to the total number 
of actions a firm undertakes to enhance its market position (Ferrier et al., 1999; Yu et al., 
2009). The Austrian view of economics suggests that competitive actions are undertaken 
for profit opportunities (Jacobson, 1992; Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996); therefore, 
firms carrying out competitive actions are more aggressive in exploiting more 
opportunities. Accordingly, we argue that, in general, a greater number of competitive 
actions reflects a higher level of competitive aggressiveness of the firm (D'Aveni, 
Dagnino, & Smith, 2010; Ferrier, 2001).  Conversely, if resting on their laurels and 
become complacent, even market leaders may become vulnerable to competitive 
challenges due to inertia — this is particularly true in market characterized by frequent 
technological change and variation (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Miller & Chen, 1994). 
Empirical studies have also provided evidence that firms undertaking more competitive 
actions are likely to have better performance (Ferrier, 2001).    
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Action complexity refers to the extent to which firms utilize different types of 
actions to compete against rivals (Miller & Chen, 1996; Yu et al., 2009). We define 
action complexity as firms’ propensity to concentrate their competitive actions on a 
narrow range of different types, as opposed to a broad range of different types (Ferrier, 
2001; Yu et al., 2009). Austrian view of economics has suggested that the overall 
aggressiveness of a firm in the ever-changing competitive market depends at least 
partially on the ability to surprise competitors by carrying out a range of distinct 
competitive actions (Rindova et al., 2010). The more complex a firm’s competitive 
repertoire, the more difficult competitor can understand the competitive threat imposed 
by the firm, and it follows that the competitors may feel more difficult to respond. Firms 
that are able to carry out a complex sequence of actions can attack rivals on multiple 
fronts to generate competitive advantage. Empirical evidence has shown that in general, 
competitive complexity is positively related to firm performance (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et 
al., 1999; Miller & Chen, 1996).   
Hypotheses 
Market maturity, dominant design, and competitive dynamics 
Suarez (2004) has illustrated several stages in the process for a dominant design 
to emerge in a market category. In the early phase in which the basic technical 
characteristics of an emerging technological field are determined, several firms with 
expertise in the emerging technological order will conduct applied R&D aimed at 
producing new commercial products. Since the new technological ideas are unproven and 
there will be various errors in the new technological designs, firms engaging in this 
process have to make the new category both understandable and appealing to diverse 
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stakeholders — establishing the legitimacy of the new technological field becomes the 
utmost task for sponsoring firms (Navis & Glynn, 2010). In spite of their relationship as 
would-be competitors, firms along a specific technological trajectory may collaborate and 
the battle for dominance has not yet been started at the stage.   
 The first working prototype of the new technology marks the milestone that a 
technological trajectory has been proven feasible and has reached the stage for 
commercialization in the market. A working prototype serves as a powerful signal for 
competing firms to speed up their product development and seriously consider when they 
should introduce their own designs to compete with the first mover, marking the start of 
the dominance battle. In the word processing software market, for example, shortly after 
the first product WordStar, several similar products, including WordPerfect, MS Word, 
and NewWord, were introduced by other firms to compete with WordStar.  Typically, the 
first product in the market does not represent the technical front, and since they are 
sometimes too expensive for the mass market, they often target at the high-end of the 
market as serve as the “front-runners” of the emerging product class. While front-runners 
may or may not become the dominant designs in the later stage, the appearance of front-
runners ushers the dominance battle into a new stage because the increase in the installed 
base of the front-runners has the potential to create positive feedbacks to early adoption 
and “excess inertia” — the work of network economists (e.g., Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 
1994) have clearly explained how network externalities can completely change the 
outcome of technological selection and given the winner-take-dynamics, firms will be 
extremely alert toward competitive threats imposed by alternative technological designs 
(Schilling, 1998, 2002; Suarez, 2004). Thus, the intensity of competition reaches the 
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highest level during the time when alternative technologies compete to define the 
dominant design of the market category.  
If a specific technology achieves dominance in a market category, then a 
dominant design is said to have emerged. Anderson and Tushman (1990: 613) defined  a 
dominant design as “a single architecture that establishes dominance in a product class.” 
If a dominant design emerges, the large installed base becomes a strong defense 
mechanism to rip off competitive advantages of challenger designs, particularly when 
there are strong network effects and high switching costs (Sheremata, 2004). In addition, 
the locus of competition in this post-standard phase shifts from technological ferment to 
define the dominant design to “within-standard” competition (Gallagher and Park, 2002) 
between firms that produce “clones”  based on the dominant technology. It is therefore 
often based on production capabilities and process innovation (Utterback and Abernathy, 
1975; Utterback and Suarez, 1993) — as the success of Dell Computers illustrates. This 
phase of within-standard competition is characterized by long periods of incremental 
change, until a discontinuous technology again starts a new dominance cycle.   
Empirical work has cumulated to systematically capture the establishment of a 
dominant design. Anderson and Tushman (1990) considered a technology as dominant if 
the technology has more than 50% market share; Christensen et al. (1998) followed more 
qualitative process by a historical analysis of specific innovations in the hard disk drive 
industry to indentify four dominant designs; Srinivasan et al. (2006) developed a method 
that combines both qualitative as well as quantitative information. In spite of this 
accumulation, Suarez (2004) criticized the extant empirical work on dominant designs 
because they fail to address the competitive dynamics behind each dominance battle — 
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for instance, an early front-runner could temporarily become the market leader but other 
competitors may compete aggressively to close the market share gap and then change the 
outcome of the dominance battle.  In addition, to avoiding being technologically locked 
out, firms sponsoring alternative technologies will compete even more aggressively after 
a dominant design has emerged. Empirical work has suggested that absolute dominance 
characterized by winner-take-all rarely happens in the real world (Lee et al., 2006). For 
example, even if the IBM PC design had prevailed over the Mac design for years, Apple 
was still a strong competitor in the personal computer market (Hagedoorn et al., 2001). 
Thus, we hypotheses that: 
H1a: The frequency of action between technologies pursuing the dominant design 
in a nascent market category will be higher after the emergence of a dominant 
design.  
H1b: The complexity of competition between technologies pursuing dominant 
design in a nascent market category will be higher after the emergence of a 
dominant design.  
 
While the dominance battle may or may not lead to the emergence of dominant 
designs, the longitudinal development of technological innovation and related market 
categories follows the S-curve proposed by Rogers (1983), suggesting that in the later 
stage of a market category, there will be less customers to make purchase decisions. It 
follows that firms are less motivated to compete aggressively to attract more customers. 
In addition, the product life cycle theory suggests that as a technology moves into the 
mature stage, (1) the sales volume will decline or stabilize and (2) the competition 
becomes increasingly based on price and profitability diminishes. These factors also 
reduce firms’ motivation to compete aggressively. Thus, in spite of the potential 
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dominant designs, the total competitive actions firms undertake will eventually decline. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
H2a: The frequency of action between technologies pursuing dominant design in 
a nascent market category will first increase and then decrease as the market 
category matures.  
While the total number of actions declines as the market category matures in the 
later stage, the complexity of these actions may not decline. As technologies become 
mature, they often serve as platforms for various complementary products, provided by 
other firms, to work together to foster innovation and networks. Evolution of the 
interfaces between the complementors and the platform involves extremely complex 
decision rules and interactions. Occasionally, technological leaders may reconcile with 
complementors to consider alternative ways to make the platform open or proprietary or a 
hybrid model, and how to provide incentives to stimulate investment by the 
complementors. The overall decision frameworks become increasingly complex to 
incorporate issues related to network effects, co-specialization, interoperability, and 
installed base at various levels (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Teece, 2007).  
H2b: The complexity of competition between technologies pursuing dominant 
design in a nascent market category will increase as the market category matures. 
Density and competitive dynamics 
We define density in a market category as the total number of firms that each 
introduce a technological trajectory. In the race to define a dominant design, firms 
controlling alternative designs will compete fiercely to establish technological dominance 
in the market category (Arthur, 1989; Arthur, 1996; Auriol & Benaim, 2000; Farrell & 
Klemperer, 2006; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995; Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1998; Witt, 
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1997). The competitive dynamics between designs has two major characteristics. First, 
design-based competition normally involves only a very limited number of designs; 
however, each design is supported by a large number of periphery complementors 
(Teece, 2007). Second, due to network effects and learning-by-doing, the dominance of a 
single design is self-reinforcing (Schilling, 1998, 2002); in effect, the success of one 
design often results in sharply decreased market shares for other designs (Gallagher, 
2007; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Saloner & Shepard, 1995; Srinivasan et al., 2006; 
Stremersch et al., 2007). The rise of JVC’s VHS, for example, reduced the market share 
of its major competitor, Sony’s Betamax, to minimum (Cusumano et al., 1992). Each 
single design here represents substantial competitive threat and as the total number of 
competing designs increases, the overall competitive threat will increase as well. These 
arguments lead to the following hypothesis:    
H3a: The frequency of action between technologies pursuing dominant design in 
a nascent market category will increase as the density of the market category 
increases. 
The market category may or may not experience the emergence of a dominant 
design; however, once a dominant design emerges, the competition in the post-
dominance phase is often focused on (1) firms that have developed relatively large 
installed bases to pursue alternative technological designs and (2) the “within-standard” 
competition between several firms that produce technological clones of the dominant 
technology. The impact of new comes with other technological trajectories will not be the 
focus of competition. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H3b: The influence in the increase of density on frequency of action between 
technologies pursuing dominant design will be weaker after the emergence of the 
dominant design in a nascent market category. 
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As more firms are involved in the race for dominant designs, firms will seek 
distinct ways to compete with each other. Researchers in strategy, marketing, and 
economics have addressed several competitive strategies used by firms attempting to 
establish technological dominance (e.g., innovation, product strategy, pricing, licensing, 
merger and acquisition and others ) (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2003; 
Suarez, 2004; Warner et al., 2006). Research on hypercompetition has argued that when 
competition is intense, firms have a strong need to combat rivals through “aggressive 
competitive actions characterized by strategic surprise, speed, and simultaneous and 
sequential thrusts” (Rindova et al., 2010: 1475). Ashby's (1956) “law of requisite variety” 
suggested that the competitive arsenal of firms must have certain degree of complexity to 
reduce the danger of intense competition (Miller & Chen, 1996).  
 The increase in the number of firms sponsoring alternative technological 
trajectories also makes the technological interdependences extremely complex. Few 
technologies today work only in isolation and at various levels, even head-to-head 
competitors will develop some coordination and compatibility. This is particularly true if 
a lot of competitors are involved as co-specialization required to advance more demands 
in related technological fields enable firms to manage their interdependence with others 
(Soh, 2010). In that case, collective action becomes the most important competitive 
strategy for all firms involved, which in turn reduces the availability of alternative 
competitive approaches. Thus, we hypothesize:    
H4a: As the density of a nascent market category increases, the complexity of 
competition between technologies pursuing dominant design will first increase 
and then decrease.  
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H4b: As the density of a nascent market category increases,  the competition 
between technologies pursuing dominant design will increasingly concentrate on 
collective actions.  
 
Methods 
Sample  
An appropriate sample to test our hypotheses required identifying market 
categories whereby dominant designs tend to emerge. Previous empirical studies on 
dominant designs suffered a major limitation in identifying a substantial number of such 
market categories. We designed our research to overcome this limitation. By talking to 
industrial experts and reading extensively various trade journals, we recognized that the 
emergence of dominant designs is a major industrial event and will likely capture 
substantial attention in media, so we used this source to locate market categories where 
dominant designs tended to emerge. Thus, we started with a search process which 
involved three major steps. In Step One, we developed a thesaurus to capture the core 
concept of dominant design — a technological design that dominates the market. After 
we extensively read research publications and trade journals and talked to various 
industrial experts, we found that the phenomenon could be referred to alternatively in the 
media using such terms as ‘dominant design’, ‘technology /technological standard’, 
‘industry/industrial standard’, ‘standards war’, ‘dominance battle’ and/or ‘standards 
competition’. For an inclusive search, we included all these keywords to construct our 
first thesaurus (Thesaurus One).  
In Step Two, we launched a search at Lexis-Nexis database using Thesaurus One, 
yielding more than 10,000 newspaper articles containing at least one keyword. A review 
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of these articles uncovered a number of technological designs involved in creating de 
facto standards. In further investigation, however, we found that a large portion of these 
technologies were duplicates and some were irrelevant or ambiguous, which substantially 
reduced our pool to 167 technologies. We carefully examined each technology to 
understand which product class it belonged to using following sources: Software 
Taxonomy and Hardware Taxonomy developed by a leading market research company, 
technical descriptions offered in public sources such as newspapers, company websites 
and annual reports, and expert opinions. The investigation indicated that the 167 
technological designs belonged to 145 product categories.  
Step Three involved an additional search for ‘competitors’ of aforementioned 
technological designs using a thesaurus (Thesaurus Two) of keywords such as 
‘competitors’, ‘competing’, ‘compete’, ‘rival’, ‘defeat’ and many others19
The final pool included 145 market categories (with total 358 technological 
designs). A further investigation indicated that these technological designs were 
. This search 
was necessary because it substantially adjusted the skewness towards more successful 
technological designs in our search. For example, in the search for technological designs 
competing to establish de facto standards in spreadsheet market, using Thesaurus One 
only uncovered two successful technological designs: ‘Lotus 1-2-3’ and ‘Microsoft 
Excel’; however, using Thesaurus Two, we further identified such technological designs 
as ‘Quattro Pro’ and ‘VP Planner’, which were unsuccessful rivals against ‘Lotus 1-2-3’. 
This exhaustive search enabled us to capture most of the technological designs in a given 
product category.  
                                                          
19 The complete list has 32 keywords and will be provided upon request. 
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sponsored by 253 organizations in which 188 were firms incorporated after 1980. We 
then carefully examined the products/technologies of these firms and found that 
standardization was the core strategy for all firms since their incorporation. Thus, this 
group of firms constituted an appropriate sample to test our hypotheses.    
Identification of competitive actions 
A competitive action is defined as an individual move that the firm undertakes to 
enhance its market position (Chen, 1996; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992; 
Smith et al., 1991; Yu et al., 2009). To identify the competitive actions of firms 
participating in the dominance battle, we collected textual data in published news articles 
and wires from the LexisNexis database. We chose this data source because some 
researchers argued that investors respond to action announcements as manifested in news 
release (Westphal and Zajac, 1998). To ensure comprehensiveness, we used multiple data 
sources from the Lexis/Nexis online database: PRNewswire, Business Wire, the 
Associated Press Service, M2Presswire, Newsbyte News Service, Canadian Newswire, 
and Gannett News Service. We deleted repeatedly reported actions and  used the first 
report to decide the action date.  Following Ferrier (1999), we focused on news headlines 
to identify the competitive actions. When the name or abbreviation of the company led to 
confusion, we used LexisNexis ’s ‘intelligent indexing’ function  to screen out irrelevant 
headlines, a technique used by Uotila and colleagues (2009). An extensive reading of 
these news headlines and the literature on competitive dynamics suggested that these 
competitive actions belonged to 13 categories: ‘Introduce a new product / innovation’, 
‘Update an existing product’,  ‘Form product / innovation alliances’, ‘Form marketing 
based alliances’, ‘Merger and Acquisition’, ‘Open new divisions or restructure the 
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organization’, ‘Involve in open source development’ ‘Sign licensing agreement’, 
‘Improve distribution  or customer services’, ‘HR action’, ‘Price action or Promotion’, 
‘Undertake legal action’, ‘Participate in trade events’. We validated these categories by 
consulting several management professors and industrial experts and they agreed that 
these were the common most types of competitive actions in the information technology 
industries.  
We then used a software package, PASW Text Analytics for Survey, to categorize 
the competitive actions. PASW Text Analytics for Survey is a software package developed 
by SPSS Inc. to code textual data into meaningful categories. There were several 
advantages of using this software. First, PASW Text Analytics for Survey utilized several 
automated linguistic techniques to enhance the reliability of the computer-aided coding. 
To assess its accuracy and reliability, we ask two coders to manually coded 600 headlines 
and then used the software to code the same news headlines; a detailed review of the 
coding results indicated that there was very high consistency between human and 
computer-aided coding (greater than 80 percent agreement).  The second advantage of 
using computer-aided coding was that it allowed us to handle large dataset with relatively 
high efficiency. As the number of observations increased, the impact of a single coding 
mistake could be substantially reduced (Uotila et al., 2009).Accordingly, we used PASW 
Text Analytics for Survey to code our competitive actions data. The final dataset 
contained 71,127 competitive actions.  
Measures 
Frequency of action in a market category. We measured frequency of action in a 
market category by counting the total number of competitive actions undertaken by firms 
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sponsoring competing designs in a market category. This measure has been used in 
previous research (Ferrier et al., 1999; Young et al., 1996). We created a yearly measure 
for this variable.    
Action Complexity in the market category. Previous research (Ferrier et al., 1999; 
Yu et al., 2009) on action complexity has focused on the competitive repertoire at the 
firm level; in this paper, we extend the analysis to a market category level. Using a 
similar method, we calculated the complexity of action in a market category by 
estimating the extent to which firms in the market category carried out a broad range as 
opposed to a narrow range of competitive actions in year t.  Using  to denote the 
total number of actions a design-based entrepreneur undertook in a particular type of 
action  j, we calculated the overall concentration index in year t as follows: 
 
Emergence and Time of de facto Standards. We followed the method of 
Srinivasan and colleagues (2006) to measure emergence and time of de facto standards. 
Srinivasan and colleagues’ (2006) methodology involved two steps. First, two graduate 
students content-analyzed various archival sources to identify whether and when a 
technological design has become a de facto standard (dominant design). Second, the 
authors validated this measure by collecting market share data20
2006
 and consulting multiple 
industrial experts. Srinivasan and colleagues ( ) reported high correlation (ρ =.86) 
                                                          
20 The criteria to decide whether and when a technology has become a de facto standard was that its market 
share was beyond 50 %, the same criteria used by Anderson and Tushman (1990).  
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between the de facto standard’s emergence times measured respectively by content 
analysis and market share data.  
We utilized the same procedure in this study. We first collected various archival 
information (e.g. research articles, books, trade journals, newspapers) reporting a 
particular technological design’s involvement in standardization 21
2006
. Two coders (one 
author and a Ph.D. student) separately read the articles to code whether and when a 
technological design has emerged as a de facto standard. The two coders unanimously 
coded the emergence and time of 105 technological designs as de facto standards. We 
then followed Srinivasan and colleagues ( ) to validate our measure. We collected 
market share data for each technological design; due to data unavailability, we only found 
market share data for 60 out of the 145 technologies coded as de facto standards. We then 
correlated the de facto standards’ emergence times identified from two methods. A 
correlation of  .97 was reported, indicating high consistency between two measures. To 
further enhance our confidence, we invited several industrial experts to review the 
technological designs we identified as de facto standards and asked them to comment on 
(1) whether the technological designs should be considered as de facto standards and (2) 
when the technological designs, if ever, emerged as the de facto standards. Thus, we were 
reassured of the reliability of our measure. 
Market Maturity. We used the age of the market (the difference between the 
observation year and the year of first product introduction) to capture market maturity.  
                                                          
21 We collected relevant research articles by a comprehensive literature review. We found relevant trade 
journals and newspapers by searching the technology’s name together with keywords such as ‘standard’ , 
‘dominance’,  ‘ winning’ and so on.    
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Total Number of Competing Designs. The three-step search allowed us to 
develop listings of competing designs in each product category. We then collected 
information about the entry and exit of each technological design. An entry was recorded 
when the firm first introduced a design; the information was collected from newspapers 
in LexisNexis database, and then verified with other sources such as annual report, 
company website, information provided by other research articles or books. Exit was 
recorded when the firm discontinued the product line. We also recorded exit of a 
technology if it completely disappeared from all public sources. In addition, following 
Tushman and Anderson (1986), exit was also recorded when the firm discontinued 
operating as an independent firm. With the entry-and-exit information, we constructed 
yearly listings of competing designs for all product categories to operationalize total 
Number of Competing Designs (Number of Competitors). 
 Control Variables. We controlled several industry variables to rule out plausible 
alternative explanations. Consistent with previous research on similarly topics (Nadkarni 
& Narayanan, 2007),we controlled: (1) market growth, measured as percentage change in 
industry gross sales in a given year; (2) R&D intensity, measured by R&D expenditures 
divided by sales; (3) capital intensity, measured by capital expenditures divided by sales; 
(4) advertising intensity, measured by advertising expenditures divided by sales; and (5) 
the depreciation rate measured by the average depreciation rate in the industry. All the 
control variables were computed using data from COMPSTAT. 
Analysis 
We used fixed effects models to test our hypotheses. Fixed effects models control 
for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time and correlated with independent 
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variables. As we were interested in the change of competitive dynamics over time along 
the evolutionary path of technological change, this approach had the advantage of 
capturing the over pattern of time-based variance and therefore was appropriate to test 
our hypotheses. In testing hypotheses regarding frequency of action, we used the negative 
binomial model as we used count of actions in a given year as the dependent variable 
(Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). For models predicting complexity and concentration in 
collective actions, we used general linear models.  
  Results 
Table 7 includes statistical models testing hypotheses predicting frequency of 
actions. Model 1 only contained control variables. In this model, R&D intensity was 
negatively related to frequency of action, suggesting that the increase in firms’ R&D 
investments may reduce the total number of competitive actions in the market place. In 
contrast, Model 1 found capital intensity and advertising intensity positively related to 
firms’ total competitive actions. Market growth and depreciation rate of the industry was 
not a significant factor in predicting firms’ total actions. 
Model 2 and Model 3 tested our hypotheses regarding frequency of action. Model 
2 focused on the main effects of our independent variables. In this model, we found the 
coefficient for emergence of dominant design positive and significant (β = 0.57, 
p<0.001), suggesting frequency of action was higher after dominant designs emerged in 
the market categories. In the same model, market maturity was positive and significant ( 
β = 0.04, p < 0.5) and its square term was significant and negative (β = -0.01, p < 0.001) , 
suggesting an inverted-U shaped relationship between market maturity and frequency of 
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action (See Figure 13). Finally, Model 2 also reported density as a significant antecedent 
of frequency of action ( β = 0.59, p < 0.001), which supported our expectation that 
density will be positively related to frequency of action. Thus, our hypotheses regarding 
the main effects on frequency of action (H1a, H2a and H3a) were all supported.  
We used Model 3 to test the interaction effect between density and emergence of 
dominant designs. Figure 14 offers a graphic presentation of the impact of density on 
firms’ frequency of action before and after dominant designs. While there is a positive 
association between density and frequency of action in both situations, the unit increase 
of density is associated with more increase in the frequency of action before the 
emergence of dominant designs than after the emergence of dominant designs. However, 
the graph indicated that the overall frequency of action is higher after the emergence of 
dominant designs. 
Table 8 includes statistical models testing hypotheses predicting action 
complexity. Model 5 only contained control variables. In this model, R&D intensity was 
positively related to frequency of action, suggesting that the increase in firms’ R&D 
investments may increase the complexity of competitive actions in the market place. 
Model 4 also found capital intensity and positively related to firms’ total competitive 
actions. Market growth and depreciation rate of the industry was not a significant factor 
(at p<0.05 level) in predicting firms’ action complexity.  
Model 5 ~ Model 7 tested the impact of the emergence of dominant design, 
market maturity and density on action complexity in a given market category. In Model 
5, we found the coefficient for emergence of dominant design positive and significant (β 
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= 0.76, p<0.001), suggesting action complexity was higher after dominant designs 
emerged in the market categories. In Model 6, market maturity was positive and 
significant ( β = 0.0, p < 0.001), which suggests that as the market becomes mature, the 
competitive actions in the market category becomes more complex. In Model 7, we 
included density and its square term and found  both density  ( β = 0.33, p < 0.001) and 
its square term ( β = -0.03, p<0.05) were significantly related to action complexity, which 
supported our expectation that density will have an inverted-U shaped relationship with 
action complexity (See Figure 15).  
Finally, in Model 8, we tested the impact of density on firms’ concentration in 
collective actions and found a significant, positive relationship between density and 
firms’ concentration in collective actions ( β = 0.02, P < 0.05). All our hypotheses 
regarding action complexity received support in our statistical models. 
Discussion 
This paper advances the process models of dominant design by focusing on how 
competitive dynamics in the ferment of dominant designs co-evolve with technology. We 
found that technological leaders sponsoring alternative designs compete more fiercely in 
the post-dominant design phase, in terms of both frequency and complexity of 
competitive action. Our longitudinal observation suggests that the maturity of a 
technology-based market category — captured by the age of the market category — has 
strong implication on the pattern of competitive dynamics in a market category. 
Specifically, our research suggests that the frequency of action between technologies 
pursuing dominant designs follows an S-curve (first increase and then decrease) along the 
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linage of a nascent market category; however, competitive complexity linearly increases 
over time as the market turns mature. We also found a strong association between 
patterns of competitive dynamics and density — i.e., the total number of competing 
technological leaders. We found density in general increases the frequency of action, but 
this association becomes weaker after the emergence of a dominant design. In contrast, 
we found a curvilinear ( inverted-U shaped) relationship between density and action 
complexity.  
Our research is linked to several streams of research on dominant designs. First, 
our findings advance the understanding of the process of dominance battles in 
technological ferment as discussed by prior researchers such as Anderson and Tushman 
(1990) and Suarez (2004). While cumulative research on this topic has suggested that 
there is fierce competition between alternative technologies following a technological 
discontinuity to ferment a dominant design, this research has remained unclear in terms 
of the actual process whereby firms exchange competitive actions to formulate a 
dominant design. However, it is at this level that firms sponsoring alternative 
technological trajectories encounter each other and compete to gain advantage in the 
technological diffusion. Our research shed light on the process models of dominant 
design by directly observing firms’ competitive actions. Several findings in our research 
may highlight our contribution to the dominant design literature. First, in contrast to the 
punctuated equilibrium model of technological change in which the emergence of a 
dominant design reduces technological uncertainty, we found that competition among 
alternative technological designs continues and is even more intense in the post-dominant 
design phase — this finding is consistent with intuitive observation of many real world 
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cases (e.g., Apple Macintosh versus Microsoft Windows). We found that the force that 
reduces competition between designs is not the emergence of a dominant design, but the 
maturity of the market — as the market turns mature, the competition to define a 
dominant design becomes less intense.  
Second, we research extends the conversion regarding the relationship between 
population density and technological dominance initiated by Wade (1995, 1996). 
However, our work differs from the hypotheses developed by Wade as we focus on how 
density influences competitive dynamics in nascent market categories. We found that in 
general the increase in density increases firms’ propensity for competitive actions in a 
market category — as captured by total number of competitive actions undertaken by 
firms, whereas the types of actions firms choose to contend rivals first increase and then 
decrease as more competitors are involved. We found this curvilinear relationship perhaps 
has to do with firms’ increasing focus on collective actions — as more competitors are 
involved in technological ferment, there is an increasing need for firms to work with 
other firms and the dominance battle is centered on the competition formulate collective 
action in the technological field, thereby narrowing firms’ competitive weapons.     
Our research has several limitations. First, competitive dynamics has various 
facets and our research only addresses factors that we considered most relevant to our 
topic. However, the sustained work on competitive dynamics has introduced diverse 
perspectives and future research may incorporate these perspectives to advance our 
understanding of the dominance battle. Second, our research only focuses on the 
competitive dynamics between firms introducing alternative designs in nascent market 
categories and the competition between firms producing “technological clones” is not 
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addressed in our research. Prior researchers have suggested that in the period after a 
dominant design has emerged, the locus of competition may shift from the rivalry 
between alternative designs to “in-group” competition (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). 
Future research may systematically examine how the “in-group” competition may co-
evolve with technology. Empirically, we research only examines cases in relatively fast-
changing industries and does not reflect the competitive dynamics in slow-changing 
industries. Future research should extend this research to capture the evolution of 
competitive dynamics in slow-changing industries.     
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 Table 1 
A Summary of Primary Research Streams and Key Arguments 
Perspective Theme Code Mechanism Key Arguments 
N
at
ur
al
-s
el
ec
tio
n 
Process models of 
technology change 
NS-01 Technological paradigms  
 
 
 
 
 
Punctuated equilibrium 
model  
 
Technological complexity 
Technological change resembles the process of paradigm shift: major 
scientific breakthrough can introduce a new paradigm to replace the 
existing one, however, the rise of the new paradigm stems from the 
interplay among scientific advances, social institutions and economic 
forces.   
 
Technological change is characterized by long periods of incremental 
change punctuated by technological discontinuities.  
 
The process of standard-based competition is more complex when each 
technological design represents a technological community consisting of 
technological leaders, periphery firms, institutional actors and users of 
various preferences.   
Factors that lead to 
the emergence of 
standards 
NS-02 Network externalities and 
increasing returns 
mechanism  
 
 
Switching costs and path 
dependence  
 
Government policy and 
intellectual property 
regimes 
Because of network externalities, there are increasing returns to the 
installed base of a technology standard which may overturn competitive 
outcome.  
 
 
The adoption of a new technology may imply investment in terms of 
hardware, software, skills, and network resources, creating switching costs 
to make the markets for technology standards “tipping”. 
   
Government policy on the one hand permits collaboration required for 
technology innovation, while on the other hand prosecutes violation of 
antitrust law to intervene into the process for de facto standards to emerge.  
If strong intellectual property rights hinder innovation, the government 
should bring in antitrust action. 
Industry structures NS-03 Winner-take-all dynamics 
 
 
Two-sided market  
 
 
 
Technological ecosystems 
A winning standard will govern a large user base and the more it gains 
prevalence, the more likely it will emerge as the sole technological design 
in a given market category and kick out alternative designs. 
 
A technological platform becoming the standard often serves as the inter-
mediating platform to connect two distinct user groups that are called (1) 
“sellers” who produce complementary products for the platform and (2) 
“buyers” who desire the synergy of the standard and complementary 
products.  
 
A complex technological system involves one or a few core firms that 
decide the standards for product design and number periphery firms 
produce complementary product to support the standards.  
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Sy
st
em
-s
tr
uc
tu
re
 
Time-related 
adaptation  
SS-01 Strategic fit with 
technological stages 
Firms are born to win or lose the natural selection associated with 
technological change; rather, incumbent firms may react by adjusting 
administrative and production structures in accord to dynamics of industrial 
innovation. 
Technology-based 
adaptation 
SS-02 Incorporation of 
technology standards 
 
 
 
Compatibility 
 
 
Open source 
Firm incorporating designs that become standards have better survival 
chance. 
For firms that initially use other designs, if they shift to what has become 
the “dominant design”, they will still have better survival chance.  
 
If a standard is embedded in a complex technological system, adaptive 
firms’ profitability may depend on its compatibility with the platform and 
other complementary products. 
 
Adaptive firms may use different business models to pursue open source 
standards. 
Their adaptive strategies may depend on organizational size and age. 
Market-based 
adaptation  
SS-03 Network effects 
 
 
 
Switching costs 
If a firm adopts a new innovation early, the influence of network effects is 
contingent on factors such as radicalness of new technology, technological 
intensity of products and incumbency of the firm.  
 
Switching costs influence profits of firms introducing radical innovation to 
the market. 
St
ra
te
gi
c-
ch
oi
ce
 
Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
SC-01 Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
Standard-setting firms are institutional entrepreneurs who introduce change 
to otherwise stable institutional spaces.  
By seeking legitimacy, institutional entrepreneurs can accomplish 
technological leadership in the industry. 
Technology and 
product strategies 
SC-02 Proprietary versus open 
platforms 
 
 
Compatibility and 
bundling strategies 
 
 
 
Learning and innovation 
The degree of openness of a standard, varying from purely proprietary to 
completely open, may influence the establishment of technological 
dominance and profitability in different ways.  
 
Compatibility is functionally critical when innovative firms desire to shift 
the locus of standards from an existing new technological system to a new 
one.  
In setting standards, firms may leverage the installed base of an established 
product by bundling a new, compatible product to it.  
 
For firms controlling complex technological systems, integrating know-
how from outside and within the firm is critical — the creation of learning, 
knowledge sharing and knowledge integration are important. 
Role of resources SC-03 Complementary products 
  
 
Installed base 
Availability of complementary products may influence the success of the 
core technology.   
 
Firms’ installed base is a critical resource to provide competitive 
advantage.  
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Drivers of collective 
action 
CA-01 Complexity of 
technological systems 
 
 
 
Government action 
 
 
 
Motives of the firm 
Facilitating standards in complex technological systems requires the 
collective efforts of various agents including in- and out-house innovation 
units, manufactures of core and periphery components, the government, 
industrial associations, and various technological users. 
 
Government may exert influence on forecasted and actual installed base of 
a technological system, the amount of competition in the market, and the 
degree of openness in technology, which controls cooperation and 
competition in the standards battle. 
 
Institutional entrepreneurs are motivated to formulate collective action with 
firms who collectively possess the technology and know-how to advance 
innovation in the industry.   
Forms of cooperation 
and competition 
 
CA-02 Hierarchy of a 
technological community 
 
 
Proprietary versus open 
source platforms 
On top of a technological community is the core firm controlling the 
platform and standards, and fierce competition may occur between core 
firms controlling different technological communities. 
 
The form of cooperation with a proprietary standard depends on IPRs. 
Open source represents an “extreme” form of cooperation which ties the 
role of network externalities to speed of diffusion of standards. 
Mechanisms to create 
standards 
CA-03 “Strategic maneuvering”  
 
 
Committees 
 
 
Social mechanisms 
Coalition of the core firm with numerous complementary firms and 
industrial organizations may lead to the creation of standards.  
 
 Industrial committees represent the de jure mechanisms to create 
technology standards through collective action.  
 
Standards emerge out of a social-political process of comprise and 
accommodation in a specific institutional space. 
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Table 2 
Research Methods Used in Empirical Studies 
 Natural Selection View System Structure View Strategic Choice View Collective Action View 
Case Study 10 1 9 6 
Interview 1 1 3 4 
Survey 4 2 1 2 
Simulation 3 1 0 2 
Archival Data 
 (case study not included) 
15 8 6 4 
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Table 3  
Research Opportunities in Theoretical Integration 
Method of Integration            Future Directions 
Incorporation of Boundary 
Conditions  
• Technological complexity. Introduce more complex process models to incorporate 
the impact of increasing technological complexity on the standardization 
processes 
• Institutional environment. Advance theories of standards in global settings.  
Integration among the four 
perspectives 
• Strategic choice and system structural views. This integrative perspective will 
examine how complementors will react to the “ecosystem” controlled by 
technological leaders.  
• Collective action and natural selection views. This perspective can be used to 
examine the patterns of cooperation among firms from a longitudinal 
perspective. 
• System-structural and collective-action views.  This approach is useful in 
investigating the interactions between firms' reaction to the system and the 
collective action of the technological regime.  
 
Persistent debates  • Ontological differences may persist. For example, it is convenient to attribute a 
priori voluntaristic behavior to standard setting firms and deterministic behavior 
to those firms that are adapting to standards. However, from a voluntaristic 
perspective both may see as the willful decision of the firms: some firms 
proactively decide they will adapt to standards instead of creating them 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
 
Table 4  
Research Opportunities in Each Perspective 
Perspective            Future Directions 
Natural 
Selection 
 
• Conduct research to address the competitive dynamics in the post-standard era.  
 
System-
structural  
 
• Research on entrepreneurial firms that engage in standards-based competition.  
 
Strategic-
choice View 
 
• Utilize the action-response perspective to investigate how firms' strategies will 
shape industrial standards.  
• Investigate firms’ performance after they establish technology standards.  
Collective 
Action View 
 
• Theorize the collective action in standardization using the social movements 
perspective. 
• Incorporate the economics of collective action.  
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Table 5 
Industry Conditions and Design-based Entrepreneur’s Hazard for Exit - Results from Event History Analyses 
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Table 6 
Firm Strategy and Design-based Entrepreneur’s Hazard for Exit - Results from Event 
History  
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Table 7 
Results  of Negative Binomial Regression with Frequency  of Action as DV 
 
Variables Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 Intercept 3.75 
(0.08) 
** 
 
2.87 
(0.11) 
** 
 
2.90 
(0.11) 
** 
 
R&D Intensity -0.11 
(0.04) 
 
 
-0.07 
(0.03) 
 
 
-0.08 
(0.03) 
 
 
Capital Intensity 0.16 
(0.04) 
* 
 
0.074 
(0.03) 
 
 
0.08 
(0.03) 
 
 
Advertise Intensity 0.17 
(0.07) 
 
 
0.10 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.10 
(0.05) 
 
Market Growth 0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
 
Depreciation 0.01 
(0.01) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
 
Emergence of Dominant Design   0.57 
(0.07) 
** 
 
0.55 
(0.07) 
** 
 
Market Maturity   
0.04 
(0.02) 
 
 
0.04 
(0.02) 
 
 
Market Maturity Square   
-0.01 
(0.00) 
** 
 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
** 
Density   
0.59 
(0.02) 
** 
 
0.69 
(0.04) 
** 
Density × Dominant Design      
-0.14 
(0.05) 
* 
Years Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
Dispersion 1.87 
(0.07) 
 0.99 
(0.04) 
 0.98 
(0.04) 
 
DF 1067  1063  1062  
Pearson Chi-Square 2366.962  1595.383  1609.852  
Scaled Pearson X2 2366.962  1595.383  1609.852  
Log Likelihood 165417.8  165846.3  165851  
Full Log Likelihood -4859.71  -4431.2  -4426.48  
AIC (smaller is better) 9737.425  8888.406  8880.965  
AICC (smaller is better) 9737.594  8888.749  8881.361  
BIC (smaller is better) 9782.246  8953.147  8950.686  
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Table 8 
Regression Results with Action Complexity as the Dependent Variable 
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Figure 1. Number of Papers by Journal 
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Figure 2. Number of Papers by Year 
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Figure 3. A Graphic Presentation of the Scholarly Community on Technology Standards 
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Figure 4. A Summary of Fundamental Arguments from Four Perspectives 
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Figure 5. Number of Papers by Theme 
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Figure 6. Venn Diagram for Theoretical Papers Based in Different Views 
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Figure 7. Venn Diagram for Empirical Papers Based in Different Views 
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Figure 8. A Summary of Findings in the Natural Selection View 
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Figure 9. A Summary of Findings in the System Structural View 
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Figure 10. A Summary of Findings in the Strategic Choice View 
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Figure 11. A Summary of Findings in the Collective Action View 
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Figure 12. A Conceptual Model of New Firm Survival in Dominance Battle 
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Figure 13. Frequency of Competitive Actions in Different Market Stages 
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Figure 14. Density and Frequency of Action before and after Dominant Design 
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Figure 15. Density and Competitive Complexity 
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 Appendix 1. Summaries of Theoretical  Papers 
Year Author Theme Type Unit of analysis Key Constructs Findings 
 
Natural Selection View 
 
     
1978 Abernathy and 
Utterback 
NS-01 Practitioner Product line and 
associated production 
process taken together 
Product versus process 
innovation;  
 
The article highlights the pattern of innovation in an industry. Product 
innovation is followed by process innovation.     
1982 Dosi NS-01 Conceptual Technological 
paradigms 
Technology change, 
technological discontinuity 
Continuous technological changes are often related to progress along a 
technological trajectory, while discontinuities are associated with the 
emergence of a new paradigm, whose establishment is often related to 
new "Schumpeterian" companies. 
1986 Robertson & 
Gatignon 
NS-01 
NS-02 
Conceptual Innovation Industry competitiveness, 
reputation of industry, 
standards, 
vertical coordination, 
resources 
 
The level and speed of diffusion of technological innovation depend on 
factors such as the competitive intensity, reputation, vertical 
coordination, R&D, market resources and so on 
1989 Weiss and 
Birnbaum 
NS-02 
NS-03 
Conceptual Infrastructure 
supporting 
technological change 
Dominant design, technology 
change, institutions 
A firm’s technology strategy requires understanding the dynamics of the 
technological environment and the level of development of the 
technological infrastructure. 
1996 Arthur NS-02 
NS-03 
Practitioner Industry Increasing returns, network 
effects, technology race 
Increasing returns to adoption change the way firms compete in network 
markets.  
1999 Loch & Huberman NS-01 
NS-02 
Analytical Technology Technology diffusion, 
punctuated equilibra, 
network externalities, path 
dependence 
The expected time to adoption of a new technology depends on (1) the 
rate of incremental improvement of the new technology and (2) the 
system’s resistance to switching.  
2000 Tassey NS-03 Practitioner Standard Standard, compatibility, 
market structure 
Standards are a form of technical infrastructure with considerable public 
good. Research policy must include standardization in analyses of 
technology-based growth. 
 
2006 Economides and 
Katsamakas 
NS-03 Analytical Technology platform Technology platforms, 
network externalities, 
complements, open source,  
Competition in two-sided markets occurs in the combined interaction 
across platform versus applications markets. The introduction of a third 
price, a fee that application developers may pay or receive from the 
platform makes a very significant difference in firms’ competitive 
interactions and the evaluation of the platform applications competitive 
landscape from the point of view of public policy. 
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System Structural View 
 
     
1995 Xie & Sirbu SS-02 Analytical Firm Pricing, compatibility , 
network externalities, 
installed base 
A new entrant is better off if its products are compatible with those of 
the incumbent, especially when demand externalities are strong and the 
installed base of the incumbent is large 
1996 Kotabe, et al. SS-02 
SS-03 
Conceptual Firm Licensing, standards, 
network externalities, 
compatibility, industrial 
structure 
Firms’ incensing strategy depends on (1) network externalities and 
standards, (2) compatibility requirements, industry structure, (4) 
technology intensity, (5) appropriability regime, (6) complementary 
assets, and (7) technology development and others. 
1997 Padmanabhan, et 
al. 
SS-03 Analytical Product Installed base, sequential 
product introduction, 
network externalities 
 
Consumer knowledge about network externalities has a significant 
bearing on the new product strategy. Firm can obtain higher profits with 
a one-shot new product introduction when consumers are aware of 
demand externalities. Sequential introduction of products is the optimal 
strategy when consumers are not informed about the externalities. 
 
2003 Benner and 
Tushman 
SS-02 Conceptual Firm Exploration, exploitation, 
ambidextrous organizations, 
process innovation 
Process management is positively associated with 
organizational effectiveness during periods of stability or incremental 
change. However, during eras of ferment and turbulent environments, 
process management is less conducive to organizational effectiveness. 
 
2004 Sheremata SS-02 
SS-03 
Conceptual Firm Compatibility, radical 
innovation, network 
externalities 
The profitability of challengers’ compatibility and innovation strategies 
in network markets depends on the type of innovation, compatibility, 
intellectual property protection, heterogeneity of consumer preferences, 
network effects, switching costs, R&D fixed costs, technological 
uncertainty.  
 
Strategic Choice View 
 
     
1990 Wilson, et al. SC-02 Analytical Bundling options Industrial systems, 
modularity, bundling 
Firms’ choice of bundling drives the growth of market size. Growth is 
the key to making the unbundling option attractive. 
1992 Mcgrath, et al. SC-03 
SC-02 
Conceptual Firm Top management team, 
dominant design, 
technological discontinuity 
A dominant design is driven by strategic decisions by top managers of 
interacting firms and practitioner communities. 
1998 Schilling SC-02 
SC-03 
Conceptual Firm Learning, installed base, 
complementary products, 
standards 
In the competition for technological dominance, firms’ likelihood of 
technological lockout depends on interaction between (1) firms’ 
innovation strategy and resources (including complementary products) 
and (2) external conditions such as network effects and entry barriers. 
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2002 Cusumano and 
Gawer 
SC-01 
SC-02 
Practitioner Firm Platform leader, 
complementors, standards 
war  
Platform leadership can create an industry ecosystem greater than the 
sum of participating firms.    
 
Collective Action View 
     
2006 Hargrave & Van 
De Ven 
CA-01 
CA-03 
Conceptual Technological 
community 
Institutional innovation, 
social movement, standards, 
collective action 
The paper proposes a model to link the converging perspectives from 
the technology innovation management and social movements literature, 
viewing institutional change as a dialectical process in which partisan 
actors espousing conflicting views confront each other and engage in 
political behaviors to create and change institutions. 
 
2007  Osterloh & Rota CA-02 Conceptual Open source 
innovation 
Open source, Licensing, 
Collective invention; 
OSS enhances the collective invention model by generating a low-cost 
situation in contributing to public goods. The institutional innovation of 
OSS licenses maintains voluntary donations of intrinsically motivated 
contributors.  
 
Studies Based in Multiple Views 
 
   
       
2004 Suarez NS-02 
SC-02 
SC-03 
Conceptual Firm Technological innovation, 
open source, complementors, 
network externalities 
The paper highlights several key firm- and environment-level factors 
affecting the outcome of a technology battle, positing that the relative 
importance of each factor will vary depending on technological phase. 
2005 Parker and Van 
Alstyne 
NS-03 
SC-02 
Analytical Firm Complementary products, 
network externalities, two-
sided markets, free products 
Even in the absence of competition, a firm can rationally invest in a 
product it intends to give away into perpetuity. Second, there exist 
distinct markets for content providers and end consumers and either can 
be a candidate for a free good. Third, product coupling across markets 
can increase consumer welfare even as it increases firm profits 
 
2007 Teece SC-02 
CA-03 
Conceptual Firm Co-specialization, 
ecosystem, dominant design 
Enterprises with strong dynamic capabilities shape ecosystems through 
innovation and through collaboration with other enterprises, entities, 
and institutions. 
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Appendix 2. Summaries of Empirical  Papers 
Year Author Theme Sample Method Findings 
Natural Selection view   
1986 Tushman &Anderson NS-01 
NS-03 
Cement, airline, minicomputer industries, 
11 technological discontinuities 
Frequency table / 
Archival 
Technology evolution follows long periods of incremental 
change punctuated by rare innovations that radically improve the state of art.  
1990 Anderson &Tushman NS-01 
NS-03 
Cement, minicomputer, glass industries 
(glass industry has three sub-segments), 
12 dominant designs, 16 technological 
discontinuities 
Frequency table / 
Archival 
The paper provides a punctuated equilibrium model of technological change. It also 
provides implications on the link between environmental / organizational factors and 
technological change / dominant designs. 
1990 Barnett NS-02 986 telephone companies in Pennsylvania 
and Iowa from 1879-1934 
Event history analysis 
/ Archival 
Technological change does not necessarily favor technically advanced organizations; 
instead, mutualism plays a key role as long as technology is standardized.  
 
1990 Henderson & Clark NS-01 The semiconductor photolithographic 
alignment equipment industry 
Case study / Archival Architectural innovation destroys the usefulness of the architectural knowledge of 
established firms, and since architectural innovation is embedded in the structure and 
information-processing procedures of established organizations, this destruction is 
difficult for firms to recognize and hard to correct. 
1995 Wade NS-02 
NS-03 
20 communities / quarterly data from 
1971-1989 
Poisson 
event model / Survey / 
Archival 
The paper highlighted the importance of community-level framework in understanding 
the bandwagon phenomenon in industries characterized by network externalities and 
increasing returns. 
1996 Brynjolfsson & 
Kemerer 
NS-02 93 different product observations in 
commercial spreadsheet industry  from 
1987 to 1991  
Hedonic regression / 
Archival 
Network externalities significantly increase the price of spreadsheet products. Products 
adhering to the dominant standard commands prices which are higher.  
1996 Wade NS-03 35 firms / quarterly data from 1971-1989 Poisson 
regression/ Survey / 
Archival 
Microprocessors were likely to be introduced by first-time sponsors; and entry rate of 
later sponsors and supporters follows density-dependence model.  
1997 Mazzoleni NS-02 US and Japanese machine tool industry Descriptive stats/ 
Archival 
The diffusion of new technological designs is influenced by the path-dependence 
engendered by the learning processes. 
1999 Van den Ende &Kemp NS-01 
NS-02 
Digital computer industry  Case study/ Archival Digital computer regime is created through a process of transformation conceptualized as 
a regime shift: a change in rules that underpin technical change, which guides innovative 
activity and output into particular directions. 
2000 Gruber NS-03 Chip industry with four submarket data 
from 1984–1997 
Time-series analysis / 
Archival 
This paper looks at the role of product standards in determining the evolution of market 
structure in semiconductors. The paper suggests that product standards, along with 
learning-by-doing effects, lead to market concentration and persistence of leadership in 
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product innovation. 
2001 Lee and Lim NS-01 Selected industries in Korea, including 
the D-RAM, automobile, mobile phone, 
consumer electronics, personal computer, 
and machine tool industries 
Case study / Archival The process of technological catching-up is an outcome of a complex interplay of in-
house R&D, the government, the modes of technology transfer, market conditions, 
absorption capacity, and the nature of the technology or knowledge itself. A path-
following or skipping catching-up is more likely to happen largely by private initiatives 
in industries, whereas a path-creating catching-up is more likely to happen by public–
private collaboration. 
2002 Bekkers, et al. NS-02 
NS-03 
GSM in the global market Case study / Archival The timing of the emergence of strong network positions is linked to IPRs. The 
relationship between market power and IPRs and network centrality is positive with 
some notable exceptions. 
2002 Gallaugher and Wang NS-03 321 observations based on monthly data 
in Web server industry from August 1995 
- February 1997 
Hedonic pricing model 
/ Archival 
Market share is positively linked to price in network markets. A network market is two-
sided and firms may capture market share for one product and enjoy benefits in terms of 
both market share and price for the complement.  
2003 Frels, et al. NS-03 237 usable survey from the initial attempt 
to 3000 senior computing executives at 
large firms in the United States 
Structure equation 
model / Survey 
Network-based value is significantly and positively associated with the resources 
allocated by customers to competing products.  
2003 Takahashi & Namiki NS-02 
NS-03 
Personal computing industry since 1980s Case study / Archival This paper raises interrelated issues about innovation: (1) the path-dependent nature of 
innovation, especially that due to network externalities, (2) the balance between property 
rights and antitrust laws, and (3) the relevance of government intervention in these areas. 
2004 Funk NS-01 Mobile phone industry from 1981-1999 Case study / Archival Klepper’s model of the product life cycle theory in combination 
with the concept of product line management provides a better explanation for the 
evolution of competition in the mobile phone industry than the traditional product life 
cycle model. 
2006 Casadesus-Masanell 
&Ghemawat 
NS-02 Shipments of Linux versus Microsoft 
server OS in 45 countries in 2001 
Case study, OLS 
regression  / Archival 
Forward-looking buyers tip market outcomes toward Open Sources software and away 
from proprietary software. 
2006 Chakravarti & Xie NS-02 181 undergraduate students participated 
in a computer-based experiment 
Binomial logistic 
regression / 
Experiment 
Consumers are less likely to adopt a new product when there is ongoing standards 
competition. The impact of information about the relative performance of a product on 
consumers’ adoption decisions is stronger in markets with standards competition than in 
those without it. 
2006 Chen & Forman NS-02 22,000 establishments surveyed by  Harte 
Hanks Market Intelligence 
Multinomial Logit 
model / Survey 
The presence of switching costs can lead to inefficient adoption of new information 
technology and vendors may be able to influence the speed of technology adoption. 
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2006 Hanseth, et al. NS-01 
NS-02 
Field study (interviews, observations) 
from 1996 - 2001 
Case study 
/Interview/Observation 
Information system standards are a socio-technically complex issue which generates 
reflexive processes that undermine standardization aims. It is useful to bring in a 
theoretical interpretation of standardization complexity by using ideas from complexity 
theory and the theory of reflexive modernization. 
2006 Baldwin, et al. NS-01 NA Simulation The paper illustrates the path of how user innovations are transformed into commercial 
products. 
2006 Lecocq and Demil NS-03 193 active U.S. companies in RPG sector 
between the 2-year periods of 1998–99 
and 2000–01 
ANOVA / Archival The introduction of an open system in a low-tech industry increases the number of new 
entrants into that industry. In a low-tech industry, new entrants adopt an open system 
more readily than incumbents. The introduction and diffusion of an open system into a 
low-tech industry is followed by a decrease in the average size of firms in that industry. 
2006 Lee et al NS-01 
NS-03 
NA Simulation 
/Experiment 
The validity of winner-take-all hypothesis depends on how customers interact with one 
another (e.g., if they exchange advice or files). In some interaction networks, customers 
influenced by their acquaintances may adopt a lagging technology even when a lead 
technology has built a large installed’ base. The presence of such a local bias facilitates 
the persistence of incompatibilities. When local bias cannot be sustained in other 
interaction networks, one technology corners the market. Overemphasizing the installed 
base, while ignoring network structure, could mislead practitioners. 
2006 Nickerson & Muehlen NS-01  505 participants in standard-making 
activities across nine standard 
institutions, 63 meetings and 22 
standards-related publications in Web 
Services Choreography 
Case study, link 
analysis / Archival 
An ecological approach will apply to inventions that have been incubated, such as the 
Internet. Changes to institutional Internet governance, particularly to the bylaws of 
standards bodies, can have drastic and unintended effects that will reshape the standard-
making ecology 
2006 Srinivasan, et al. NS-02 63 office products and consumer durables 
from different sources: articles published 
in scholarly journals, books, and online 
business databases 
Split-population 
hazard model / 
Archival 
A dominant design is more likely to emerge with weak appropriability, weak network 
effects, low product radicalness, and high research-and-development intensity; Dominant 
designs that emerge are likely to emerge sooner in product categories in which there is 
weak appropriability, there are a large number of firms in the value net, the standards are 
set by a de facto process, and there is low product radicalness. 
2006 Weitzel, et al. NS-02 NA Simulation  Network topology and density have a strong impact on standard diffusion and that the 
tendency toward monopoly in such market occurs less frequently than expected. 
2007 Stremersch, et al. NS-02 Consumer electronics in different 
historical time periods (1946-2005) 
Takeoff analysis, time 
series analysis / 
Archival 
Indirect network effects are often weaker than expected from prior literature. In most 
markets examined, hardware sales “lead” software availability, whereas the reverse 
almost never happens, contrary to existing beliefs. 
2007 Terlaak and King NS-03 13,710 U.S. manufacturing facilities from 
178 industries adopting  ISO 9000 from 
1988 to 1999  
Logistic regression / 
Archival 
When the value of adoption increases with organizational size, smaller adopters have 
such disproportionate influence because they allow observers to infer that adoption will 
be profitable for their own organization. Alternative information sources moderate the 
influence of smaller adopters. 
169 
 
2007 Theoharakis, et al. NS-02 10,412 LAN related market stories for 
the period 1981–2000 
Event history analysis 
/ Archival 
Technology and product availability have differential effects on the adoption of 
competing standards. The significance of these effects depends on the technology’s order 
of entry. High-tech product managers should make strategic use of market-level 
information by appropriately focusing the content of their communications. 
2008 Peine NS-01 
NS-02 
Smart Home systems Case study  Technology systems may involve distinct paradigms that jointly shape the innovation 
process, creating challenges for the coordination of innovation.  
 
System Structural View     
1975 Utterback & Abernathy SS-01 Five industries, 120 firms, 567 
innovations / data provided by the study 
of Myers and Marquis (1967) 
Frequency table / 
Archival 
The pattern of innovation within a firm changes systematically from product to process 
innovation, as predetermined by technological cycle. 
1995 Suarez &Utterback SS-01 All firms from automobile, typewriter, 
transistor, calculator, television and 
picture tube industries in different time 
periods 
Event history analysis 
/ Archival 
The paper provided evidence that early entry before a dominant design is associated with 
higher chance for survival.  
1998 Christensen, et al. SS-01 
SS-02 
Every firm who introduced disk drive 
worldwide 1976 - 1979 
Event history analysis 
/ Archival / Interviews 
First mover advantage is not important in the rigid disk industry; instead, the entry-
window tied to the emergence of dominant design is crucial for firm survival. 
1999 Tegarden, et al. SS-01 
SS-02 
463 PC manufacturers from 1975-1991 Event history analysis 
/ Archival 
Firms are not doomed even if they choose the wrong design initially. For both earlier and 
later entrants, switching to dominant design increases their survival. 
2001 Afuah SS-02 81 RISC computer workstation projects 
by 25 workstation makers between 1986 
and 1993 
Panel Random-
Effects/ Archival 
Following a competence-destroying technological change, firms vertically integrated to 
new technology will perform better than those that are not. Firms vertically integrated 
into the old technology will perform worse than those that had not been. 
2004 Srinivasan, et al. SS-02 
SS-03 
45 office products and consumer durables 
introduced after the second World War 
(time period over 50 years) 
Event history analysis 
/ Archival 
Network externalities have a negative main effect on the survival duration of pioneers; 
however, for more radical products and for technologically intense products, increases in 
network externalities are associated with increased survival duration. In addition, the 
larger the pioneer, the more network externalities increase its survival duration, whereas 
incumbent pioneers experience a decrease in survival duration compared with non- 
incumbents. 
2004 Venkatraman &Lee SS-02 
SS-03 
2,815 releases (links) in 96 months from 
1995 through December 2002 
Multinomial 
Logit models / 
Archival 
The developers’ choices to launch games for particular game consoles depend on 
network structure (density overlap and embeddedness) and technology characteristics of 
a platform (dominance and newness). 
2005 Kauffman & Li SS-02 Firm-level decision-making simulation 
for technology adoption 
Simulation / 
Experiment  
A technology adopter should defer its investment until one technology’s probability to 
win out in the marketplace and achieve critical mass reaches a critical threshold.  
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2006 Zhu, et al. SS-03 1,394 respondents from a large-scale 
international survey conducted in 10 
economies during February, March, and 
April, 2002. 
Structural equation 
modeling / Survey 
There are significant impacts of network effects on open-standard IOS adoption. 
Adoption costs are a significant barrier to open standard IOS adoption, but EDI users and 
nonusers treat this very differently: EDI users are much more sensitive to the costs of 
switching to the new standard. 
2006 Bonaccorsi, et al. SS-02 146 Italian software firms Logit model / Survey Firms tend to follow a hybrid business model in the face of open source. However, the 
stability of the hybrid models depends on the evolution of the industry.  
Strategic Choice View     
1992 Cusumano, et al. SC-02 
SC-03 
Video Cassette recording industry / two 
competing firms 
Historical analysis / 
Archival 
The success of VHS (Video Home System), introduced in 1976 by the Victor Company 
of Japan (Japan Victor or JVC), demonstrates how a firm may successfully diffuse and 
standardize its technological in the presence of a powerful rival — in this case, the 
Betamax, introduced in 1975 by the Sony Corporation.Despite being first to the home 
market, the Beta format fell behind the VHS in market share during 1978 and declined 
thereafter. This mass consumer market with network effects took years to unfold and was 
largely shaped by the strategic maneuvering of the VHS producers. 
1993 Garud 
&Kumaraswamy 
SC-02 Work station industry / Sun 
Microsystems 
Historical analysis / 
Archival 
Firms’ choices of complementary products, compatibility between products, and access 
to technical knowledge are key issues to establish standards.  
1994 Khazam & Mowery SC-02 Microprocessor industry / several 
computer manufacturers 
Historical analysis / 
Archival 
The history of RISC suggests that firms can pursue strategies that aid in the 
establishment of their products as dominant designs. In the case of RISC, licensing has 
assumed particular significance because of the important complementarities between 
hardware and applications software, which results in network externalities. 
2001 Hargadon and Douglas SC-01 
SC-02 
Edison’s introduction of electric lighting Historical case study / 
Archival 
Robust design explains how Edison’s organization gained acceptance for an innovation 
that would ultimately displace the existing institutions of the gas industry. Electric 
lighting systems gained recognition, at least in part because they were framed early on in 
familiar terms that called to mind existing gas lights. 
2002 Gallagher and Park SC-01 
SC-02 
U.S. home video game industry since 
1976 - 2002 
Historical analysis / 
Archival 
The paper confirms the value of traditional strategic management in a network based 
industry, such as technological innovation, building entry barriers, protecting firm-
specific assets, in winning network-based competition. 
2002 Garud, et al. SC-01 
SC-02 
Sun Microsystems’ Java Case study / Archival Firms may use institutional entrepreneurship to establish technology standards. 
Standardization is an institutionalization process that is inherently unstable and 
politicized. 
2002 Schilling SC-02 
SC-03 
89 cases from 14 product 
categories 
Logistic regression / 
Archival / Survey / 
Interview 
Besides installed base and the availability of complementary goods, a firm's learning 
orientation and timing of entry also play significant roles in achieving technological 
success. 
2002 Stremersch and Tellis* SC-02 NA NA There are several types of bundling firms can use to generate competitive advantage and 
performance. However, the effectiveness of this strategy depends on market conditions.  
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2003 Funk SC-02 NTT Docomo and its four phone 
suppliers in Japanese cellular phone 
market from 1993 and 1997 
Case study / Archival / 
Interview  
NTT Docomo and its suppliers heavily influenced the resulting dominant design through 
their information advantages. However, installed base does not appear to play the same 
role in the determination of dominant designs (at least in this case) as it does in standards.  
2003 Soh & Roberts SC-02 150 firms and 319 alliances in the US 
data communications industry from 1985 
to 1996 
Network analysis / 
Archival 
 During eras of incremental change, if established firms with peripheral subsystems are 
able to adopt early new technologies with implication for compatibility, they may 
become more central in the technology collaboration network.  
2004 Windrum SC-02 The browser wars (1995-1999) Case study / Archival Cross-product externalities played an important role in determining the final outcome, 
namely, the winner of the browser wars (technology standard). 
2006 Warner, et al. SC-02 
SC-03 
163 acquisitions in IT Industry from 
1995-2000 
Logit model / Archival Firms competing in standardizing markets may choose the acquisition timing to obtain 
technical knowledge and thus to keep growth option open. 
2008 Clymer and Asaba SC-02 
SC-03 
Seven “dominant design manufacturers” 
in the consumer ink-jet printer market 
OLS regression / 
Archival 
Dominant design can occur at the firm level and can be quantitatively represented by the 
number of ink-jet patents in nine categories of a matrix that distinguishes patents 
according to method of implementation and type of module. Further, we find that annual 
firm ink-jet revenue from 1990 through 2000 is positively correlated with a balanced 
dispersion of patents across the nine categories. Results suggest that higher revenues will 
accrue to firms in integrated industries when resources are balanced among important 
sub-technologies in the dominant design. 
Collective Action View     
1994 Cottrell CA-01 US and Japanese microcomputer markets Case study/ Archival Public policy efforts to address problems that arise from multiple standards have proven 
less successful in the minicomputer software industry. A comparison of the US versus 
Japanese microcomputer software industries suggests that while Japanese firms may lag 
in the near term, the problems posed by multiple standards may well aid in the long-term 
adaptability and performance of the Japanese industry. In contrast, the US industry, while 
firms may benefit from the existence of a single dominant standard, the industry has 
evidenced difficulty moving to new standards. 
1995 Axelrod, et al. CA-03 Nine firms developing Unix workstations ANOVA / Archival Firms may balance the conflict between enjoying the benefits of standardization and 
incurring the problems of associating with close competitors. 
1995 Kogut, et al. CA-01 
CA-02 
126 start-ups from semiconductor 
industries from 1977 and 1989 
Poisson regression/ 
Archival 
Higher density of cooperation in the subfield should lead to more start-up entrants in the 
subsequent time period. In addition, the more centralized is the subfield network, the 
more start-ups should enter the subfield in the subsequent time period.  
2001 Funk and Methe CA-01 9 Japanese, 3 US, 6 European firms in 
mobile communication industry in Japan, 
US and Europe 
Multiple case studies / 
Interviews  
Governments can influence the installed base for systems in the mobile and 
communication industry. The choice of a single standard increases the forecast for the 
standard's domestic installed base, causing other countries to adopt the same standard.  
2001 Hagedoorn, et al. CA-02 IBM and Apple alliances from 1980–
1996 
Case study / Archival / 
Interview 
Technology partnering between proponents of competing basic designs can only 
materialize several years after the DOS-based design of IBM and Microsoft had become 
dominant. 
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2003 Bonaccorsi & Rossi CA-02 
CA-03 
A simulated population of heterogeneous 
interacting agents in software industry 
Simulation Open Source systems diffused in environments dominated by proprietary standards. The 
movement took off through the activity of a community that did not follow profit 
motivations. A hierarchical co-ordination emerged without proprietary rights.   
2006 Markus, et al. CA-01 
CA-02 
VIS standardization in the U.S. 
residential mortgage industry 
Case study / 
Interviews / 
Observation 
VIS standardization involves two linked collective action dilemmas — standards 
development and standards diffusion — with different characteristics, such that a 
solution to the first may fail to resolve the second. Successful VIS standards consortia 
must encompass heterogeneous groups of user organizations and IT vendors without 
fragmenting. Some tactics successfully can be used to solve the collective action 
dilemma of VIS standardization — e.g., governance mechanisms and policies about 
intellectual property protection.  
2004 Blind &Thumm CA-01 149 European companies, survey data 
derived from the study ‘Interaction of 
standardization and 
intellectual property rights’  
Regression / Factor 
analysis / Survey 
This paper analyses the relationship between strategies to protect intellectual property 
rights and their impact on the likelihood of joining formal standardization processes. 
Companies at the leading edge are often in such a strong position that they do not need 
the support of standards to market their products. The results suggest that the higher the 
patent intensities of companies, the lower is their tendency to join standardization 
processes. 
2009 Sillanpää and 
Laamanen 
CA-03 Television broadcasting technology in 
U.K. 
Case study / Archival / 
Interview 
By building on an analysis of the digital television launch in the United Kingdom, this 
paper suggests that network externalities intensify competition and cause strong negative 
feedback effects to emerge. Actions aimed at improving one’s position are systematically 
imitated and pre-emptied. Pressure builds up in the business system, and only when the 
weakest firms exit, the positive feedback effects are unleashed in their full magnitude. 
The findings contribute to an improved understanding of institutional dynamics in new 
technology introduction. 
2009 Soh CA-01 49 firms that competed for two 
technology standards in the U.S. local 
area network industry from 1989 to 
1996 
Negative binomial 
regression / Archival 
Firms can benefit from maneuvering through alliance networks 
that consist of partners and rivals that prefer a competing standard. Central firms with 
high ego network density, coupled with a strategic intent to acquire and share knowledge 
broadly within the technological community, achieve better innovation performance 
Studies Based in Multiple Views   
1993 Utterback & Suarez  NS-03 
SS-01 
Firms from automobile, typewriter, 
transistor, calculator, television and 
picture tube industries from at different 
time periods 
Descriptive stats/ 
Archival 
Driving forces based on technological change determine the form and level of 
competition, the attractiveness of entry and ultimately the structure of an industry. The 
life chance of organizations in technology industries depends on their ability of 
adaptation.  
1996 Kim and Kogut SS-01 
SC-03 
180 startup firms founded between 
1977 and 1989 in semiconductor industry 
Regression / Archival The pattern of diversification of firms reflects the evolutionary branching of underlying 
technologies. A firm with experience in a platform technology is more likely to diversify 
into the exploration and generation of new markets than a firm that has developed 
narrowly based skills. However, the pattern and timing of entry into a subfield are related 
positively to the growth of the market. 
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2003 West SC-02 
CA-02 
Apple Computer, IBM and Sun 
Microsystems, computer industry 
Case study / Archival Proprietary platforms may use hybrid strategies to generate competitive advantage in 
standardization processes. Platforms may explore advantages of open source strategy but 
at the same time control the technology to remain differentiation. The effectiveness of 
this strategy, however, depends on the industrial conditions. 
2009 Waguespack and 
Fleming 
SC-02 
CA-01 
1,141 US venture-backed start-ups in 
Internet communications / data 
communications industries 
Even history analysis / 
Survey / Interview / 
Archival 
A start-up’s participation in open source standards might increase its chances of a 
liquidity event (IPO) in four ways: gaining endorsement of the startup’s technology 
standard, openly developing the startup’s technology within the community, attending 
physical meetings of the community, and having startup members elected to leadership 
positions. Examination of venture-funded startups in the networking/ data 
communications industry sectors reveals that those startups that participate in an open 
standards community have a greater likelihood of an initial public offering or acquisition. 
*We considered this paper as empirical because it offers descriptive statistics. 
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